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SUMMARY 
The impact of political and economic events on the asset pricing model described by the 
arbitrage pricing theory (APTM) was examined in order to establish if they had caused any 
changes in its specification. It was concluded that the APTM is not stationary and that it must 
be continuously tested before it can be used as political and economic events can change its 
specification. It was also found that political events had a more direct effect on the 
specification of the APTM, in that their effect is more immediate, than did economic events, 
which influenced the APTM by first influencing the economic environment in which it 
operated. 
The conventional approach that would have evaluated important political and economic 
events, case by case, to determine whether they affected the linear factor model (LFM), and 
subsequently the APTM, could not be used since no correlation was found between the 
pricing of a risk factor in the LFM and its subsequent pricing in the APTM. A new approach 
was then followed in which a correlation with a political or economic event was sought 
whenever a change was detected in the specification of the APTM. This was achieved by first 
finding the best subset LFM, chosen for producing the highest adjusted R2, month by month, 
over 87 periods from 20 October1991 to 21 June 1998, using a combination of nine 
prespecified risk factors (five of which were proxies for economic events and one for 
political events). Multivariate analysis techniques were then used to establish which risk 
factors were priced most often during the three equal subperiods into which the 87 periods 
were broken up. 
Using the above methodology, the researcher was able to conclude that political events 
changed the specification of the APTM in late 1991. After the national elections in April 
1994 it was found that the acceptance of South Africa into the world economic community 
had again changed the specification of the APTM and the two most important factors were 
proxies for economic events. 
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CHAPTERl 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This thesis studies the impact of political and economic events on the specification of the 
nonlinear multifactor asset pricing model, described by the arbitrage pricing theory, for the 
financial and industrial sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange before and during South 
Africa's transition to normality (1988-1998) which was heralded by the unbanning of the 
African National Congress and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. 
1.2 THE SUBPROBLEMS 
The first subproblem is to establish whether the impact of political and economic events 
changed the specification of the linear factor model described by the arbitrage pricing theory 
for the financial and industrial sector of the JSE, during the period from 1988 to 1998. 
The second subproblem is to confirm that any change in the specification of the linear factor 
model is translated into a change in the specification of the nonlinear asset pricing model, 
described by the arbitrage pricing theory. 
1.3 THE HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis is that a different set of financial and macroeconomic variables will be 
specified in the linear factor model, assumed by the arbitrage pricing theory, for the period 
before and after a regime switch caused by an economic or political event (events). 
The second hypothesis is that any change in specification of the linear factor model will be 
translated into a change in the specification of the nonlinear asset pricing model, described 
by the arbitrage pricing theory. 
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1.4 THE DELIMITATIONS 
The thesis will not attempt to explain the impact of every single political and economic event 
on the APTM, for reasons provided in chapter 4. 
The thesis will be limited to the financial and industrial sector of the JSE and will not include 
the mining and related sectors. Substantiation for this decision will be given in chapter 2. 
Testing of the possible changes in the specification of the arbitrage pricing theory model will 
be confined to the use of the method where prespecified financial and macroeconomic 
variables are used. This method was chosen for reasons outlined in chapter 2. 
1.5 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
• Arbitrage pricing theory. This is a theory of asset pricing introduced by Ross (1976) 
which describes asset pricing in the absence of arbitrage opportunities. 
• Arbitrage pricing theory model. This is a multifactor nonlinear asset pricing model 
which encompasses the restrictions imposed by the arbitrage pricing theory on the linear 
factor model. 
• Asset pricing model. An asset pricing model is an economic model which fashions the 
relationship between an asset and the underlying variables that influence its value. 
• Capital asset pricing model. This asset pricing model was developed by Sharpe, Lintner 
and Black and explains the return of an asset as a linear function of its covariance with 
the market portfolio. 
• Efficient market. An efficient market is one in which share prices adjust rapidly to the 
infusion of new information and in which current share prices fully reflect all available 
information, including the risk involved. 
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• Efficient portfolio. This refers to portfolios in which it is not possible either to obtain a 
greater expected return without incurring greater risk, or to reduce the risk without 
decreasing the expected return. 
• Endogenous variables. These are variables which form an inherent part of the system. 
• Exogenous variables. These are variables which impinge on the system from the outside. 
• Linear factor model. This is a model of a return-generating process where asset returns 
are represented in terms of their sensitivities to a certain number of factors. 
• Market portfolio. This is the efficient portfolio which represents all assets to which risk 
is attached. 
• Regime switch. This refers to a change in the specification of an asset pricing model. 
• Static capital asset pricing model. This refers to the specific situation in which the 
asset's covariance with the market portfolio is treated as constant over time. 
1.6 ABBREVIATIONS 
2SLS: two-stage least square 
3SLS: three-stage least square 
ANC: the African National Congress 
APT: arbitrage pricing theory 
APTM: the arbitrage pricing theory model 
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ASI: the all-share index 
EMR: excess returns on the market portfolio 
F & I index: the financial and industrial index 
I-NET: Intelligent Network (Pty) Ltd 
IFP: lnkatha Freedom Party 
ITNLSUR: iterated nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression 
JSE: the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
LFM: Linear Factor Model 
MPT: modem portfolio theory 
MRA: multiple regression analysis 
NP: National Party 
NYSE: New York Stock Exchange 
OLS: ordinary least squares 
PAC: Pan African Congress 
SA COB: South African Chamber of Commerce 
SUR: seemingly unrelated regression 
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1. 7 ASSUMPTIONS 
The first assumption is that the conditions necessary for testing the validity of the APTM on 
the JSE are in place. These assumptions can be found in chapter 2. 
The second assumption is that the data downloaded from the I-NET are free of any errors. 
1.8 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Certain world trends have brought about a tremendous increase in the amount of money 
invested by the South African public on the Stock Exchange. Numerous investment schemes, 
such as options, warrants, smaller companies unit trusts, international unit trusts, mining and 
resources unit trusts, gold unit trusts, financial unit trusts, financial and industrial unit trusts 
and general equities unit trusts have made this possible. This has accentuated the relevance of 
any economic theory that could explain the relationship between risk and reward. Such a 
theory is known as the modem portfolio theory. The arbitrage pricing theory model is 
perhaps one of the most vital components of this body of knowledge. 
The unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela on 11February1990 can be 
regarded as one of the most important milestones in the history of South Africa. It led to 
significant economic changes, such as the falling away of economic constraints relating to 
trade, investments and the movement of capital. Another consequence has been an increase 
in liquidity on the JSE. Studies have shown that the predictive power of economic factors 
over stock returns changes over time and tends to vary with the volatility of returns. It could 
therefore reasonably be expected that the specification of asset pricing models applicable on 
the JSE would change. The confirmation of any regime switch and the gaining of any 
knowledge on the nature of the mechanism of this regime switch form a major part of this 
thesis. 
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The identification of any structural changes in asset pricing models and the timing of these 
changes are economically important. A change in the structure of an asset pricing model will 
change the estimates of expected stock returns. This will affect 
( 1) the selection of portfolios 
(2) the evaluation of portfolio performance 
(3) the measurement of abnormal returns in event studies 
( 4) the estimation of the cost of capital 
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CHAPTER2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of stock exchanges in Western countries, such as the Netherlands and the 
USA, was a result of the need to finance trading ventures. The need to finance these trading 
ventures by the Dutch led to the formation of the NYSE in 1692, just as the need to finance 
the emerging gold mining industry on the Witwatersrand led to the formation of the JSE in 
1887, by one Benjamin Woollman. 
For the most of its existence the JSE has been associated with the image of a rough mining 
town and the belief is held by many that investing on the JSE is best left to people who enjoy 
gambling. In fact Hofmeyer (1988:32) claims that the public who invested in unit trusts 
during the period 1970 to 1986 barely managed to break even on their inflation-adjusted 
capital. This dismal performance, coupled with cases of blatant insider trading, and the 
flotation of companies in the mining sector that can at best be described as speculative, lent 
considerable credence to the attitude described above. 
Very little research on asset pricing models on the JSE has been published - only 34 papers 
had been published by the end of 1997 (Sandler & Firer 1998:55). 
The biggest breakthrough in understanding the relationship between risk and reward in 
buying and holding a security (share) in the USA occurred in the 1950s when Markowitz 
introduced a theory which provided rigorous mathematical justification for the time-
honoured investment maxim that diversification is a sensible strategy for individuals who 
like to reduce their risks. This theory opened a whole new field of study called the modem 
portfolio theory (MPT). Although the most prominent asset pricing model devised in this 
field is the Sharp-Lintner-Black capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the arbitrage pricing 
theory model (APTM) makes fewer restrictive assumptions. 
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2.2 THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
Sharpe (1964) and others focused directly on the part of a security's risk that can be 
eliminated by diversification and the part that cannot. The systematic risk related to the 
market risk cannot be eliminated by diversification, whereas the unsystematic risk relating to 
factors peculiar to an individual security can be eliminated by diversification. Hence the 
CAPM asserts that every asset must be compensated only according to its systematic risk, 
which is defined as the covariability of the asset with the market portfolio. 
The CAPM assumes that investors are concerned only with portfolio risk and expected 
returns, and concludes that the expected return on a security is linearly related to the returns 
on the market in the following way: 
where: the expected return on security i 
the expected return on the market 
Rr the risk-free rate (usually the treasury bill rate) 
bi 
The testability of the CAPM is compromised over the issue of the market portfolio. Roll 
(1977) argued that no portfolio adequately represents all risky assets in the market portfolio. 
The market portfolio is thus unobserved and a test of the CAPM using ex post data is 
ambiguous - it results only in testing the efficiency of a proxy portfolio used in lieu of the 
market portfolio in estimating the systematic risk. 
Studies that have empirically examined the performance of the static version of the CAPM in 
explaining the cross-section of realised average returns support the view that it is possible to 
construct a set of portfolios with which the static CAPM is unable to explain the cross-
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sectional variation in average returns among the different portfolios. In particular, portfolios 
containing stocks with relatively small capitalisation appear to earn higher returns on average 
than those predicted by the CAPM (Reinganum1981). 
In their widely cited study, Fama and French (1992) provided evidence suggesting that the 
inability of the static CAPM to explain the cross-section of average returns that has been 
reported in the literature may be economically important. Using return data on a large 
collection of assets, they examined the static version of the CAPM and found that the 
"relation between market beta and average return is flat". Instead they found that the 
structure of returns is effectively predicted by price-book value (P/BV) ratios and size. They 
interpreted the P/BV and size variables as proxies for risk. 
2.3 THE ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY 
The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) introduced by Ross (1976) provides another model for 
explaining the relationship between return and risk. The APT, like the CAPM, asserts that 
every asset must be compensated only according to its systematic risk. But unlike the CAPM, 
where the systematic risk of an asset is defined as the covariability of the asset with the 
market portfolio, in the APTM, the systematic risks are defined as the covariability with not 
only one factor, but also possibly with several economic factors. 
2.3.1 The linear factor model 
The APTM is based on the assumptions that 
(1) Markets are perfectly competitive and frictionless. 
(2) Investors are risk-averse wealth maximisers. 
(3) Individuals homogeneously believe that the random returns for the set of n securities 
under consideration are generated by a k-factor process of the form: 
where: 
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K 
Rit = E(Rit) + .I:bikfkt + Eit 
k=l 
= 
bik = 
actual returns earned by asset i in time period t, 
where i = 1,2 . . . n and t = 1,2 . . . T 
the expected rate of return of asset i for period t at 
the beginning of period t 
kth risk factor that impacts on asset i's returns, 
where k = 1,2 ... K. All risk factors have a mathematical 
expectation of zero, that is E(f1ct) = 0 
a coefficient that measures the sensitivity of Rit to 
movements in the common factor f1ct 
a stochastic error term specific to asset i in period t 
which measures unexplained residual return where 
E( Eit) = 0; E( Eit Ejt) = 0 for all i = j and E( Eit f1ct) = 0 
(Ross 1976:342) 
Elaborating on assumption 3 helps us to understand the intuitions underlying the theory. 
(2.1) 
The return of a traded security can be subdivided into two parts. The first part is the 
expected return, E(Ri1), which shareholders anticipate (expect). The second part (Uit) is the 
part which is unexpected. The ex post return of the security can thus be written as follows: 
(2. la) 
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If we allow for the unexpected part of the return to be broken down into its undiversifiable 
(unsystematic) component and diversifiable (systematic) component, we can express 2.la as 
follows: 
= 
where: 
(2.lb) 
the (unexpected) returns of asset i generated in period t as a result 
of systematic risk factors 
the (unexpected) returns of asset i in period t as a result of 
unsystematic risk factors 
A particular security may have a sensitivity to a number of factors such as interest rates, the 
ability of its managing director, and its relationship with the trade unions. However, an 
investor holding a diversified share portfolio need only be concerned about a limited number 
of factors. These are the factors that cannot be diversified away, and for which he or she 
requires a premium in order to bear the risk. 
Thus the systematic portion of the share's unexpected returns can be decomposed into a 
cumulative contribution of a limited number of significant factors: 
where: 
K 
Lbikfkt 
k=l 
the kth risk factor that impacts on assets' or portfolio 
returns, 
where k = 1,2 ...... Kand E(f1ct) = 0 
(2.lc) 
a coefficient that measures the sensitivity ofRit to a unit 
movement in f1ct ceteris paribus 
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Substituting 2. lc into 2. lb allows an asset's ex post returns to be expressed as the linear 
model mentioned above: 
K 
Rit = E(Rit) + ~bikfkt + Eit 
k=l 
(2.1) 
This equation 1s a return-generating process underlying equity returns and is void of 
economic theory. Note that this equation is not an equilibrium pricing relationship because 
no restrictions are placed on the constant (representing E(Rit)) of this model. This allows two 
assets with identical sensitivities (bik:s) to have differing expected returns (Sharpe 1984:23). 
The factors ( fkt) in the LFM underlying the APT must be unexpected and systematic. 
Although the identification of priced multifactor asset pricing regressors is essentially an 
empirical issue, the theory does provide certain guidelines on the characteristics that these 
regressors should possess. 
Berry, Burmeister and McElroy (1988:29) state the following: 
Economic variables that are legitimate risk factors must possess three important 
properties: 
( 1) At the beginning of every period, the factor must be completely unpredictable to 
the market. 
(2) Each APT factor must have a pervasive influence on stock returns. 
(3) Relevant factors must influence expected return~ i.e. they must have non-zero 
pnces. 
According to Van Rensburg (1995:47): 
In accordance with property 1, the APT factors constitute unexpected movements in 
certain economic variables. As a result expected movements in the macroeconomic 
variables have to be determined using either statistical techniques or economic 
arguments. Property 2 implies that only variables that have a non-diversifiable or 
"systematic" influence will be priced. Thus, it follows that candidate factors should 
comprise macro-economic variables and not firm-specific characteristics such as 
financial ratios. 
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Alexander, Sharpe and Bailey (1993:252-253) also described the nature of the factors as 
follows: 
Three primary criteria influence the choice of factors. Most importantly, selected 
factors should demonstrate a significant impact on many securities 1 ... 
Second, selected factors should possess theoretical justification. Including factors 
based solely on past statistical relationships with security prices is a dangerous 
game. These relationships may simply be coincidental and may not persist in 
future ... 
Finally, factors should be selected for which timely, accurate data are readily 
available. For example, the spread between high and low quality bond yields (a 
measure of investor risk aversion and default risk) is widely and accurately reported. 
Conversely, even though one might believe that changes in the personal savings rate 
have a significant impact on share prices, such information is notoriously inaccurate 
and undergoes constant revisions. 
Alexander et al ( 1993) have established that the APT factors are unexpected movements in 
certain macroeconomic variables. 
Van Rensburg ( 1996) selected the following factors for his study: unexpected movements in: 
(1) the (dollar) returns on the Dow-Jones index, (2) inflation expectations, (3) the gold 
price (in rand), ( 4) the term structure of interest rates, and ( 5) the "residual market factor" 
of Burmeister and Wall (1986). 
Van Rensburg (1996:106) reported the following: 
The macroeconomic variables used as candidate factors in this study do not exhaust 
all of the variables that meet these a priori criteria. In unreported tests the all share 
index was regressed on the following variables: 
Unexpected movements in 
1. inflation (percentage changes in the CPI) 
2. the growth rate of manufacturing production 
3. the growth rate of retail sales 
4. the growth rate of the money supply (M3) 
5. the rand/dollar exchange rate 
6. the growth rate of building plans passed 
7. (percentage changes in) the rand gold price 
8. dollar returns on the Dow-Jones industrial index 
9. inflation expectations 
10. the term structure of interest rates 
1 This is equivalent to property 2 above. 
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In only the last four cases was a significant (contemporaneous) relationship found. 
Thus, invoking the a posteriori criterion that the factors should demonstrate a 
"pervasive" impact on securities, only these candidate factors were selected to 
proceed to the next level of testing. 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Burmeister and Wall (1986) suggest a broad outline 
regarding which macroeconomic variables' unexpected movements are likely to be priced. 
They take as their starting point the following basic share valuation formula : 
where: Pit 
E 
r 
00 
Pit= ~ E(CFi.J 
t=o (1 + r)1 
= 
the price of stock i at time t 
the expectations operator given information at time t 
the cash flows (dividends or capital gains) accruing to 
shareholders of asset i at time t 
the appropriate discount rate 
(2.2) 
In effect, the price of a share is equal to the net present value (NPV) of all expected cash 
flows accruing to the shareholder by virtue of his or her ownership of this asset. Referring to 
the valuation model above, it can be argued that any macroeconomic variable that affects 
either the numerator or the denominator of this equation will influence returns. 
However, since the cash flow expectations also depend on the business cycle, an approach 
where business cycle variables such as earnings and dividend yield are considered, m 
addition to macroeconomic variables, should be adopted when selecting candidate factors. 
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2.3.2 The arbitrage pricing theory model 
The central intuition of the APT is that all portfolios that satisfy the conditions of 
(1) using no wealth and 
(2) involving no risk 
must earn no return on average. 
Portfolios that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) are termed "arbitrage portfolios". To form an 
arbitrage portfolio that requires no change in wealth, the usual course of action would be to 
sell some assets and then use the proceeds to buy others. This can be represented 
mathematically as follows: 
n 
0 (2.2a) 
i=l 
where 
w 1 the market value weighting of asset i 
To obtain a risk-free arbitrage portfolio one has to eliminate both diversifiable (ie 
unsystematic or idiosyncratic) and undiversifiable (ie systematic) risk. This can be done by 
meeting three conditions: 
(1) selecting percentage changes in investment ratios, Wi ,that are small 
(2) diversifying across a large number of assets 
(3) choosing changes, wi, in such a way that for each factor, k, the weighted sum of 
systematic risk components, ~,is zero. This condition can be more formally stated as: 
K 
0 (2.2b) 
k=l 
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Finally, the no positive expected returns condition can be stated as: 
n 
0 (2.2c) 
i=l 
Equations 2.2a, 2.2b and 2.2c are really statements in linear algebra. Any vector that is 
orthogonal to the constant vector, that is, 
0, 
and to each of the coefficient vectors, that is 
K 
0 for each k, 
k=l 
must also be orthogonal to the vector of expected returns, that is, 
n 
0, 
i=l 
An algebraic consequence of this statement is that the expected return vector must be a linear 
combination of the constant vector and the coefficient vectors. Algebraically, there must 
exist a set ofk + 1 coefficients, A.1 , A 2 , ••••• , Ak such that 
+ (2.3) 
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A natural interpretation of this equation is that Aot = the return on a risk-free asset (Rit) 
typically proxied by the three-month treasury bill. Substituting the expression for E(Rit) from 
the fundamental APT pricing relation (equation 2.3) into the linear factor model (equation 
2.1) we obtain what Berry et al (1988:31) call the "full APT". 
+ + (2.4) 
k=l k=l 
When compared to equation 2.1, it can be seen that restrictions have been placed on the 
intercept term of the linear factor model. These restrictions embody, and indeed are a direct 
algebraic consequence of, the no-arbitrage conditions. 
2.3.3 Significant prior research done overseas 
The APT has been studied empirically for close on two decades. Estimation methods for 
factors and factor loading remain a focus of research. The principal hypothesis of the model 
is that expected returns should be linearly related to the weights of the common factors in the 
assumed linear process. In every factor analysis test of the model the focus has been to use 
factor analysis to extract K factors from sample covariance matrices and then to test the 
hypothesis by regressing returns or average returns against the factor loading of the common 
factors. 
Roll and Ross (1980) wrote what has become the classic article on testing the arbitrage 
pricing theory. Using data for individual equities during the 1962 to 1972 period, at least 
three and probably four factors are found in the generating process of returns. Roll and Ross 
(1980) used maximum likelihood factor analysis to estimate both the number of factors 
generating returns and the factor loadings. 
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In their critique on the empirical test described above, Dhrymes, Friend and Gultekin (1984) 
showed that there is a general nonequivalence between factor-analysing small groups of 
securities and factor-analysing groups of securities sufficiently large for the APT to hold. As 
one increases the number of securities to which the factor-analytic procedures are applied, 
the number of factors "discovered" increases and this result cannot be readily explained by a 
distinction between "priced2" and "nonpriced" risk factors. 
In view of this criticism, the focus of the research has shifted to different multivariate 
analysis techniques (principal components, "mimicking portfolios" regression analysis, semi-
autoregression approach), as well as to another approach suggested by papers by Chan, Chen 
and Hsieh (1985), Chen et al (1986) and Burmeister and McElroy (1988), which used 
macroeconomic factors such as unexpected inflation to explain asset prices in an APTM or 
multifactor model. The primary advantages of using measured economic factors are the 
following: 
( 1) In principle the factors and their APTM prices can be given economic interpretations, 
while in a factor-analysis approach one does not know what factors are being priced. 
(2) Rather than using only asset prices to explain asset prices, measured macroeconomic 
factors introduce additional information, linking asset-price behaviour to 
macroeconomic events. 
Chen et al (1986) correlated four macroeconomic variables in particular with returns on five 
portfolios that mimic the underlying factors. They were 
( 1) an index of industrial production 
(2) changes in a default risk premium 
(3) twists in the yield curve 
( 4) unanticipated inflation 
2 Priced factors are factors that are statistically significant. 
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Since these factor premiums cannot be constant, the above method evolved into a new 
approach which examined the relationship between overall economic conditions and time-
varying risk premiums for a small group of portfolios as in studies by Keim and Stambaugh 
(1986), Chen (1991), Fama and French (1988), and Ferson and Harvey (1991). 
McElroy and Burmeister (1988) used a nonlinear iterative estimation technique similar to the 
one that had been developed by Gallant (1975) to allow for the joint estimation of the f3's and 
the asset risk premiums (A.'s). Given that the factors are observable, the factor sensitivities 
and risk premiums in equation 2.4 can be estimated in three steps, as follows: 
(1) Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques are applied to equation 2.1 on a 
share-by-share basis, to yield estimates for {13i1A.i. ..... f3icpAcp}. 
(2) The OLS residuals from fitting equation 2.1 share by share, which are denoted by 
( ei1, ..... eit) for share i and ( ej1, ..... ejt) for share j, are then used to derive consistent 
estimates for S, the covariance term between E1 and Ej. 
(3) A nonlinear feasible generalised least squares estimation technique is used to 
estimate Aj and bij jointly based on the minimisation of a generalised least 
squares equation. 
This entire procedure was performed using the ETS submodule of the SAS computer 
software package. 
The study tested the significance of the four macroeconomic factors tested by Chen et al 
(1986) and the residual market risk factor. Using a sample of 70 firms, share returns were 
calculated from 1972 to 1982. Joint estimates of the risk premium of each factor and the 
sensitivity coefficients were determined by using the technique outlined above on individual 
shares. On average the five factors accounted for 24 percent of the returns on the individual 
shares and all five factors were priced. 
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The ITNLSUR method described above is superior to the two-stage approach used by Chen 
et al (1986) for the following reasons: 
(1) In the Chen et al (1986) model, estimates from stage one (the asset betas) are used as 
inputs in the second stage. This introduces an "errors-in-the-variables" problem, 
where the errors that are produced in the first-stage estimates are compounded 
in the second stage, causing further errors and statistical problems. This problem is 
obviated because joint estimates of beta and the risk premiums are produced in one 
step by the McElroy and Burmeister (1988) approach. 
(2) In the second stage in the method used by Chen et al (1986), portfolios that 
diversify away the unsystematic risk in the returns need to be derived in order to 
control the errors-in-the-variables problem. The McElroy and Burmeister (1988) 
analysis is performed on a share-by-share basis and does not require the 
construction of such portfolios. 
(3) Little is known about the nature of the estimators of the Chen et al (1986) model or their 
characteristics (eg normality and consistency). Burmeister and Wall (1986:12) 
state that "these methods are known to give consistent estimates, but little else 
is known about the properties of the estimators". Thus the characteristics of the 
estimates produced and their accuracy and reliability are also unknown. The 
nature and characteristics of the estimates that are produced by the 
McElroy and Burmeister (1988) model are well documented. Gallant's 
nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression delivers "even in the absence of 
normally distributed errors, joint estimates of asset sensitivities and of risk 'prices' 
that are strongly consistent and asymptotically normally distributed and to which 
standard hypothesis testing applies" (McElroy & Burmeister 1988:29). 
The robustness of the McElroy and Burmeister (1988) method in relation to the non-
normality of the error distribution is an important consideration in South Africa because of 
the apparent absence of normality in returns on the JSE (Klerck & Du Toit 1986). 
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A number of studies have tried to integrate the more robust APT model with the CAPM. 
Tietman (1988) studied the conditions under which exact arbitrage pricing is compatible with 
the existence of a positive portfolio on the minimum-variance frontier and therefore (weakly) 
compatible with the CAPM. In his study, Wei (1988) combined the positive aspects of the 
APTM and CAPM models to derive a theory unifying both models. The derived results 
demonstrate that one need only add the market portfolio as an extra factor to the factor model 
in order to obtain an exact asset-pricing relation. 
Jaganathan and Wang (1996) attempted to bridge the two models. They found that when the 
market index (against which beta is usually measured) is redefined to include human capital 
and when betas are allowed to vary with cyclical fluctuations in the economy, the support for 
the CAPM and beta as a predictor of returns is quite strong. This "conditional" CAPM is 
different from what is commonly understood as the CAPM, and resembles the multifactor 
APT model in that three betas are used whereas the standard CAPM has only one beta. 
Because of the "lagged premium factor" and the "labour-income-growth-rate factor" used, 
the model is known as the PL model (premium labour model). Although the conditional 
model performs better than the static model, caution is advised with regard to strong support 
for this conditional CAPM because of the " ... somewhat ad hoc ... " (Malkiel,1996:270) 
procedures used to measure beta. 
Fama and French (1996) adopted another approach. They found that a three-factor risk-return 
relation could explain the cross-sectional variation of expected returns. This model explained 
many of the average return anomalies not explained by the CAPM (such as size, 
earning/price (Basu 1983), cash flow/price, book-to-market equity, past sales growth, and 
long-term past returns). The model states that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of 
the risk-free rate is explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors, namely: 
(1) the excess return on a broad market portfolio 
(2) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks 
(3) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the 
return on a portfolio of low- book-to-market stocks 
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This model follows from their earlier work (Fama & French 1995) where they argued that 
firm size proxies for sensitivity to an unknown risk factor. They also found that small stocks 
have lower earnings on book equity than big stocks because, while both were harmed by the 
recession of 1981 to 1982, big but not small stocks benefited from the subsequent expansion. 
The finding presented by Thorbecke (1997) that monetary policy is a risk factor that has a 
large effect on small firms, coupled with the theoretical framework of Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994) and the empirical evidence reported in Thorbecke and Coppock (1995), provides a 
possible explanation for Fama and French's results. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) argued that a 
monetary tightening, by worsening balance sheet positions, could constrain the access of 
small firms to credit. They further argued that these credit constraints bind a larger number of 
small firms in a downturn, implying that changes in monetary policy should have a bigger 
effect on small firms in bad times than in good times. Building on this insight, Thorbecke and 
Coppock (1995) found that tight monetary policy during the 1981 to 1982 recession harmed 
both small and large firms, while easier monetary policy during the subsequent expansion 
benefited large, but not small firms. The evidence of an asymmetric response of small stocks 
to monetary shocks in recessions and expansions together with the finding that monetary 
policy is a common factor that has a big effect on small firms, suggests that it might be one 
of the state variables producing the size-related variation in returns discussed by Fama and 
French. 
The Fama and French (1996) model was compared with the multifactor model specified by 
Jagennathan and Wang (1996), where it was found that R2 for the Fama and French (1996) 
model was 55,12 percent (where R2 is the fraction of the cross-sectional variation of average 
returns of 100 stock portfolios that can be explained by the model), which was comparable to 
the Jaganathan and Wang (1996) model. When tested, the multifactor model specified by 
Chen et al (1986) produced an R2 of 38,96 percent while the static CAPM explained only one 
percent of the cross-sectional variation in average returns. 
Paseran and Timmerman ( 1995) found that the predictive power of various economic factors 
over stock returns changes over time and tends to vary with the volatility of returns. The 
degree to which stock returns were predictable seemed quite low during the relatively calm 
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markets of the 1960s, but increased to a level where, net of transaction costs, they could have 
been exploited by investors in the volatile markets of the 1970s. They established a base set 
of nine potential forecasting financial and macroeconomic variables, and at each point in 
time, searched for a reasonable model specification capable of predicting stock returns across 
this set. They found that predictability of stock returns of a magnitude that is economically 
exploitable seems to depend not only on the evolution of the business cycle, but also on the 
magnitude of the economic shocks. Also, there does not seem to be a robust forecasting 
model, in the sense that the determinants of the predictability of stock returns in the USA 
seem to have undergone important changes throughout the period under consideration. The 
timing of the episodes where many of the regressors are included in the forecasting model 
seems to be linked to macroeconomic events such as the oil price shock in 1974 and the 
Federal Reserve Banks' change in its operating procedures during the 1979 to 1982 period. If 
they are correct in their conclusion that important episodes of predictability of stock returns 
are closely linked to the incidence of sudden shocks to the economy, then in analysing stock 
return predictability, it is advisable to use forecasting procedures that allow for possible 
regime changes. 
Burmeister and McElroy (1988) first raised the possibility of the existence of "mimicking" 
portfolios. These are portfolios whose returns and factors are the same even though they have 
no residual risk. According to Brown (1988:734), the nonexistence of such portfolios is 
implicit in the ITNLSUR procedure and explicit in most of the other empirical examinations 
of the APT. A notable exception to this statement is the NL3SLS approach. 
According to Burmeister and McElroy (1988:732): 
The potential application of the APTM to the study of economic structure, the 
allocation of risk and the relative factor sensitivities of firms within particular 
industries are indeed affected by the violation of the assumption. 
Burmeister and McElroy (1988) presented their argument on the existence of "mimicking" 
portfolios (which is equivalent to regarding the market portfolio as an endogenous variable) 
by showing that unobserved (latent) macroeconomic factors should be included in the 
APTM. 
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Priestley (1996:884) agreed with this concept, but disagreed with the fact that Burmeister and 
McElroy (1988) constrain the variance-covariance matrix to be diagonal and by implication 
assume that the residuals of the "full APT model' are uncorrelated with one another. 
In a further article, Clare, Priestley and Thomas (1997:645) state the following: 
In Ross's original version of the APT (Ross, 1976), the errors in the APT expected 
return equation are ignored by invoking the law of large numbers. This version of 
the model has become known as the strict factor version of the APT. Chamberlain 
(1983) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) show that as the number of assets 
increase causing idiosyncratic variance to approach zero, there may be bounded 
correlations amongst idiosyncratic returns. In this case the results of Ross (1976) 
still hold. This version of the APT is known as the approximate factor version of the 
model and has been given intuitive appeal by Connor and Korajczyk (1993) who 
argue that: 
"It seems possible that a few firms in the same industry might have industry specific 
components to their returns which are not pervasive sources of uncertainty for the 
whole economy. For example, awarding a defence contract to one aerospace firm 
might affect the stock price of several firms in the industry. Assuming a strict factor 
structure would force us to treat this industry specific uncertainly as a pervasive 
factor (Connor & Korajczyk 1993:1264)." 
The strict factor structure version of the APTM is estimated within the framework where the 
variance-covariance matrix of idiosyncratic returns is restricted to be diagonal (ITNLSUR 
approach). 
Clare et al ( 1997) found that the APT is highly sensitive to the estimation technique used. 
Using the nonlinear three-stage least squares estimator (NL3SLS), where the variance-
covariance matrix is restricted to be diagonal, they found that no factors are priced in the 
London Stock Market. However, when they estimated the model using the full, unrestricted 
variance-covariance matrix, they found five macroeconomic variables to be priced: a proxy 
for default risk; the retail price index; the yield on an index of UK debenture and loan stock; 
bank lending; and the return on the market portfolio. 
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These results were fully confirmed by Garrett and Priestley ( 1997) when they again found 
that returns are best described by an approximate market factor structure, and that when this 
is allowed for, six factors carry significant prices of risk. In contrast, when returns are 
constrained to have a strict factor structure, no factors carry significant prices of risk. Thus, 
the assumption about the behaviour of idiosyncratic returns is of crucial importance in terms 
of identifying the number of observed systematic risk factors that are priced. 
To conclude, according to Seneque (1986:34), the AP1M is less restrictive than the CAPM. 
He added that the AP1M does not make use of the market portfolio concept and requires 
only that portfolios should be constructed using the factors to eliminate arbitrage profits - that 
is, that equilibrium conditions are established by ensuring that the "law of one price" holds 
for all possible portfolio combinations. 
Copeland and Weston (1988:469) claimed that the APM (APT) is more robust than the 
CAPM for the following reasons: 
(1) The APT makes no assumptions about the empirical distribution of asset 
returns. 
(2) The APT makes no strong assumptions about individuals' utility functions 
(at least about nothing stronger than greed and risk aversion). 
(3) The APT allows the equilibrium return of assets to be dependent on many 
factors, not just one (eg beta). 
( 4) Because the APT yields a statement about the relative pricing of any subset of 
assets, one need not measure the entire universe of assets in order to test the 
theory. 
( 5) There is no special role for the market portfolio in APT, whereas the CAPM 
requires that the market portfolio be efficient. 
(6) The APT is easily extended to a multiperiod framework (see Ross 1976). 
The major disadvantage of the APTM is that the factors affecting asset returns cannot be 
specified in advance. The model itself does not define the nature or identity of the macro-
economic factors which explain asset returns. 
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2.3.4 Significant prior research done in South Africa 
The South African output of research in the field of asset pricing models has been extremely 
modest - only 34 papers had been produced by the end of 1997 (Sandler & Firer 1998). 
Gilbertson and Goldberg (1981) used the return on a mining index and an industrial index as 
two factors in a multifactor LFM. They compared the explanatory power of this model with 
that of the market model. However, they only examined three shares: East Driefontein Gold, 
Anglo American Corporation and Barlow Rand. They found that the beta coefficients of each 
of these sector indices were more statistically significant than the market model beta for all 
three shares, and that the two-factor model explained a greater percentage of share returns 
than the all-share index. The returns of each share were found to be related to different 
indices. For example, East Driefontein Gold's returns were related to returns on the mining 
index, Barlow's returns to the industrial index and Anglo American's to both indices. In other 
words, each share's returns were affected by the index, which in tum was affected by the 
same underlying macroeconomic forces. They thus concluded that a two-factor LFM would 
explain returns on the JSE better than the single-factor market model. 
Page (1986) carried out empirical research into the APT model using data from the JSE. He 
found that at least two factors determine security returns rather than just the return on the 
market as predicted by the CAPM and that a two-factor APT model has significantly better 
explanatory powers than the CAPM in an ex post sense. His finding suggested that the 
underlying macroeconomic variables determining the return generation process can be 
divided into those that influence the mining sector to a greater extent and those that affect the 
industrial sector to a greater extent. 
Using a factor-analysis approach, Barr (1990) identified the main economic forces which 
drive the various sectors of the JSE, such as the price of gold, the short-term rate of interest, 
the performance of foreign stock markets and local business confidence. 
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Davidson and Meyer (1993) report that with a few exceptions, the reported anomalies in 
overseas countries are absent on the JSE. The few market anomalies reported on the JSE are 
the Monday effect (Bhana 1985), the December effect (Bradfield 1990), the Public Holiday 
effect (Bhana 1994) and the PIE ratio effect (Page&Palmer 1991). Using multivariate tests on 
the CAPM, Bradfield and Affleck-Graves (1990) found that the CAPM cannot be rejected on 
the JSE, but more importantly that none of the additional factors, namely: firm size, dividend 
yield and liquidity, influence asset pricing on the JSE. 
Reese (1993) studied the APT, employing a sample of 72 actively traded shares listed on the 
JSE for the period, 1980 to 1989. The ITSUR technique discussed in chapter 4 (sec 4.2.1) 
was employed to test the significance of the risk premium of each factor. Reese (1993) 
treated the mining and industrial sectors as two completely separate markets, performing 
separate APT studies on each sector. The APT test results for mining shares showed that the 
model with gold price risk and residual market risk and the model with growth rate risk and 
residual market risk had the highest adjusted R2 values. However, these factors were not 
priced APT factors since they were not significantly different from zero. Four models were 
selected from the APT tests on industrial shares, on the basis of having the highest adjusted 
R2 values and factors which were significantly different from zero. The four models were 
made up of the following risk factors: gold price risk and residual market risk; foreign 
exchange risk and residual market risk; inflation risk and residual market risk; default 
premium risk, gold price risk and residual market risk. She concluded that further work was 
required to identify APT factors operating on the JSE. 
Van Rensburg (1996) attempted to identify the "priced" macroeconomic variables underlying 
percentage price movements realised by a representative sample of 72 non-thinly traded 
securities on the JSE over the period 01101/1980 to 31/12/1989. Employing the ITNLSUR 
methodology of McElroy and Burmeister (1988), he found that unanticipated movements in 
the Dow-Jones industrial index, the term structure of interest rates and inflation expectations 
(as proxied by innovations in short-term interest rates) are associated with statistically 
significant and theoretically consistent risk premia over the period of the sample. In addition, 
the residual market factor, representing that variation in the JSE all-share index not explained 
by the above macrovariables, was priced and associated with a negative risk premium. 
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In their investigation of the relationship between domestic political news events and share 
market activity on the JSE, Van der Merwe and Smit (1997:21) found that the number of 
South African domestic political news events explains up to 59 percent of the volume traded 
as well as up to 23 percent of the movement of price (volatility) in the industrial index. 
Beck ( 1995) found that share prices on the JSE had been largely affected by the perceived 
fortunes of the company concerned, and were relatively insensitive to sociopolitical factors 
within the country itself He concluded that macroenvironmental factors appeared to 
influence the general health of the economy, and subsequently the share prices over a much 
longer time period than a single month. 
Meyer (1998) used the APTM with a different number of factor indices (three, five and nine) 
as benchmarks in evaluating portfolio performance in South Africa. She found that, 
depending on the use of either CAPM or APTM benchmarks, average performance of passive 
portfolios was either better or not better than that of unit trusts for the ten-year period 1985 to 
1995. She concluded that different benchmarks led to different results when evaluating 
portfolios. 
Van Rensburg (1996:111) commented as follows on all the work done in South Africa on the 
APTM: 
Despite adopting essentially a factor analytic approach, Barr (1990) claims to 
ascertain the macroeconomic identity of the "pricing factors on the JSE". 
Employing the co-variance-bi-plot methodology, Barr observed which of a list of 
twelve pre-specified macrovariables accorded most closely with the first two (factor 
analytic) factors. 
However, despite its ingenuity, the methodology adopted by Barr is characterized by 
the following weaknesses: 
(a) Notwithstanding its graphical convenience for the co-variance-bi-plot, the 
assumption (no statistical testing was conducted) of two factors is not adequately 
justified. Citing Conway & Reinganum (1988) as evidence is misleading as their 
analysis was not conducted in the South African environment. Page (1986) did 
find two priced factors but the composition of Page's sample differs from that of 
Barr's in an economically meaningful way. Barr excluded all gold mining 
indices from his sample of 26 share indices. In contrast, Page explicitly observes 
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one of his (varimax rotated) factors being "composed exclusively of mining 
related shares" (1986:42). Excluding the gold indices from the sample "because 
initial research indicated that there was only one macroeconomic factor that 
dominated the pricing of gold securities in an obvious way, namely the gold 
price, and this effect tended to dominate the analysis" (1990:20) allows for more 
aesthetic results at the cost of misrepresenting reality. (Also note that despite its 
"obviousness", gold price risk was, in fact, found not to be priced in this study. 
Criticism (i) of Reese below is also of relevance here). 
(b) No attempt was made to extract unexpected movements in the candidate macro-
variables. 
( c) It is not examined whether exposure to any of the prespecified macro-economic 
variables are associated with a significantly non-zero risk premium. This is the 
defining characteristic of a priced factor and without empirically examining this 
issue, no claim can be made to identify priced sources of macroeconomic risk. 
Criticisms (a) and (c) together suffice to undermine the drawing of inferences from 
Barr (1990) regarding the macroeconomic identity of the priced APT factors on the 
JSE. 
Reese (1993) proceeds on methodologically firmer ground by adopting the 
prespecified variable (rather than factor analytic) approach and uses the systems 
equation technique ofMcElroy & Burmeister to explicitly test whether the candidate 
macro-variables are able to explain the cross section of share returns. However, her 
study exhibits the following weaknesses: 
(i) Reese conducts separate tests on the mining and industrial sectors of the JSE, 
taking into account the fact that different factors drive security prices in these 
sectors. However, even though mining shares' returns are likely to exhibit 
sensitivities to different factors other than industrial shares, this does not imply that 
different factors will be priced in each of these two markets. Through the 
diversification argument, attempts to find priced factors specific to particular 
industries are fundamentally misguided. 
(ii) Reese identified the expected values of these variables by taking a moving 
average of the previous twelve months' values. These moving averages were 
subtracted from actual values of the macroeconomic variables in each period, to 
obtain a measure of unexpected movements in the macro-variables. Attempts to 
extract unexpected movements are unavoidably 'crude', however, Reese took no 
measures to ensure that her candidate factors had a mean of zero and were void of 
auto-correlation as equation (1) assumes. In fact, such is the nature of a moving 
average that it will systematically underestimate a variable if that variable is 
engaged in an upward trend and vice versa. 
(iii) Unfortunately, Reese provided no synthesis of her findings pointing to some 
indication of a reasonable specification of the APT model. Rather, an array of 
varying combinations of factors that appeared to be priced in either the industrial or 
mining sectors was tabulated. In all cases, when the residual market factor was 
excluded from the analysis, the explanatory power of her models was prohibitively 
weak. 
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2.4SUMMARY 
There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that share returns on the JSE are affected by more 
than one financial and/or macroeconomic variable. It has also been shown that the APTM is 
superior to the static CAPM and that the pricing restrictions that it places on the LFM cannot 
be rejected. 
Enough work has also been done on the JSE to confirm that it can be regarded as comprising 
two dichotomous sectors. This thesis has segmented the South African market and has 
concentrated on the industrial and financial sector to the exclusion of the gold mining and 
other related sectors. Since this sector (F & I index) fulfils the requirements of arbitrage (ch 
2, sec 2.3 .2.) and since the APTM is valid for any group of assets that fulfil this requirement, 
this approach is valid. 
If Paseran and Timmerman (1995) are correct in their conclusion that important episodes of 
predictability of stock returns are closely linked to incidences of sudden shocks to the 
economy, of which South Africa has experienced many, then in analysing stock return 
predictability, we would have to use a model which allows for possible regime changes. 
From the research that has been done both overseas and in South Africa, it would appear that 
the best method of testing the APTM is the approach where prespecified macroeconomic 
variables are used together with either the ITNLSUR and/or NL3SLS approach to jointly 
estimate the asset risk premiums and sensitivities. These models should be calculated on a 
recursive basis in order to capture the changes in the specification described in the previous 
section. 
Because the JSE is largely free of the market anomalies (as discussed in the previous section) 
associated with the NYSE, the prespecified risk factors will resemble those proposed by 
McElroy and Burmeister (1988) rather than those of Fama and French (1996) and Ja 
gennathan and Wang (1996). 
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CHAPTER3 
RISK FACTOR, INSTRUMENT AND SHARE SELECTION 
3.1 ESTIMATION OF CANDIDATE RISK FACTORS 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The most severe limitation of the APT is that the theory does not provide an explanation for 
the choice of macro-economic variables for use as factors in the model. The empirical work 
which attempted to identify the factors operating on the NYSE and JSE was summarised in 
chapter 2 (sec 2.3). 
The factors to be tested are chosen from those suggested by economic theory and empirical 
studies of both the APT and related subjects. Since the particular interest of this study is the 
effect of political and economical events on the APTM, risk factors that could proxy for these 
events were sought. 
Before this exercise was undertaken, a thorough study of the political and economic 
environment prevalent in South Africa during the period under consideration was carried out 
to gain perspective on the situation in question. 
The following brief overview of the history of South Africa before 1988 is meant to provide a 
brief summary and does not necessarily reflect all the major events in the country's history, 
nor is it meant to be judgmental. This section draws on Tyson, Steyn, Gibson, Trail and Desai 
(1998). 
As the period under consideration in this thesis extends from 1988 to 1998, a more detailed 
analysis of important political and economic events is needed on a year-to-year basis. In 
order to be consistent and nonjudgmental in the listing of important political and economic 
eve11ts~a respected and reliable single source of news events was sought. It was decided to 
// -~---
tlse The Economist, a respected British political and financial weekly magazine, as the 
reference source. 
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Appendix 1 shows the annual index issued by The Economist from January 1988 to June 
1998, listing all articles published by the magazine on South Africa for the year. 
South Africa before 1988 
The earliest settlers in the southern tip of Africa were the San people, who were gradually 
displaced by the Khoikhoi, after which the Bantu peoples started migrating southwards into 
the area from about 300AD. 
The Portuguese explorers, Bartholomew Dias and Vasco da Gama, visited the Cape in the 
16th century. The first white settlement was established by the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) under Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape in April 1652. As this half-way station between 
Europe and the East Indies grew, the settlement was swelled first by the Huguenot refugees 
from religious oppression in Europe, then by slaves brought from Asia. 
The Dutch settlement expanded during the 18th century and colonists spread out into the 
interior as farmers. In the Eastern Cape, the whites came up against the Xhosa. As 
competition for grazing land grew, the first of nine frontier wars erupted in 1779. 
In 1775, during the French revolutionary wars, Britain annexed the Cape. Eight years later 
the colony reverted briefly to the Batavian Republic, the new name for the Netherlands under 
Napoloenic rule. In 1806 the Cape was re-occupied by Britain. 
Concerned at the instability of the Eastern Cape frontier, the colonial government brought in 
5000 settlers from Britain in1820. The British settlement and annexation of the Cape colony 
in 1806 helped stimulate the development of a strong sense of identity among the Afrikaners 
or Boers ("farmers") of broadly Dutch stock who responded with a series of northerly 
movements into the hinterland, culminating in what became known as the Great Trek. This 
movement led to battles between Afrikaners and Bantu groups, notably the Zulus, and to the 
formation of two Boer republics north of the Orange River: the Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State. 
33 
The discovery of diamonds in the northern Cape in 1867 and of gold on the Witwatersrand in 
1866 changed the face of southern Africa. New immigrants flooded into the country, 
transforming a predominantly rural, pastoral land into a thriving industrial economy, based 
on mining. Johannesburg and its environs became the economic heartland of the country. 
After the British victory in the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 the two Boer republics 
were united with the Cape Colony and Natal and the Union of South Africa, a self-governing 
dominion within the British empire, was declared in 1910. 
During the years between the declaration of the Union and the post World War 2 election of 
1948, South Africa transformed itself into a modern industrial nation and began to give legal 
effect to the segregation of Black and White races that had always been inherent in South 
African society. Black dissatisfaction resulted in the formation of the African National 
Congress in 1912. 
In 1948 the National Party, which represented Afrikaner Nationalism, won the election and 
came into power. Building on existing policies, this party devised a more rigid system of 
territorial, social and political segregation known as apartheid, which met with growing black 
resistance and with hostility from all parts of the post-war world. 
Following the shooting of 69 people in a demonstration against "pass laws" at Sharpeville in 
1960, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress (an anti-apartheid 
organisation formed under Robert Sobukwe) were banned. In 1961, after a referendum had 
been held, the National Party withdrew South Africa from the British Commonwealth and 
declared it a republic. 
The National Party's policy of apartheid was to build up the legal and political framework of 
a system which was designed ultimately to create a white state which could draw on the 
labour of a number of "black nations" (homelands) that would legally bind blacks to their 
rural land of ancestry. Four of these homelands, namely the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei (the TBVC states) were declared independent although they were wholly 
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reliant on financial assistance from the central government and were never recognised by the 
government of any other country. 
After the assassination of premier Hendrik Verwoerd in 1966, his successors BJ Vorster and 
PW Botha instituted some reform measures while tightening internal security. However, 
worker opposition, international sanctions and the growing economic interdependence of 
black and white in a modernising, urbanising economy combined to make the apartheid 
system increasingly untenable. 
On 16 June 1976 schoolchildren in Soweto revolted, igniting a campaign of resistance 
designed to make the black townships and eventually the entire country ungovernable. By 
the 1980s the liberation of Africa had reached South Africa's borders after the collapse of 
Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique and the independence of Zimbabwe. 
During this period tensions reached their highest ideological pitch. Under the presidency of 
PW Botha the government actively attempted to destabilise independent states in the region, 
especially the then communist governments of Angola and Mozambique. At home it mixed 
tight military control and artificial constitutional reforms with some genuinely reformist 
measures, such as a relaxation of the "pass laws" constraining black freedom of movement in 
urban areas, and the abolition of the Mixed Marriages Act in 1986. During the same year, the 
US Congress imposed sanctions against South Africa. 
Although a detailed list of news events from January 1988 to July 1998 1s given m 
Appendix! the highlights are listed below: 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1988 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• PW Botha bans 17 black organisations. 
• Trade unions embark on a general strike. 
• Government cracks down on political activity. 
• Signing of Namibia/ Angola peace deal. 
February 1988 
April 1988 
October 1988 
December 1988 
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• Zephania Mothopeng and Zwelakhe Sisulu released. 
Questions asked on date of Nelson Mandela's possible 
release. 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1989 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
December 1988 
• PW Botha suffers a mild stroke. January 1989 
• PW Botha meets with Nelson Mandela. July 1989 
• PW Botha resigns, FW de Klerk new National Party leader. August 1989 
• National Party wins general election. September 1989 
• FW de Klerk becomes State President. September 1989 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1990 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• The African National Congress, the Pan African Congress 
and the South African Communist Party unbanned. 
• Nelson Mandela released after 27 years in prison. 
• FW de Klerk has talks with Nelson Mandela. 
• Suspension of armed struggle. The Pretoria Minute signed. 
• Winnie Mandela prosecution. 
• Reintegration of homelands. 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1991 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• Talks on new constitution stalled. 
• De Klerk promises to end apartheid. 
February 1990 
February 1990 
April 1990 
August 1990 
September 1990 
December 1990 
January 1991 
February 1991 
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• African National Congress ultimatum to De Klerk. 
• African National Congress-Government compromise. 
• Population Registration Act repeal. 
• America's trade embargo ended. 
• Problem of African National Congress-Inkatha violence. 
• Formation of Patriotic Front. 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1992 
April 1991 
May 1991 
June 1991 
July 1991 
November 1991 
November 1991 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• Whites-only referendum endorses the Government's reform March 1992 
progress. 
• Boipatong massacre, 39 people killed. 
• Ciskei massacre. 
• Mangosuthu Buthelezi secedes from talks. 
• African National Congress/Government hold talks on 
multi-racial elections. 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1993 
June 1992 
September 1992 
October 1992 
December 1992 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• Constitutional talks resume with 26 parties participating. March 1993 
• Chris Rani, Secretary-General of the South African April 1993 
Communist Party, is assassinated. 
• Afrikaner Volksfront formed to negotiate self- May 1993 
determination for Afrikaners. 
• Constitutional compromises. 
• Transitional constitution providing for non-racial 
democracy, three tiers of government and a justiciable 
Bill of Rights in a unitary South Africa is accepted. 
July 1993 
November 1993 
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• Beginning of Transitional Executive Council. December 1993 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1994 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• Bophuthatswana uprising. 
• Pre-election instability. 
• End of election boycott by Inkatha Freedom Party. 
• First non-racial election. 
• African National Congress wins the election. 
• Nelson Mandela inaugurated as South Africa's first black 
President. 
• Chris Liebenberg, a respected banker, appointed as 
Finance Minister. 
• John Major visits South Africa. 
• Political tensions in KwaZulu-Natal. 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1995 
February 1994 
February 1994 
April 1994 
April 1994 
May 1994 
May 1994 
May 1994 
September 1994 
September 1994 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• Fraud problems with two-tier exchange rate, possible 
scrappmg. 
• Winnie Mandela sacked from Government. 
• Inkatha Freedom Party withdraws from Constitutional 
Assembly until international mediation is agreed on. 
• Threats to Central Bank independence. 
• Influx of foreign investment banks. 
February 1995 
April 1995 
April 1995 
June 1995 
August 1995 
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South Africa: Political and economic events of 1996 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• Rand falls sharply after speculation about President 
Mandela's health. 
• Opening of Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
hearings. 
• National Party resigns from Government of National 
Unity. 
South Africa: Political and economic events of 1997 
April 1996 
April 1996 
May 1996 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant events of this year: 
• Amnesty for political crimes cut off date is extended to 10 January 1997 
May 1994. 
• FW de Klerk resigns from politics. He is succeeded as August 1997 
leader of the National Party by Martinus van Schalkwyk . 
• Nelson Mandela steps down as African National Congress December 1997 
President and is succeeded by Thabo Mbeki. 
South Africa: Political and economic events, January to June 1997 
Appendix 1 describes the following dominant event during the first six months of this year. 
• Truth commission hearings continue. January 1998 
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3.1.2 The selection of the nine risk factors 
The researcher was particularly interested in ascertaining what effect the political and 
economic events described in the previous section had on the APTM, and risk factors that 
could proxy for these events were therefore sought. 
Two studies were published in South Africa recently which sought to examine the effect of 
political and economic events on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange during the five-year 
period from 1990 to 1995 when South Africa was experiencing a particularly turbulent period 
in its history. 
Van der Merwe and Smit (1997) found statistically significant coefficients of determination 
(R2) to exist between domestic political news events and all-share index volatility, industrial 
index volatility and volume traded on the JSE. 
Henn and Smit (1997) found that a number of South African economic news events have a 
weak negative and insignificant correlation significance with the movement in prices of 
shares traded on the JSE. Their finding that the number of news items with economic 
content have very little impact on share market volatility is not entirely unexpected. The 
number1 of economic events were meant to proxy important events such as "the lifting of 
sanctions and abolition of the financial rand" (Henn & Smit, 1997:30), and to measure their 
effect on the JSE. Beck (1995) found that share prices on the JSE were not affected by 
macroenvironmental factors and that "these macroenvironmental factors appeared to 
influence the general health of the economy and subsequently the share prices over a much 
longer time period than a single month" (Beck 1995:35). This argument does not apply to the 
study by Van der Merwe & Smit ( 1997), who found a correlation between the number of 
domestic news events and the movement of shares on the JSE. "One explanation for these 
results could be that economic trends and results are more predictable than political news 
items and are therefore discounted beforehand in the share prices" (Henn & Smit 1997:33). 
1 Henn and Smit (1997:30) tested and confirmed that there is a relationship between the number of news events and the 
importance of such economic news events. 
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As important as the findings above was the way in which political and economic news events 
were quantified. Van der Merwe and Smit (1997:12) and Henn and Smit (1997:24) chose 
Renter's News Services as their source for news events. They justified their choice on the 
grounds that Reuters has met the criteria for reliability as a source, has a proven track record 
of consistency and freedom from bias and is utilised by the majority of market participants in 
South Africa. They reported that the editorial staff of Reuters classifies news items into the 
following main categories: corporate affairs, economics, markets and politics. Each main 
category consists of further subsets. 
The following are subsets in the economic news category: 
(1) aid 
(2) balance of payments 
(3) consumer credit 
(4) consumer finances 
(5) consumer prices 
(6) current prices 
(7) current account 
(8) economic output 
(9) employment 
(10) external trade 
(11) government borrowing 
(12) government finances 
(13) housing starts 
(14) monetary policy 
(15) money supply 
(16) performance 
(17) personal income 
(18) reserves 
(19) retail sales 
(20) wholesale sales 
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According to Henn and Smit (1997:26), "These sub-headings are all macro-economic 
related". As these subheadings are all macroeconomic related, each of the above 20 
subheadings can be tested to establish if they can explain the movement of share prices 
traded on the JSE. Any risk factor found to be correlated with the movement of shares on the 
JSE could then be used as a proxy for economic news events. This procedure is undertaken 
later in this section. 
The following are subsets in the political news category: defence, domestic politics, 
education, the environment, the European Union, foreign affairs, the Government list, and 
health and welfare. 
Whereas the category of economic news events was found by Henn and Smit (1997) not to 
have any influence on the movement of shares on the JSE, Van der Merwe and Smit (1997) 
showed that the movement of share prices and the volume of shares traded on the JSE and 
the number of South African political news events were correlated. Therefore the volume of 
shares traded on the JSE could be used as a proxy for political news. 
Rather than choose only risk factors that could proxy political and economic events in South 
Africa and then use a set number of these factors (nine) in this study, an alternative approach 
was considered. In this approach a wide selection of risk factors was made using the studies 
published in South Africa as a guideline and the choice was then narrowed down to the nine 
most important risk factors. This alternative approach was preferred to the obvious method 
of choosing only risk factors that could proxy for political and economic events for the 
following reasons: 
(1) A risk factor such as the Dow Jones index has been shown to be important in all South 
African studies on the APTM. If a selection process had been used where only factors 
that can proxy political and economic events were chosen, this risk factor would not 
have been used, and as no other risk factor can explain the variation in returns on the 
JSE that the Dow Jones risk factor can, the results of the study would have been 
compromised. 
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(2) By using nine prespecified risk factors in our APTM we have made ample allowance for 
risk factors proxying political and economic events to be chosen in the final list of the 
nine most important risk factors. 
(3) As the aim of this study is to identify the effect that political and economic events have 
on the JSE, risk factors that proxy these political and economic events need to be used in 
the APTM over 87 test periods in a combination that provides the maximum explanatory 
power over returns on the JSE. If this is not done there will be no benchmark for 
comparing the behaviour of these risk factors over time. In effect we will be measuring 
the behaviour of risk factors proxying political and economic events in an APTM (made 
up from a selection of the nine most important risk factors) which gives the maximum 
explanatory power over returns on the JSE. 
In pursuance of the argument above, which requires the inclusion of as wide a selection of 
candidate risk factors as possible, the researcher reffered to the following studies published 
in South Africa on asset pricing models: Reese (1993) and Van Rensburg (1996). 
In his study Van Rensburg (1996:106) used the following macroeconomic factors for testing 
the APTM on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange: 
Unexpected movements in 
(1) (percentage changes in) the rand gold price 
(2) dollar returns on the Dow Jones industrial index 
(3) inflation expectations 
( 4) the term structure of interest rates 
Reese ( 1993 :21) in her study on the effect of prespecified risk factors on share prices on the 
JSE used the unexpected movement in the following variables: 
( 1) foreign exchange risk 
(2) default premia risk 
(3) inflation rate risk 
( 4) gold price risk 
( 5) term structure of interest rates risk 
( 6) growth rate risk 
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Van Rensburg (1996) found three2 risk factors priced in the APTM to be applicable on the 
JSE while Reese's (1993) results were inconclusive. The decision to use nine prespecified 
risk factors in this study would ensure that, as on average three would probably be priced 
during the period under consideration, the number and composition of priced risk factors 
varied significantly during the 87 periods during which the APTM was tested. 
On the basis of the above arguments candidate risk factors were chosen using the list of 20 
macroeconomic factors making up economic news, the proxy for political news, as discussed 
at the beginning of this section, and past studies done in South Africa on the arbitrage pricing 
theory model as a guide. 
The following risk factors were eliminated because of the unavailability of data: aid, 
consumer credit, consumer finances, government finances and personal income. 
When a risk factor could not be duplicated risk factors that were similar were used. 
Specifically, this meant using the seasonally adjusted value of building plans passed in 
constant terms instead of housing starts and gross domestic product at constant prices instead 
of economic output. 
The list of 25 risk factors chosen is given below: 
Unexpected movements in 
(1) net long-term capital flow 
(2) net short-term capital flow 
(3) the index of export volume excluding gold 
( 4) the index of export volume including gold 
(5) the index of import volume 
(6) the rate of change in the three-month bankers' acceptance rate 
2 Excluding the residual market risk factor. 
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(7) the rate of change in the consumer price index 
(8) the rate of change of the dollar/crude oil spot price (per barrel) 
(9) the gross domestic product at constant prices 
(10) the index of employment figures in the nonagricultural sector 
( 11) the index of pay per worker 
(12) the index of productivity 
( 13) government borrowing 
(14) the rate of change of the SACOB business confidence index 
( 15) the term structure of interest rates 
(16) the money supply measure, M3 
( 17) gold and foreign exchange reserves 
(18) the rate of change in the volume of shares traded on the JSE 
(19) inflation expectations as represented by the one-time lag difference in the 
three-month bankers' acceptance rate (as used by Van Rensburg 1995) 
(20) the rand gold price per ounce 
(21) the US dollar/rand exchange rate 
(22) the monthly number of companies placed in liquidation 
(23) the rate of change of the Dow-Jones industrial index 
(24) the rate of change of the dollar/ gold price of one ounce of pure gold 
(25) the rate of change of dividends in the financial and industrial sectors 
Risk factors 1,2,3,4 and 5 proxy for the balance of payments, current account and external 
trade subsets of economic news. 
Risk factor 6 proxies for monetary policy (as will be shown in sec 3.1.3.2 and also, together 
with risk factors 7 and 8, for the consumer prices and current prices subsets of economic 
news. 
Risk factor 9 proxies for the economic output subset of economic news. 
Risk factors 10, 11 and 12 proxy for the employment subset of economic news. 
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Risk factor 13 proxies for the government borrowing subset of economic news. 
Risk factor 14, by virtue of its composition of thirteen indicators which are shown in section 
3 .1.3 .2, proxies for the consumer prices, balance of payments, retail sales, external trade, 
monetary policy, employment, economic output, housing starts and personal income subsets 
of economic news. 
Risk factor 15 proxies for the monetary policy subset of economic news. 
Risk factor 16 proxies for the money supply subset of economic news. 
Risk factor 17 proxies for the reserves subset of economic news. 
Risk factor 18 proxies for political events. 
Risk factors 19 to 25 are factors that have been used in previous studies on asset pricing 
models. 
However, a number of risk factors had to be eliminated from the start because of the poor 
quality of the data available on them. The following ten risk factors were eliminated because 
data on them were available only on a quarterly basis: 
( 1) net long-term capital flow 
(2) net short-term capital flow 
(3) the index of export volume excluding gold 
( 4) the index of export volume including gold 
( 5) the index of pay per worker 
(6) the index of employment figures in the nonagricultural sector 
(7) the index of productivity 
(8) the gross domestic product at constant prices 
(9) the index of import volume 
(lO)governmentborrowing 
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After extracting the unexpected components of the 15 risk factors, a procedure that will be 
described in section 3.1.4, the following factors were subsequently eliminated because they 
exhibited substantial correlation with other risk factors: 
(1) Inflation expectations as represented by the one-time lag difference in the three-month 
bankers' acceptance rate (as used by Van Rens burg 1995). This risk factor exhibited 
substantial correlation with the risk factor represented by the three-month bankers' 
acceptance rate. 
(2) Rand gold price. This risk factor was eliminated because it was found to have a high 
correlation with the risk factor represented by the US dollar/rand exchange rate. 
Returns on the financial and industrial sector were then regressed on the remaining 13 risk 
factors, using the stepwise regression method described by Pirow ( 1994: 180) as follows: 
where: 
Rit = return on the financial and industrial index 
co = constant 
13 1 = sensitivity of risk factor 1 
c1 = unexpected component of risk factor 1 
132 = sensitivity of risk factor 2 
c2 = unexpected component of risk factor 2 
13 13 = sensitivity of risk factor 13 
c13 = unexpected component of risk factor 13 
Our previous elimination of factors ensured that any correlation between pairs (or groups) of 
risk factors was eliminated. If this correlation is not removed, it may cause serious problems 
because it could produce misleading estimates of parameter values and result in totally 
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invalid statistical inferences. The risk factors shown above were added to the first risk factor 
one at a time and the R2 statistic was used to classify the latest addition as 
(1) useful 
(2) detrimental 
(3) superfluous 
"Useful" variables were retained because they increase the "explanatory power" of the 
model. "Detrimental" and "superfluous" variables were excluded from the model for 
different reasons. The "detrimental" variables would cause a multicolinearity problem (a 
safety measure in case a problem had been overlooked), and the "superfluous" variables 
neither add any useful information nor cause any problems. This procedure was used to 
choose nine "useful" risk factors. 
In other words, using this procedure, the researcher chose the most important nine risk 
factors according to their contribution to the overall R2 statistic of the regression. 
The four risk factors which were removed in this way were 
( 1) the US dollar/rand exchange rate 
(2) the monthly number of companies placed in liquidation 
(3) the money supply measure, M3 
( 4) gold and foreign exchange reserves 
After this process of elimination, the nine candidate risk factors that were finally chosen were 
as follows: 
Unexpected movements in 
( 1) the rate of change in the volume of shares traded on the JSE 
(2) the rate of change of the SACOB business confidence index 
(3) the rate of change of the Dow-Jones industrial index 
(4) the rate of change of the dollar/gold price of one ounce of pure gold 
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(5) the rate of change in the three-month bankers' acceptance rate 
(6) the term structure of interest rates 
(7) the rate of change of dividends in the financial and industrial sectors 
(8) the rate of change of the dollar/crude oil spot price (per barrel) 
(9) the rate of change in the consumer price index 
3.1.3 Risk factors chosen 
Of the nme risk factors eventually chosen, six are effective proxies for political and 
economic events. Of these six risk factors, one proxies for political events and five for 
economic events. 
The risk factor proxying for political events is the volume of shares traded on the JSE. 
The risk factors proxying for economic events are: 
(1) the rate of change in the three-month bankers' acceptance rate 
(2) the rate of change of the US dollar crude oil spot price 
(3) the rate of change in the consumer price index 
( 4) the term structure of interest rates 
( 5) the SA COB business confidence index 
Three risk factors fall into the categories of corporate affairs and markets as used by Reuters. 
These are: 
(1) the rate of change of the Dow-Jones industrial index 
(2) the rate of change of the dollar/gold price of one ounce of pure gold 
(3) the rate of change of dividends in the financial and industrial sectors 
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A tenth factor, namely the residual market factor, was chosen for inclusion in all the linear 
factor models (LFMs) for reasons explained in section 3.1.3.6, but essentially to ensure that 
the effects of all systematic risks in the market are measured when using the ITNLSUR 
technique. 
The justification for choosing the above 10 risk factors, with corroborating evidence, as well 
as the way these factors are calculated, is outlined in the following sections. Note, however, 
that the descriptions of these factors are only partially complete. In order to extract the 
unexpected movement of these risk factors, procedures described in section 3.1.4 have to be 
undertaken. 
3.1.3.1 A risk factor affected by the political climate 
The risk factor proxying for political events is the volume of shares traded on the JSE. 
a The rate of change in the volume traded on the JSE 
Van der Merwe and Smit ( 1997) found statistical significance to exist between domestic 
political news events and all-share index volatility, industrial index volatility and volume 
traded on the JSE. 
Van der Merwe and Smit ( 1997) tried to quantify the effect of domestic political events on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. News events are reported daily by Reuters, which is an 
international news service provider. Van der Merwe and Smit (1997) isolated from the news 
released by Reuters daily items which were associated with domestic political events. They 
undertook this study over a five-year period ( 1990-1995) when South Africa was 
experiencing a particularly turbulent period in its history. When they compared the monthly 
number of political news releases with the volume of shares traded on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, they found that South African domestic political news events explain 59 
percent of the volume traded. 
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On the basis of the above evidence one would expect a relationship to exist between the 
volume of shares traded on the JSE and the political climate in South Africa. This would 
justify the selection of this factor as a proxy for political events in South Africa. 
Graph 3.1 shows a plot of the weekly volume of shares traded on the JSE from 16 
October1988 to 21June1998. 
GRAPH3.1 
Weekly volume of shares traded on the JSE vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21106/1998 
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It is interesting to note that the dramatic increase in the value of shares traded from 1995 
onwards can be largely attributed to the introduction of the JET system of trading on the JSE. 
A combination of an influx of foreign investment banks (Appendix 1, August 1995), a change 
in regulations on the way business is conducted on the JSE (Appendix 1, November 1995) 
and the introduction of electronic trading helped tremendously to boost the volume of shares 
traded. This observation is not offered as a justification for including this risk factor as a 
proxy for political events but rather as a point of interest. 
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The rate of change of the volume traded on the JSE was calculated as follows: 
PVOLt 
where: VOLt 
VOLt-1 
(VOLt - VOLt-1)NOLt-1 
volume of shares traded on the JSE at time t 
(R'OOO) 
volume of shares traded on the JSE at time t-1 
(R'OOO) 
For reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor was 
extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
3.1.3.2 Risk/actors affected by the economic climate 
The risk factors proxying for economic events are: 
( 1) the rate of change in the three-month bankers' acceptance rate 
(2) the rate of change of the US dollar crude oil spot price 
(3) the rate of change in the consumer price index 
( 4) the term structure of interest rates 
(5) the SACOB business confidence index 
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a The rate of change of the three-month bankers' acceptance rate 
The BA rate is the abbreviation for the bankers' acceptances rate which is the rate at which 
banks are willing to discount three-month bankers' acceptances. According to Mohr, Van der 
Merwe, Botha and Inggs (1995:6), 
A BA can therefore be formally defined as an unconditional written order addressed 
by a company (the drawer) to a bank (the drawee) that accepts to pay a particular 
amount at a specified future date to (or to the order of) the company. If the bank 
(drawee) accepts the above order, it signs it and becomes the acceptor, hence the 
term bankers' acceptance. 
Nel (1994:20) observed that" ... the general course and pattern of the BA rate after 1987 was 
to a greater degree in harmony with that of the Bank Rate than before this time." As the bank 
rate is controlled by the Reserve Bank the BA rate is in harmony with the official monetary 
policy of the Reserve Bank. 
Correia and Wormald (1987) attempted to find a relationship between the contemporaneous 
rate of inflation as a proxy for expected inflation and returns on the JSE ASI during the 
period 1960 to 1986. They found no relationship, however, when utilising short-term interest 
rates as measures of inflationary expectations. Statistically significant results were found at 
the 95 percent level of confidence. They argued that changes in these interest rates are 
driven primarily by revisions in inflationary expectations. 
The theoretical rationale for utilising short-term interest rates as measures of inflation 
expectations has its roots in the Fisher hypothesis: 
= + Bt(n) 
where: Rn nominal three-month interest rate at time t 
real interest rate at time t 
Bt(n) = expected inflation over the next three months 
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Fama (1976) observed that the value of the real interest rate is relatively small and stable in 
comparison with inflation expectations. Van Rensburg (1995), in the light of the above 
argument, used the three-month bankers' acceptance rate to proxy for inflation expectations 
in his study of the APTM. 
In light of the above empirical studies the BA rate qualifies as a proxy for economic events 
by virtue of the fact that it has been shown empirically to proxy inflation expectations and 
hence consumer prices, which by definition are a subset of economic events. However, in 
that it proxies the economic environment in another way - as illustrated by means of two 
examples - it is an even more powerful proxy for economic events. 
Kusi (1993) examined South Africa's adjustment experience in the 1980s by quantifying the 
relative importance of demand management policies. He observed that the widespread threat 
of the imposition of sanctions on trade and investment in the mid-19 80s and the refusal of 
foreign banks to defer repayments of short-term loans triggered the most serious balance of 
payments crisis that the country has ever experienced. In order to protect foreign reserves 
from capital outflows the authorities reintroduced the dual exchange rate system in 
September 19853. To maintain large surpluses on the current account in order to accumulate 
foreign reserves to service the foreign debt the authorities placed more emphasis on domestic 
demand by 
( 1) introducing tariff protection measures 
(2) introducing surcharges to reduce import demand 
(3) taking steps to achieve a real depreciation of the rand exchange rate 
( 4) raising taxes 
Kusi (1993:256) stated that " ... the tax policy was supported by interest rate increases to 
control the money supply, thereby restricting domestic demand and dampening inflationary 
pressures." 
3 The two-tier exchange rate was abolished in February 1995 (Appendix 1). 
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After South Africa joined the world economic community it was in a position to run a deficit 
on its current account as it could rely on financing this deficit through the inflow of foreign 
capital. If this deficit is not covered by net capital flows it has to be covered by running 
down gold and other foreign reserves. 
However, a continuous deficit on the overall balance of payments can have a drastic effect on 
money market interest rates. In 1996, for example, after a drop in the value of the rand 
(Appendix 1, April 1996) the sudden worsening in the balance of payments drained liquidity 
from the banking system, which in turn created a money market shortage. The Reserve Bank 
had two options for rectifying this situation, namely either to increase liquidity by injecting 
more money into the banking system (thus risking a consequent rise in inflation) or to 
increase the bank rate. As the Reserve Bank's position regarding inflation is to bring it down 
to the level of its foreign trading partners it chose to do the latter. 
The above two examples confirm the assertion by Nel (1993:140) that since the mid-
nineteen-eighties the monetary authorities have relied almost exclusively on the bank rate as 
the domestic instrument of monetary control4. 
From the above arguments it can be seen that the BA rate is sensitive and thus can proxy 
inflation expectations and monetary policy, both of which are subsets of economic events. 
Graph 3.2 shows a plot of the value of the BA rate from 16 October1988 to 21June1998. 
4 As the BA rate has been shown to be in harmony with the bank rate, this argument could apply to the BA rate. 
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GRAPHJ.2 
BA rate vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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It is interesting to note that the behaviour of the BA rate curve tends to confirm the behaviour 
of this important financial variable during the various phases of the business cycle. During 
the upward phase of the business cycle (April 1986 to February 1989)5, when monetary 
market conditions tightened towards the end of the second leg of the upswing, this was 
reflected by an upward trend in the BA rate. During the downward phase of the business 
cycle (March 1989 to May 1993)5, when money market conditions eased, this was reflected 
by a downward trend in the BA rate as shown. From June 1993 to July 19956 the upward 
phase of the business cycle is reflected by an upward trend in the BA rate for the same 
period7. These observations do not contradict our assumption that the BA rate proxies for 
economic events. Since we are interested in extracting the unexpected component of a risk 
factor and using it in our APTM, the fact that the BA rate is susceptible to unexpected 
changes in the economic environment, as shown in our argument before, is what confirms 
our assessment that this risk factor proxies for economic events. 
5 These dates were officially confirmed by the Reserve Bank. 
6 This date is an estimate of the upper turning point of the business cycle made by ABSA Bank. 
7 Comparison between the business cycle and the BA rate after July 199S is not possible, as any estimate of the 
behaviour of the business cycle would be speculative. 
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The rate of change in the three-month BA rate was calculated as follows: 
where: PINT 
BA3t = 
BA3t-1 = 
the rate of change in the BA rate 
the three-month bankers' acceptance rate at time t 
the three-month bankers' acceptance rate at time t-1 
Again, for reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor 
was extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
b The rate of chan~e of the US dollar crude spot oil price (per ba"el) 
Chen et al (1986) included inflation risk as one of the prespecified factors to be tested in their 
APTM analysis. The inflation factor was measured as the difference between actual and 
expected inflation for each period. Chen et al (1986) concluded that inflation risk was 
significantly different from zero, during the period from 1968 to 1977, but was insignificant 
before and after that period. The period of significance correlates roughly with the world oil 
crises and the resulting inflationary effects. In addition, the signs of the coefficients were 
mostly negative, which suggested to the authors that stocks were not performing as hedges 
against inflation. 
Roberts (1998) has shown that there is a high correlation between imported PPI and the year-
on-year three-month led Dubai spot crude oil price. She added that although imported PPI 
makes up only about 20 percent of the PPI, because of the fact that prices are measured at the 
level of the first commercial transaction, the PPI can provide an indication of the most likely 
trend that consumer prices will follow. 
To the extent that the price of crude oil was shown by Chen et al (1986) to proxy inflation 
and by Roberts (1998) to be sensitive to consumer prices, the selection of this risk is justified 
where it can proxy for consumer prices, which are a subset of economic events as described 
in section 3.1.2. 
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Graph 3.3 shows a plot of the US dollar Dubai spot crude oil price from 16 October1988 to 
21June1998. 
GRAPH3.3 
US dollar Dubai spot crude oil price per barrel vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21106/1998 
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The sudden jump in the crude oil price in late 1990 was entirely due to the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq. 
The gradual decline in the crude oil price from the end of 1996 onwards has helped the 
Reserve Bank to bring down inflation notwithstanding the drop in the value of the rand 
(Appendix 1, April and May 1996). 
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The rate of change of the US dollar/ crude oil spot price is measured as follows: 
PCRUDEt 
where: CRUD& 
CRUDEt-1 
= 
(CRUD& - CRUDEt_1)/CRUDEt 
US dollar Dubai crude oil spot price at time t (per 
barrel) 
US dollar Dubai crude oil spot price at time t-1 (per 
barrel) 
Again, for reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor 
was extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
c The rate of change in the consumer price index 
Even though Correia and Wormald (1987) found no relationship between returns on the JSE, 
the ASI and the current rate of inflation, this would be consistent with the APT model since 
only unexpected changes in inflation should be a factor. Reese (1993) adopted this attitude 
and used the unexpected percentage change in the consumer price index for all items in her 
study of the APTM in South Africa. 
The same attitude is adopted here, but since there is a lag of two months in the publication of 
the monthly CPI figure, a two-month time lag is necessary when this variable is included in 
the data set. According to Paseran and Timmerman (1995:1208), this is standard practice in 
finance when dealing with such data. 
Graph 3.4 shows a plot of the consumer price index (CPI) from 16 October1988 to 21 June 
1998. 
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GRAPH3.4 
Consumer price index (CPI) vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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The selection of this risk is justified to the extent that consumer prices are a subset of 
economic events as described in section 3.1.2. 
The rate of change in the consumer price index is therefore calculated as follows: 
PCPI2t 
where: CPI2 
CPl21_1 
(CPl21 - CPl2t_1)/CPI2t-l 
the two-month time lag figure for the consumer 
price index 
CPI2 at time t 
CPI2 at time t-1 
Again, for reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor 
was extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
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d The term structure of interest rates 
The relationship between short-term and long-term rates, on a particular day, on debt 
instruments that are alike in all characteristics except maturity, is known as the term structure 
of interest rates. This relationship is usually represented graphically as a yield curve. 
Interest rate levels for short-term and long-term financial markets are determined 
independently by supply and demand in each market. This has the effect of shaping the yield 
curve. 
An upward-sloping yield curve is regarded as a normal yield curve. Longer rates are usually 
higher than short-term rates to allow for the time and risks involved. However, the curve 
flattens or inverts when monetary conditions tighten. 
During these periods, it is logical that many observers would come to expect the high and 
rising level of interest rates to push the economy into a recession which would subsequently 
cause interest rates to decline. The yield curve would flatten or invert at these times because 
observers were expecting interest rates to be lower in future. Because share prices are also 
driven by this influence, one would expect a close relationship to exist between the yield 
curve and share returns. 
Nel (1994) found that the slope of the yield curve is positively related to the growth in the 
real GDP. Nel (1994:22) stated the following: 
If the short term rate is below the long term rate . . . monetary policy is now 
accommodating and funds will be channelled into capital formation, providing 
momentum to the economic upswing. In the opposite case, which prevails around 
the peak and first section of the subsequent downswing in the business cycle, the 
bank's return on long-term lending is less than the cost of funds, with the result that 
lending is restricted. 
61 
In "The term structure of interest rates and economic activity in South Africa" Nel (1996) 
confirmed that the above description of the changes in the shape of the yield curve reflects 
the business cycle. Kaufman (1981) stated that this cyclical pattern of the yield curve is 
consistent with all three of the main term structure theories, namely the expectations, 
liquidity premium and market segmentation theories. 
Nel (1996:169) concluded that: 
The ability of the yield curve to reflect future interest rate levels and (as in this 
paper) real economic activity, will amongst other factors, depend on the monetary 
control mechanism used in a particular country. If control is focused on short-term 
interest rates (which is presently the case in South Africa), and given that the long-
term rate is largely market determined - the slope of the yield curve is basically the 
result of monetary policy. 
As the "yield curve is basically the result of monetary policy" the term structure of interest 
rates is an effective proxy for monetary policy which is a subset of the economic news 
events. 
A measure of the term structure of interest rates was taken to be the difference in yields 
between three-month and 10-year default-free bonds. 
GILTlOt -TBILL 
where: TS the term structure of interest rates 
GILTlO yield on 10-year government bonds 
TB ILL the yield on three-month treasury bills 
Graphs 3.5 and 3.6 show plots of the 3-month treasury bill rate and the 10-year Government 
bond rate from 16 October1988 to 21June1998. 
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GRAPH3.7 
Term structure of interest rates vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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It is interesting to note that following the rise in inflation (Appendix 1, September 1994) the 
Reserve Bank adopted a stricter monetary policy which caused the fixed interest market to 
become more attractive and subsequently caused the yield curve to invert as shown above. 
In order to simultaneously eliminate nonstationarity, which is necessary for the subsequent 
time-series modelling, and obtain a measure of changes in this variable, the first difference of 
TS was taken: 
where: changes in the term structure of interest rates 
at time t 
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e The rate of change of the SA COB business confidence index 
Every month, the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) publishes a figure which 
gives an indication of the business confidence prevailing in the country. SACOB'S index 
does not measure confidence specifically. SACOB's business confidence index (BCI) is a 
composite index, tracking the performance of 13 key economic indicators which have been 
judged by business to have the greatest bearing on the mood of businesses. 
The following indicators currently make up the BCI: 
(1) the average monthly exchange rate of the rand in terms of US dollars 
(2) the rate of inflation, as measured by the consumer price index 
(3) the three-month bankers' acceptance (BA) rate 
(4) seasonally-adjusted retail sales in constant price terms 
(5) the 12-month outlook of manufacturers on skilled and unskilled employment as 
reflected by SA COB' s manufacturing survey - three-month moving average 
(6) the gold price in dollar terms, as fixed on the London Metal Exchange 
(7) merchandise imports in real terms 
(8) merchandise exports in real terms 
(9) the total number of new vehicles sold 
(10) the physical volume of manufacturing production- seasonally adjusted 
(11) the seasonally adjusted value of building plans passed in constant price terms 
( 12) the number of insolvencies of individuals and partnerships - seasonally adjusted 
(13) the price of shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange as indicated by the 
JSE overall index 
From the composition of this index it can be seen that with the possible exception of 
components (6) and (13), all other components fall under subsets of economic news. 
Component (1) falls under balance of payments, (2) under consumer prices, (3) under 
monetary policy, (4) under retail sales, (5) under employment, (7) and (8) under balance of 
payments, (9) under retail sales, (10) under economic output, (11) under housing starts and 
(12) under personal income. Both the physical composition of the SACOB BCI and the 
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primary function of this index of acting as a barometer of the economic environment justifies 
its selection as a proxy for economic news events. 
Another index which measures business confidence is released monthly by the Stellenboch 
Bureau for Economic Research. This composite business confidence index canvasses 
sentiment among executives in the trade, manufacturing and construction sectors. 
Managers of small and medium enterprises are asked, every month, to rank current business 
conditions as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. The response is measured on a scale of zero to 
100, where zero reflects deep pessimism and 50 is neutral. 
The decision to use the SACOB Business Confidence Index (BCI) instead of the Stellenbosch 
Bureau for Economic Research Composite Business Confidence Index was motivated to a 
large extent by the ability of this index to proxy for economic events. Futhermore as the 
SACOB BCI is more widely used and is available directly from I-Net, which was the data 
source used by the researcher for this study, it was decided to use this index in preference to 
the one provided by the Stellenbosch Bureau for Economic Research. 
The SACOB BCI is compiled by the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) and its 
primary function is to provide an indication of business confidence in the country for the 
information of the members of SACOB. In that SACOB's members are businessmen and are 
primarily interested in the economic ramifications of this index, its function is to interpret the 
effect of the economic environment on business confidence. This is reflected by the 
composition of this index, which is made up mainly of economic indicators. 
It is interesting to note that SACOB became an agent of political change between 1990 and 
the national elections in 1994. Their publication, Business Voice, stated in 1977 that they 
had done this by becoming an "honest broker" between the business community and the 
major political players at the time, namely the National Party government and the ANC. For 
example, they visited the ANC in Lusaka before it was unbanned in order to convey their 
views on the economy, they made representations to the ANC to present a case for the lifting 
of sanctions before the elections, they sent numerous delegations to the National Party 
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government and the ANC to persuade them to resume talks when negotiations foundered and 
they submitted various policy recommendations to all parties. 
Graph 3.8 shows a plot of the SACOB BCI from 16 October1988 to 21June1998. 
GRAPHJ.8 
The SACOB BCI vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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As there is a lag of one month in the publication of the index, it is necessary to allow for a 
one-month lag when this variable is included in the data set. According to Paseran and 
Timmerman (1995:1208), this is standard practice in finance when dealing with such data. 
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The rate of change in the SACOB business confidence index is calculated as follows: 
PSACOBlt (SACOBlt - SACOBl1_1)/SACOBlt-1 
where: SACOBl the one-month lag in the SACOB BCI 
SACOBl1 SA COB 1 at time t 
SACOBlt-i SA COB 1 at time t-1 
Again, for reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor 
was extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
3.1.3.3 The rate of change of the Dow-Jones industrial index 
There can be little doubt that a link exists between the stock markets of the world. Events 
such as the 1987 crash, which was an international phenomenon, lend support to this 
contention. Bradfield (1990:2) argues that the NYSE is the most internationally influential 
stock market. He substantiates this claim by observing that the NYSE index is the index most 
highly correlated with other international stock market indices. Bradfield (1990) investigated 
the influence of the NYSE on the behaviour of securities on the JSE. He found that 19 out of 
his sample of 30 randomly selected shares displayed statistically significant sensitivities to 
dollar returns on the Dow-Jones . 
Graph 3.9 shows a plot of the Dow-Jones index from 16 Octoberl988 to 21June1998. 
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GRAPH3.9 
Dow-Jones industrial index vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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The close relationship between the Dow-Jones industrial index and the JSE is apparent when 
comparing graph 3.9 with graph 3.10, which shows the financial and industrial index of the 
JSE over the same period. 
GRAPH3.10 
JSE, financial and industrial index vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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Accordingly, it was decided to utilise unexpected dollar returns on the Dow-Jones index as a 
potential factor. Returns on the Dow-Jones index were measured as follows: 
where: DJt =the value of the Dow-Jones index at time t 
DJt.1 = the value of the Dow-Jones index at time t-1 
Again, for reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor 
was extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
3.1.3.4 The rate of change of the US dollar gold price 
The importance of the gold mining industry to the South African economy is well known and 
the relationship between the gold price and the profitability ohhis industry is indisputable. 
It can be argued that the gold price will affect the numerator of the NPV valuation formula. 
Reese (1993:28) observes: 
Apart from the obvious impact of the higher gold price increasing the revenues of 
the mines . . . the gold price affects the economy in several other different ways, in 
particular: as a direct stimulus to certain industries through demand for products to 
be used on the mines; as a substantial provider of foreign exchange; and as an 
important source of government revenue from taxation. The mining sector also 
attracts foreign resources, including capital and skills which can be used in the 
industrial sector and is an important employer. In addition, there is an indirect 
stimulus on the rest of the economy. This so-called "trickle-down" effect is caused 
by creating demand in other industries [due, for example, to wage disbursements to 
employees of the gold mining industry] and hence higher income. 
Barr (1990) applied the covariance-biplot methodology in an attempt to identify the 
macroeconomic variables which accord closely with the factors extracted on the JSE. He 
specifically excluded the shares comprising the all-gold index from his study in order to 
avoid allowing the gold price to dominate his analysis. He nevertheless found that the gold 
price correlated strongly with one of the two identified factors underlying industrial shares. 
This led Barr to propose that economic activity in South Africa is to a large degree driven by 
the levels of gold/metal prices through their direct effect on the mining sector and their 
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various filter-through effects on the rest of the economy. To the extent that the price of gold 
influences share returns, it was included as a risk factor. 
Graph 3.11 shows a plot of the US dollar gold price per ounce from 16 October1988 to 21 
June 1998. 
GRAPH3.11 
US dollar gold price per ounce vs time from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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As can be seen from the graph above, the gold price declined steadily from the beginning of 
1997, reaching an 18-year low by the end of 1997, and causing a decline in the gold mining 
industry (Appendix 1, July 1997). 
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The rate of change in the dollar/gold price was measured as follows: 
PDGOLDt (DGOLDt - DGOLDt-1)/DGOLDt-1 
where: DGOLDt the US dollar gold price at time t (per ounce) 
DGOLDt-1 the US dollar gold price at time t-1 (per ounce) 
Again, for reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor 
was extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
3.1.3.5 The rate of change in dividends 
Dividends influence the expected cash flow accruing to shareholders of assets i at time t in 
equation 2.2, which gives the basic share valuation. This formula shows the price of a share 
to be equal to the net present value of all expected cash flows accruing to the shareholder by 
virtue of his or her ownership of this asset. Therefore the inclusion of dividends as a risk 
factor is justified because this has a direct influence on share returns. 
Graph 3.12 shows a plot of the dividend yield for the financial and industrial sectors from 16 
October1988 to 21June1998. 
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GRAPHJ.12 
Dividend yield for the financial and industrial sectors of the JSE vs time from 
16/10/1988 to 21106/1998 
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As can be seen above, the dividend yield has declined steadily since the liberalisation of 
foreign exchange laws after the national elections in April 1994. A possible reason for this is 
that because the industrial giants had been prevented by foreign exchange controls from 
investing abroad they had been buying into each other's companies for years. The result was 
a formidable tangle of cross holdings where the four biggest companies, namely Anglo 
American, Sanlam, Rembrandt and Old Mutual, controlled about three-quarters of the JSE by 
1994. After the liberalisation of foreign exchange controls, instead of paying high dividends 
to their stock holders, public companies started investing overseas, especially in places like 
Mozambique (Appendix 1, May 1996) and West Africa (Appendix 1, May 1996). 
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Paseran and Timmerman ( 1995) included the dividend yield as a candidate risk factor in their 
multifactor asset pricing model. It was decided not to use the dividend yield as a risk factor 
but rather to use dividends instead. The reason for this is that the dividend yield is calculated 
as: 
DY (dividends/financial and industrial index) x 100 
The dividend yield (DY), by virtue of its having the financial and industrial index in its 
denominator, is highly correlated with the financial and industrial index and, since this index 
is the dependent variable in the regression equation (LFM), it is not suitable. 
This problem was overcome by using the dividends as the risk factor. The dividend was 
calculated by multiplying the dividend yield by the financial and industrial index. 
The rate of change of dividends was calculated as follows: 
= 
where: 
IFDIVt-I = 
the dividends of the financial and industrial sector at 
timet 
the dividends of the financial and industrial sector at 
time t-1 
Again, for reasons given in the previous chapter, the unexpected component of the risk factor 
was extracted from the rate of change in the risk factor. 
74 
3.1.3.6 The residual market risk/actor 
The residual market factor represents that variation in the market that is unexplained by the 
prespecified macroeconomic variables. The reason for including this variable in this study is 
that it is essential if we are to undertake an ITNLSUR analysis at a later stage (McElroy & 
Burmeister 1988:33). 
Although the factor is unobservable, it can be estimated by fk as shown below. The returns on 
a market proxy portfolio (wi, ... wN) are given by: 
where: 
J J 
rmt= Aot+ L bmjAj+bmKA.K+ L bmjfjt+bmKfKt+Emt 
j=l j=l 
N 
b . = L wb-· illj l IJ 
i =1 
N 
bmk= L wibik 
i = 1 
N 
Emt = L WjCit 
i = 1 
Assuming that fKt can be normalised, so that bmk = 1 and setting Emto the asset-specific risk in 
the market portfolio equal to zero (because of diversification), the model can be restated as: 
J J 
rmt= Aot+ L bmjAj+ AK+ L bmjfjt+fKtt 
j=l j=l 
Furthermore, A.m can be defined as: 
J 
Am= L bmjAj+ AK 
j = 1 
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so that the equation can be reduced to: 
J 
rmt = Aot + Am + L bmjfjt + f Kt 
j = 1 
where Am denotes the excess expected return on the market (ie in excess of the risk-free rate). 
Of the variables in this equation, rmi, Aot and fjt are measured and input into the model and Ara, 
bmj can be estimated using ordinary least squares regression techniques. 
An estimate for f Kt can then be obtained from the resulting OLS error term of the model, and 
can thus be treated as an estimate of an unobserved residual market factor that can be 
included in the APT model. 
This section draws on Reese (1993). 
3.1.4 Extracting the unexpected component of risk factors 
In accordance with the arbitrage price theory (ch 2, sec 2.3), risk factors must be treated in 
order to calculate their unexpected movement. 
Van Rensburg (1995:54) states the following: 
The macroeconomic variables selected in this study are, or are directly derived from, 
market determined "prices". Assuming a reasonable degree of efficiency on the 
NYSE, the gold market and the South African bond market, the magnitudes of these 
variables are themselves the embodiments of expectations and, hence, not amenable 
to prediction. Expected values of these variables may be estimated by focusing on 
the returns on each of the financial assets incorporated in the derivation of the 
factors. As all of the variables are composed of financial assets, asset pricing 
theories such as the CAPM can be utilised to estimate expected returns. This study 
however adopts a simpler approach: It is not unreasonable to argue that the average 
monthly realised return over the sample period approximates the average monthly 
expected return. This could be attributed to the notion that rational investors' 
expectations are unbiased i.e. they do not consistently over or underestimate returns. 
In this case, averaging realised returns over an extended period would diversify 
away the effect of their random estimation errors and the figure arrived at would 
closely approximate average expected returns measured over the same time period. 
Thus, an initial estimate of the factor values are obtained by subtracting the mean 
value of the macrovariables from their realised values in each period. 
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In addition, unexpected movements in a variable should not be able to be predicted 
from its past values. Thus, time-series modelling is utilised to forecast values of the 
above initial factor estimates and deviations from this forecast are taken to be 
unexpected. This step also aids in the correction of the deficiencies of the first step. 
In essence, using time series modeling, the macro-economic series were detrended 
in order to obtain a measure of their unexpected movements. The factor estimates 
derived in this manner should be void of auto-correlation. This was checked by 
viewing auto-correlation functions and Q statistics. 
Priestley (1996:870) expresses agreement in the following passage: 
A condition required of the unanticipated components, however, is that they should 
be mean-zero, serially uncorrelated white-noise processes. Accordingly, any 
expectations process we specify must, at least, provide unanticipated components 
that satisfy these properties. 
However, he goes on to say the following: 
The alternative methodology for generating unexpected components we specify, 
based upon the Kalman filter, does meet the basic requirements of providing, first, 
unexpected components which are innovations and, second, an expectations 
generating process which does avoid the possibility of agents making systematic 
forecast errors. 
However, in order to compare our results with those produced by Van Rensburg (1996) and 
since the results of the out-of-sample analysis indicate that there is not much difference 
between the mean-squared errors from the models using the Kalman filter and the models 
using the autoregressive corrected factors (Priestley 1996:888), it was decided to use the 
autoregressive corrected factors in combination with the "rate of change" technique. 
This decision is not unreasonable because it is consistent with that used by Clare et al 
(1997:649), which they describe as follows: 
In order to generate the shocks from the underlying macro-economic variables we 
began by estimating auto-regressive models up to order 12 for each of the variables. 
After simplifying these models according to mis-specification tests we collected the 
residuals from these models and used these residuals as the shock in each of the 
underlying macro-economic factors. . . . Since the generated shocks are residuals 
from an OLS regression, they are all mean zero, as required by the APT; in addition 
they are all serially uncorrelated. 
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The unexpected movements in the factors were extracted as follows: 
( 1) Calculating the rate of change. The rate of change of each risk factor was calculated as 
this removes the inflationary effect on factors which have monetary measures such as the 
gold price. The net effect of this is the elimination of nonstationarity in the data. 
(2) Removal of autocorrelation. As Kim and Sall (1993:187) explain: 
Ordinary regression analysis is based on several statistical assumptions. One 
key assumption is that the errors are independent of each other. However, with 
time series data, the ordinary regression residuals usually are correlated over 
time. It is not desirable to use ordinary regression analysis for time series data 
since the assumptions on which the classical linear regression model is based 
will usually be violated. 
Violation of the independent errors assumption has three important 
consequences for ordinary regression. Firstly, statistical tests of the significance 
of the parameters and the confidence limits for the predicted values are not 
correct. Secondly, the estimates of the regression coefficients are not as 
efficient as they would be if the autocorrelation were taken into account. 
Thirdly, since the ordinary regression residuals are not independent, they 
contain information that can be used to improve the prediction of future values. 
The AUTOREG procedure solves this problem by augmenting the regression 
model with an autoregressive model for the random error, thereby accounting 
for the autocorrelation of the errors. Instead of the usual regression model, the 
following auto-regressive error model is used: 
Yt 
Et IN(O,a2) 
The notation Et~ IN(O,a2) indicates that each Et is normally and independently 
distributed with mean 0 and variance a 2. 
By simultaneously estimating the regression co-efficients f3 and the auto-
regressive error model parameters <l>i. the AUTOREG procedure corrects the 
regression estimates for autocorrelation. Thus, this kind of regression analysis is 
often called auto-regressive error correction or serial correlation correction ... 
The R= ... option specifies output variable for the ... residual, computed as the 
actual value minus the predicted value. 
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In other words, where autocorrelation is detected, the component of the factor which can 
be predicted because of this autocorrelation is removed by extracting the residuals of 
autoregressive time-series models designed to forecast future values of the factor. 
Using the AUTOREG procedure and MODEL procedure SAS commands in the ETS 
submodule of the SAS computer software package, a simultaneous test for autoregression 
on each risk factor for up to 12 time lags was performed, and where it was detected, it 
was removed. 
(3) Bringing the factor mean to zero. Following Burmeister and Wall (1986), a constant is 
added to the risk factor(s) to ensure that the mean is zero. As Van Rensburg (1996:106) 
explains: 
This manipulation is justified by the assumption that the average expected 
monthly change in the underlying macrovariable, is equal to its average realised 
monthly change over the period of the same. This assumption conforms to the 
notion of rational expectations, that rational investors will not consistently over-
or underestimate returns over a sustained period of time and is equivalent to 
assuming that the long-term trend in the underlying macrovariable is expected. 
The necessity of undertaking this step arises when a risk factor is not treated to correct for 
autoregression. The reason is that the residuals from step 2 are residuals from an OLS 
regression and hence are all mean zero (Clare et al 1997:649). Since all the risk factors 
were treated for autoregression, this step was redundant. 
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3.2 SHARE SELECTION 
A share selection technique similar to that utilised by Reese (1993) was used in this study. 
The following criteria were used to select the share sample: 
(1) The shares must be listed on the JSE for the entire duration of the study. 
(2) The shares should be frequently traded so that the market price at a particular date could 
be assumed to be an accurate measure of the market's assessment of the worth of the 
share. 
(3) The shares should represent a high percentage of the market capitalisation of the JSE, but 
should also include a mix of large and small firms, given the evidence in American 
studies that small firms appear to earn higher returns than their larger counterparts. 
( 4) Where possible, the sample should exclude shares which are not active or do not operate 
( eg the companies known as "cash shells" on the JSE) and also those which are the top 
company in a group pyramid structure (and as such are purely investment companies of 
other companies in the group). The inclusion of these shares would effectively be 
duplicating a share already in the sample and would thus be of limited use. 
These being the selection criteria, it seemed logical to consider the shares chosen as the 
components of a market index as a useful guide. 
The JSE was notorious for the low volume of shares traded on the market - a phenomenon 
known as "thin trading". Before the recent introduction of the computer on-line trading 
system (JET) the annual turnover was only 6 percent of the total market capitalisation. This 
has since improved to 30 percent, but it is still well below the turnover percentages of 65 
percent for the NYSE. 
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The infrequency of trading means that the share price is not necessarily a good indicator of 
the market's assessment of the true worth of the share. Thin trading is problematic for any 
tests using JSE share prices. Thinly traded shares can lead to results that are less significant 
than those for well-traded shares. Barr and Bradfield (1988) reported that thin trading has an 
impact on both share prices and market indices. Another problem is that when thinly traded 
shares are used in a regression, the error term is heteroscedastic. This problem was dealt with 
as follows: 
The weekly trading volumes of the selected shares were examined. If a share failed to trade 
in 20 weeks out of the 10 years (two weeks per year), then the share was excluded from the 
sample. A similar approach had been previously used by Page (1986), in his study of the APT 
on the JSE. Page eliminated all shares which did not trade for more than two consecutive 
weeks. These methods do not attempt to adjust for the effects of thin trading on the share 
prices or the market indices (as performed by Dimson 1979), but simply sidestep the problem 
by choosing shares that are known to be well traded. Hence some of the problems of thin 
trading should be obviated. 
Reese (1993:45) deals with the problem of market coverage as follows: 
The share sample should cover a sufficiently large percentage of market 
capitalisation of the JSE (share price multiplied by the number of shares in issue). In 
addition, no one sector or industry should be dominant in relation to the others. The 
sample should represent the JSE fairly accurately in terms of its nature and 
composition. If one sector dominates the sample, then a factor specific to that sector 
could be indicated as a priced factor, when it is essentially sector-specific risk and 
so could be eliminated by portfolio diversification. For example, ifthere was a high 
percentage of tin-mining shares in the sample, then the results might indicate that 
the world price of tin was a priced factor. Market-wide, the tin-price is unlikely to 
affect all shares and so cannot be considered to be a systematic risk factor in the 
APT. 
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In his selection of shares to test the APTM on the JSE, Slaney (1995:41) agrees with Reese's 
(1993) methodology with one exception: 
While Reese (1993), excluded "cash shells" and other nonoperational firms (such as 
the ultimate holding company in a pyramid structure), these companies were not 
excluded from this study for three reasons: 
(1) The subsidiaries of such companies were often afflicted by thin trading and thus 
excluded from the sample. Hence there was unlikely to be excessive double 
counting. Also, the inclusion of the holding company would allow for the 
inclusion of the prospects of these subsidiaries (although indirectly) which would 
otherwise not have been possible. 
(2) The holding companies may be affected by the macroeconomic factors in 
different ways to their subsidiaries if they are merely cash shells. To exclude 
them would lead to the exclusion of companies with these potentially separate 
effects. They were listed companies in their own right and the models used 
should also fit their return-risk profiles. 
(3) Investors themselves do not differentiate between these companies and 
operational companies. They are concerned only with the return they expect to 
earn and the risk they bear, not the operations of the company (Markowitz: 1952). 
Following the procedure outlined above, the components of the financial and industrial sector 
index (FINDI30) were examined. However, only those shares which remained as constituents 
of this index over the entire period were included. This narrowed the sample of shares from 
30 to 15. A further 43 shares were chosen. They met the criteria of continuous listing and 
active trading. Of these, 28 shares had been chosen by Slaney (1995) for his share sample. 
Nine shares were chosen in order to strengthen the banking and insurance sectors. (Banks 
were underrepresented since many only listed from 1987 onwards after a change in 
legislation made it easier for banks to become public companies.) Five shares were chosen to 
strengthen an assortment of other sectors. 
The final selection of 57 shares is shown in Appendix 2. 
As in the case of Page (1986), Barr (1990), Reese (1993) and Van Rensburg (1996), when 
calculating the ratio of change on each of the shares chosen, because of the nonavailability of 
data, dividends were excluded from the analysis. 
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The dependent variable in our linear factor model is the financial and industrial index. To 
facilitate compatibility with the ITSUR methodology, the excess return realisation on the 
financial and industrial index was used. This was calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate 
from the financial and industrial rate. The three-month treasury bill tender rate was used as a 
proxy for the risk-free rate. Slaney (1995) provides arguably the most comprehensive 
explanation for the use of this instrument in the South African context: 
The risk free Rate (Rr) is the return on an asset which has zero variance (ie the 
theoretical Rr is constant across all periods), and zero covariance with the returns on 
all risky assets . . . In practice, there is no asset for which returns are constant, but to 
empirically test either model, a proxy is needed that is as free of risk as possible. 
The most risk-free asset available is usually taken to be the return on Government 
Bonds or Treasury Bills (T-Bills). The reason for this is that the default risk (as 
opposed to the interest rate risk), is zero for two reasons: 
1. The government has a large incentive to ensure it does not default on its debts. 
Were it to do so, it would not be able to raise further debt in the future, hence 
crippling the economy. 
2. Were the government ever to be short of cash to meet its debt commitments, it 
could raise taxes or increase the money supply to generate such cash. The only 
time this would not be possible would be where the economy of the country had 
already collapsed. In any financial model, an implicit assumption must be, that 
the country as a whole is a "going concern". 
Government instruments are, however, still subject to interest rate risk (ie. the risk 
that the value of the instrument will change, with a change in the market rate of 
· interest) and are thus not completely risk free as required by the theory. The risk-
free rate will thus change with the market rate of interest. Thus, when the T-Bill rate 
is used, Rr should more accurately be written as Rti:. ie. the risk-free rate in period t. 
Merton (1973), states that risk-free assets need only be riskless for instants of time, 
provided that continuous trading is allowed. This does not, however, require further 
assumptions and theoretical grounding. Scholes (1971), quoted in Merton (1973, 
883), found the correlation coefficient between the market portfolio and a portfolio 
of bonds to be near zero, meaning that empirically, the required zero co-variance 
between Rr and all risky asset returns holds approximately. Thus, the return on 
Government Bonds is an acceptable approximation of Rr. 
The 90 day T-Bill rate was used as the proxy for the risk-free rate in this study. This 
rate displayed a low level of correlation with returns on all the market indices 
employed. It had a correlation co-efficient of 0.014 with the ALSI, -0.073 with the 
Gold Index and 0.044 with the industrial index. These correlation coefficients are 
considered sufficiently low for the 90-day T-Bill rate to be considered free of 
systematic risk, irrespective of the market proxy used. 
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However, government instruments offering different maturities exist, typically split 
between short term T-Bills with a maturity of up to three months, and long term 
government bonds. The typical proxy for the risk-free asset is the short term T-Bill, 
but there is nothing in the theory precluding the use of a longer term Government 
Bond. 
Pringle and Harris (1984), quoted in Firer (1993, 26), suggested that the maturity of 
the risk-free asset be matched to the maturity of the investor's intended holding 
period. Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1993), Gilbertson (1979) and Brealey and 
Myers (1990), all quoted in Firer (1993, 26-28), as well as Firer himself, all 
suggested the use of the three month T-Bill rate as a proxy for Rr. Harrington ( 1987), 
stated that the zero variance property of the T-Bill only holds for short periods of 
time and thus advocated the use of a T-Bill with as short a maturity as possible, 
while still trying to match its maturity with that of the investment. 
In South African studies several proxies have been used for Rr, including a 360 day 
T-Bill, a 90 day T-Bill and the 12 month fixed deposit rate (Firer, 1993). The 90 
day T-Bill rate was the shortest government rate available in South Africa for which 
data was quoted on the I-Net database. It is also the government instrument with a 
maturity as close to the implicit holding period of one month as possible. 
The excess return on the financial and industrial index was calculated as follows: 
(3.1) 
where: = F & I index at time t 
FIINDt-l = F & I index at time t-1 
= treasury bill 3-month tender rate at time t 
Finally, to test if the 57 shares chosen could truly proxy for the financial and industrial index, 
an index was constructed representing the 57 shares where each share was weighted in the 
index according to its market capitalisation (this method is consistent with that used in the 
construction of the F & I index). Although information necessary in calculating the index for 
the whole period was not available on the I-NET, using available information it was 
established that during the period November 1994 to March 1998 the Pearson's correlation 
coefficient between this index and the financial and industrial index was .94033. 
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3.3 SELECTION OF INSTRUMENTS 
Following the arguments presented by Burmeister and McElroy (1998), allowance has to be 
made for the possibility that the market portfolio is an endogenous variable. This requires 
that a market portfolio, defined here as the excess returns on the financial and industrial 
index, be included as a risk factor to replace the residual market factor of the ITNLSUR 
approach. Simultaneously, an equation defining the market portfolio as the dependent 
variable to the nine risk factors has to be added to the other 57 share returns that have to be 
simultaneously solved. 
Since the market portfolio is an exogenous variable in all equations except the 58th and an 
endogenous variable in the 58th equation, using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
method to estimate these equations produces biased estimates. 
Erdman, Little and Sall (1993:553) suggest that one solution to this problem is to replace this 
factor on the right-hand side of the equations (exogenous variable) with predicted values. A 
method of estimating the predicted values is known as instrumental regression. An 
instrumental regression is a regression of the dependent regressors on a set of instrumental 
variables which may be any independent variables useful for predicting the dependent 
regressors. This method is known as two-stage least square or 2SLS. Furthermore, if as in this 
case the equation system is simultaneous, it is possible to combine the 2SLS and seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) methods to take into account both dependent regressors and 
cross-equation correlation of the errors. This method is called the three-stage least squares 
(3SLS). 
The following guidelines on choosing instrumental variables are provided by Erdman et al 
(1993:591): 
There is no standard method for choosing instruments for nonlinear regression. Few 
econometric textbooks discuss the selection of instruments for nonlinear models ... 
The purpose of the instrumental projection is to purge the regressors of their 
correlation with the residual. For non-linear systems, the regressors are the partials 
of the residuals with respect to the parameters. 
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Possible instrumental variables include: 
1. Any variable in the model that is independent of the errors. 
2. Lags of variables in the system. 
3. Derivatives with respect to the parameters, if the derivatives are independent of 
the errors. 
4. Low degree polynomials in the exogenous variables. 
5. Variables from the data set or functions of variables from the data set. 
Selected instruments must not: 
1. Depend on any variable endogenous with respect to the equations estimated. 
2. Depend on any of the parameters estimated. 
3. Be lags of endogenous variables ifthere is serial correlation of the errors. 
If the preceding rules are satisfied and there are enough observations to support the 
number of instruments used, the results should be consistent and the efficiency loss 
held to a minimum. 
At least as many instruments as the maximum number of parameters in any equation 
are needed, otherwise some of the parameters cannot be estimated. Note that 
number of instruments means linearly independent instruments. If you add an 
instrument that is a linear combination of other instruments, it has no effect and does 
not increase the effective number of instruments. 
However, too many instruments can be used. To obtain the benefit of instrumental 
variables, more observations than instruments are needed. Thus, there is a trade-off; 
the instrumental variables technique completely eliminates the simultaneous 
equation bias only in large samples. In finite samples, the larger the excess of 
observations over instruments, the more the bias is reduced. Adding more 
instruments can improve the efficiency, but after some point, efficiency declines as 
the excess of observations over instruments becomes smaller and the bias grows. 
Following the suggestions of Amemiya (1977) and consistent with Priestley (1996), the 
researcher specified as instruments current and squared values of the exogenous variables 
(nine risk factors) and instrumented for the market portfolio the returns on the mining 
financial index, squared values of the returns on this index and the fitted values and squared 
fitted values from a regression of the return on the market portfolio on the nine factors. 
The returns on the mining financial index were chosen as an instrument for the market 
portfolio because these returns should not have any correlation with the error in the market (F 
& I index) portfolio equation. 
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3.4 DATA SOURCE 
The share price data and the financial and economic data were obtained from I-NET. This 
data base is maintained and updated on a daily basis for share splits, consolidations and de-
listings. 
• The monthly data used cover the period March 1985 to May 1998. 
• The weekly data used cover the period 14 August 1998 to 28 June 1998. 
• The daily data used cover the period 8 August 1988 to 15 July 1998. 
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CHAPTER4 
MODELS TO TEST THE HYPOTHESES 
4.1 THE RECURSIVE LINEAR FACTOR MODEL 
The conventional way of testing the APTM (Van Rensburg 1996) is to find the most 
significant risk factors in the LFM and then to confirm whether or not they are priced in the 
APTM. 
To establish which risk factors are priced and when they are priced in the LFM applicable on 
the JSE (financial and industrial sector), during the period 1 April 1988 to 31 March 1998, 
the researcher used the model developed by Paseran and Timmerman (1995). 
This is a recursive model, which kept a running score of which risk factors entered or left the 
LFM month by month, from 1April1988 to 31March1998. 
The base set of nine risk factors was established in the previous chapter (sec 3.1). At each 
point in time, the optimal model specification was searched for and a note made of which 
risk factors were priced. 
Suppose that, at each point in time, t, we calculate from a base set of k factors, all possible 
excess return regressions. Standard statistical criteria for model selection are applied to the 
set of regression models spanned by all possible permutations of the k factors/regressors 
xi, x2, ... , xk in the base set. This gives a total of 2k different models, each of which is 
uniquely identified by a number, i, between 1 and 2k. Consider a k x 1 selection vector, vi, 
composed of ones and zeros, where a one in its jth element means that the jth regressor is 
included in the model, whereas a zero in its jth element means that this regressor is excluded 
from the model. The model i (denoted by Mi), can be represented by the k-digit string of 
zeros and ones corresponding to the binary code of its number. Denoting the number of 
regressors included in model Mi by ki, then ki = e1 vi> where e is a k x 1 vector of ones. 
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Suppose that p t. the excess return at time t, is forecast by means of linear regressions 
Mi : P't+l = '31 i~,i + Ct+l,i 't = 1, 2, .. ., t - 1. (4.1) 
Where Xt,i is a (ki + 1) x 1 vector of regressors under model Mi, obtained as a subset of the 
base set of regressors, ~' chosen at the beginning of the experiments, plus a vector of ones 
for the intercept term. Conditional on model Mi and given the observations Pt+h ~.i, -r = 1, 2, 
... , t - 1 (with t 2: k + 2 ), parameters of model Mi can be estimated by the 
" ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Denoting these estimates by f3t,i we have 
for t=k+2,K+3, ... ,T, 
and i = 1, ... , 2k 
The OLS estimates are fairly simple to compute and in view of the Gauss-Markov theorem, 
are reasonably robust, even in the presence of non-normal errors in the excess return 
equation. 
The particular choice ofXt,i to be used in the forecasting of Pt+I will be based on a number of 
statistical model selection criteria suggested in the literature. The selection criteria to be used 
will be the R2 and Akaike's information criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1973). These criteria are 
likelihood-based and assign different weights to the "parsimony" and "fit" of the models. The 
,.., 
"fit" is measured by the maximised value of the log-likelihood function (LL), and the 
"parsimony" by the number of freely estimated coefficients. At time t, and under model Mi, 
we have 
where: 
A A 
LLt,i = :! { 1 + log(2ncr2 t,i) } 
2 
A. 
(J2. = t,1 
t-1 
""'( 1" 2 ~ Pt+I - X t,i f3 t,i) It 
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The Akaike model selection criterion can be written as: 
A 
AICt. = L1 . - (k + 1) 
,I .l.Jt,l 1 
The R.2 criterion, originally suggested by Theil (1958) as a criterion for selecting regressors in 
a linear regression model, is given by: 
where: 
2 
er t,i 
-2 -R ti - 1 -
, S2p,t 
rl 
cr\i is the unbiased estimator of cr2 given by: 
t-1 
,., " 
cr\i = L (Pi:+ 1 - x! i:,i 13t,i) 2 /( t-ki - 1 ), 
t=O 
S2 p,t = L (Pi: - Pt)21(t - 1) is the sample variance for the first t observations on p, 
r-1 
- -I~ 
and Pt = t £... Pi:· 
i;=l 
The R.2 criterion can also be written explicitly as a trade-off between fit and parsimony: 
" TCt,i L4,i - Y2 log ( t ). 
t-ki-1 
It is easy to show that, in the context of linear regression models, the R\i and the TCt,i 
criteria are equivalent, in the sense that they select the same model. 
90 
-In the case of multiple regression, the R2 criterion must be adjusted for the presence of 
additional independent variables if a valid comparison is to be made between the single and 
multiple factor models. This adjustment is given by: 
Adj R2 = 
where: n 
k 
1 - n-1 CR.2) 
n-k 
number of data points in the sample 
number of risk factors 
In each case, the model selection criteria described before will be applied to linear regression 
models, using the excess returns on the JSE financial and industrial index as the dependent 
variable, and subsets of the base set of regressors as the independent variables. For our set of 
nine regressors, this means comparing 29 = 512 models at each point in time, and over the 
period 1April1988 to 31March1998, this gives a total of61 440 (512 x 120) regressions to 
be computed. 
To summarise, the recursive model specification proceeds as follows: in April 1988 the 
values of the selection criteria are computed for each of the 2k ( 512) possible combinations 
of regressors from the base set, using monthly data over the period, May 1985 to April 1988. 
An intercept term is included in all the regressions. The model that maximises the 
discriminant function of a given model selection criterion is chosen, and the parameter values 
that are estimated, noted. To calculate the best regression for the monthly excess returns for 
May 1988, the procedure is repeated for all the 2k models, using monthly data over the 
period, June 1985 to May 1988. 
Under normal circumstances, the results from this section, namely, the 120 best subset LFMs 
would be tested, by placing the APT restrictions to see which factors are statistically 
significant. For practical reasons explained in chapter 5 (sec 5.1.2), weekly data, instead of 
monthly data, had to be used. This required the recalculation of the recursive LFM using 
weekly data. The lack of some weekly data from the I-Net necessitated the narrowing of the 
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period under consideration from 1 April 1988 to 31 March 1998 to 20 October1991 to 21 
June 1998. This produced 87 four-week periods during which the best subset LFM had to be 
tested. 
One feature of the best subset LFM is that not all risk factors are included in it. Thus risk 
factors were not tested period for period to see if they were priced and we have not obtained 
a picture of their performance over the period under consideration. 
Therefore, the only way to evaluate the importance of a risk factor in terms of how often it is 
priced and when it is priced was to divide the 87 periods into subperiods and then to compare 
their performance from subperiod to subperiod. 
The decision on how many subperiods to use was restricted by the fact that if the subperiods 
were to be tested adequately they had to be long enough to make it possible to include each 
risk factor in sufficient LFMs. 
For reasons explained in chapter 5 (sec 5.1.2), the 87 time periods, from 20 October1991 to 
21June1997, were subdivided into three equal subperiods of29 four-week periods. 
From the analysis of these three subperiods, it was be possible to evaluate which risk factors 
become priced in the APTM over the period under consideration. 
It was then possible for the researcher to examine any change in the specification of the 
APTM and, depending on the timing of this change, to relate it to any significant political 
and/or economic event or events. 
This approach of working backwards in solving the research problem was arrived at after 
considerable time had been spent evaluating the alternatives. 
One can adopt two obvious approaches to solving the research problem of determining how 
political and economic events change the specification of the APTM. 
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Approach 1 
(1) Arrive at the specification of the best subset LFMs for the 120 monthly periods over the 
period under consideration. 
(2) Test the risk factors in each of the 120 LFMs to see which are priced in the APTM. 
(3) If it is assumed - as previous research in South Africa has implied - that a priced risk 
factor in the LFM will be priced in the APTM, we would be able to predict the 
specification of the APTM by looking at the betas of the risk factors in the LFM. 
( 4) It would then be possible to correlate the specification of the APTM directly with a plot 
of the standardised beta of the risk factors and, subsequently, with political and economic 
events. Our rationale will be, that since a political or economic event impacts on a 
particular risk factor, the risk sensitivity (beta) of this risk factor would change, and 
provided the impact was significant, it would make the change large enough to be priced 
in the LFM, and subsequently in the APTM. Appendix 9 shows a plot of each factor as 
described above. 
Approach2 
Another approach would be to plot the square of the standardised beta of each risk factor in 
the LFM against the adjusted R2 statistic. Appendix 7 shows a plot of each risk factor as 
described above. This plot would give us the unique contribution of each risk factor towards 
the explanatory power of the LFM. 
Depending on the behaviour, that is, when exactly the unique contribution increases, it would 
be possible to match this against a political or economic event proxied by that risk factor. 
Again, the rationale will be that as a political or economic event impacts on a particular risk 
factor the beta of this factor will change. The square of the beta, which indicates the unique 
contribution of this risk factor towards the total explanatory power of the model, would also 
change, indicating whether or not it is now significant. Being significant in the LFM would 
then imply that it was significant in the APTM. 
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Unfortunately none of these approaches was feasible for the following reason. As will be 
shown in chapter 6, there is no correlation between a risk factor being priced in the LFM and 
subsequently being priced in the APTM. Approaches 1 and 2 are therefore fundamentally 
flawed. 
Since one cannot predict a priori which political and economic events will affect the APTM 
model, an approach where one works backwards towards finding a relationship between a 
political and economic event when detecting a change in specification of the APTM seemed 
to be reasonable. 
This choice of research methodology is supported by the findings of Beck (1995), who found 
that share prices were relatively insensitive to major political and economic events and 
concluded that these events appear to influence the general health of the economy and 
subsequently the share prices over a longer period of time. 
4.2 THE ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY AS A RESTRICTED NONLINEAR 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL 
As noted by McElroy and Burmeister (1988:29), by regarding the APT as a multivariate 
nonlinear regression model, with across-equation restrictions, the highly developed least 
squares statistical machinery for such nonlinear systems can be accessed. 
The two such "pieces of machinery" used in this thesis are the ITNLSUR and the NL3SLS 
techniques. 
The two different approaches are fully explained over the next two sections, and the decision 
as to why we should use both is explained in chapter 4 (sec 4.2.3). 
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4.2.1 The iterated nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression (ITNLSUR) technique 
The arbitrage pricing restrictions can be seen as being manifested in two ways. Firstly, the 
intercept of the linear factor model is constrained as follows for each asset i: 
K 
E(Rit) - Rft = biO = LbikA.k 
k=l 
Secondly, the values of the risk premia are constant across each equation in the system. In 
other words, all assets with the same sensitivity profiles will have the same expected returns. 
In order for this across-equation constraint to exist, the researcher used the system equation 
technique of a seemingly unrelated regression. Thus, the following system was estimated: 
K 
Rit - Rft = LbikA.k 
k=l 
+ 
for i 1, . . . n and t = 1, . . . T. 
where: 
= realised returns on asset i in time period t 
Rft the risk-free rate of return at time t 
= the sensitivity of asset i to factor k 
the risk premium associated with factor k 
fkt the unexpected movement in factor k at time t 
the error term for asset i at time t 
(4.2) 
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Equation 4.2 may be written in matrix notation as: 
K 
Pi L (Aktr+fk)bik + E i 
k=l 
where: 
Pi (Ri1 - Rn, ... , Rir - Rir)' for i = 1, ... n 
(fki, ... , fkr)' fork= 1, ... K 
(Eii, ... , EiT)' for i = 1, ... n 
and tr is a T dimensional column vector of ones. 
This system may, in turn, be re-expressed as follows: 
Pi X(A)bi+Ei 
where: X(A) 
Txk (A
1 ® tr)+F 
A 
kxl 
= (Ai, ... , AK)' 
F = 
Txk 
(bii, ... , biK)' for i = 1, ... n 
and ® denotes the Kronecker product. 
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Stacking the n equations yields: 
r xCJ-) 0 .. . .. 0 l 
0 xCA.) ... o 
Lo 
which can also be expressed as : 
where: p (pi, ···, Pn)' 
b (bi, ... bn)' 
E (Ei, · .. ,En)' 
and E(e) = Onr and E(ee1) =[I:® Ir], where I: is then x n variance-covariance matrix of the 
contemporaneous residuals of assets i= 1, n and j= 1, . . . n. 
McElroy and Burmeister (1988:32) demonstrate that the APT model does fulfil the necessary 
condition for nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression (NLSUR) estimators to exist. 
NLSUR estimators may be obtained by following three steps: 
(1) Equation 4.2 is estimated via share-by-share OLS. This is the same procedure that is 
followed in the first step of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) "two-step" procedure. As a 
result, a vector of estimates bi = (bio + bi1 ... + bik) is obtained for each share i. The 
intercept term biO is equal to the cross-product sum: 
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Unlike in the two-step procedure, the output utilised is not b1, but the residual vector from 
these regressions E1 where: 
K 
Pi - L biolT + fkbi 
k=l 
(2) The residual vector Eis used to obtain an estimate ofL: 
(3) The estimated variance-covariance matrix is plugged in to the following quadratic 
form, Q: 
(4.3) 
Values for 'A and b are chosen in order to minimise the value of this expression. 
Equation 4.3 can be simplified as follows: 
(4.4) 
Thus, it can be seen that a weighted sum of squared errors is being minimised with 
respect to 'A and b, subject to information on the estimate of the variance-covariance 
matrix L. 
The above procedure may be repeated, with iteration occurring between the estimates of L 
and the parameters 'A and b. Residuals from the most recent estimates of 'A and b are used to 
update the estimate of L. This in turn updates the quadratic form Q, allowing revised 
estimates of 'A and b. Iteration occurs until estimates of the covariance matrix, L, stabilise. 
This estimation technique is called an iterated nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression 
(ITNLSUR). 
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Being least squares estimators, the ITNLSUR estimators are also strongly consistent and 
asymptotically normal, even if the error distribution departs from normality. The robustness 
of the McElroy and Burmeister (1988) method to the non-normality of the error distribution 
is an important consideration in South Africa because of the apparent absence of normality in 
returns on the JSE (Klerck & du Toit 1986). 
This section draws on Van Rensburg (1996), McElroy and Burmeister (1988) and Reese 
(1993). 
4.2.2 The nonlinear three stage least squares (NLJSLS) technique 
The multifactor APT model of security returns derived by Ross (1976) begins by specifying 
the following relationship: 
(4.5.a) 
E(R) (4.5.b) 
which is equation 4.2 in matrix format. 
Where R1 is an N vector of security returns, Fkt is a zero mean, k a vector of observations on 
the k pervasive risk factors at time t generated using either factor analysis, or observed 
macroeconomic variables: Bk is an Nxk matrix of sensitivities of security returns to the 
factors, u1 is an N vector of zero mean, idiosyncratic returns, E(R) is an N vector of expected 
returns, A.o is the return on the risk-free asset, tN is an N vector of ones and A.k is a k vector of 
(constant) prices of risk associated with the k systematic risk factors. One of the assumptions 
made in this model is that the correlation between the factors, F, and idiosyncratic returns, u, 
is zero. The significance of this is that since idiosyncratic returns are uncorrelated with the 
pervasive factors, the covariance matrix of returns can be decomposed into: 
(4.6) 
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where LF is the covariance matrix of the factors (representing systematic or pervasive risk) 
and Lu is the covariance matrix of idiosyncratic returns (representing idiosyncratic risk). It is 
the assumption about the form of Lu that determines whether the factor structure of returns is 
strict or approximate. Ross (1976), for example, assumes that Lu is a diagonal matrix which 
means that idiosyncratic returns are uncorrelated across assets, since the off-diagonal 
elements of the matrix are zero. In this case, returns are said to have a strict factor structure. 
This assumption about returns having a strict factor structure is made implicitly in many 
empirical studies of the APT. For example, factor analysis extracts factors from LF under the 
assumption that Lu is diagonal (see, eg Roll & Ross 1980), while studies which use observed 
macroeconomic variables as the factors usually obtain estimates of the parameters from OLS 
regressions, which again assumes Lu to be diagonal. 
As an alternative to returns following a strict factor structure, Chamberlain and Rothschild 
(1983) show that the APT still holds under the much weaker assumption that Lu is 
nondiagonal, such that idiosyncratic returns are correlated across assets, as long as the first k 
eigenvalues of LR are unbounded - as the number of assets approaches infinity, while the 
k+ 1th eigenvalue is bounded, that is, the first k eigenvalues increase as the number of assets 
increases, while the k+ 1th eigenvalue of LR is less than the largest eigenvalue of Lu. In this 
case, returns have an approximate k factor structure. 
By substituting ( 4. 5. b) into ( 4. 5. a) and stacking the equations for the N securities, we get: 
R-A.o = {I~[(A.1®tT) + F]}B + u, (4.7) 
where R is an NT x 1 vector of security returns, A. is a kxl vector of prices of risk, F is a Txk 
matrix of observations on the k factors, B is an Nkxl vector of sensitivities, IN is an NxN 
identity matrix and ® is the Kronecker product operator. 
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If the system is not supplemented by an equation for the market portfolio, from which the 
equity market risk premium can be calculated, and the market portfolio is not included as a 
factor, then the NLSUR estimators for the APT model are those values of B and 'A, that solve 
the following problem: 
A 
min u1(Lu-1®IT)u, 
'A,B 
(4.8) 
where u is derived from 4.7, Lu-1 is the estimated residual (idiosyncratic return) covariance 
matrix from estimating 4.7 with ('A1®tT)B replaced by a constant and Ir is a T x T identity 
matrix. This is the ITNLSUR approach and equation 4.8 is equivalent to equation 4.4. 
The system can be extended in a straightforward fashion to include an equation for the 
market portfolio. However, if this is the case, the market portfolio must be treated as 
endogenous and the system estimated by nonlinear three-stage least squares (NL3SLS). In 
this case, the minimisation problem becomes 
/\ 
min u'(Lu-1 ® Z(Z1Z) -1z')u, 
'A,B 
(4.9) 
where Z is a matrix of instrumental variables. An important point to note here is that L may 
be nondiagonal, thereby allowing for idiosyncratic returns to be contemporaneously cross-
correlated or it can be restricted to being diagonal, imposing a strict factor structure. The 
parameter standard errors are given by n-1 ,where: 
/\ 
(4.10) 
where G is the matrix of partial derivatives of u with respect to the parameters. From ( 4.9) 
and ( 4.10), it can be seen that the specification of Lu may make a significant difference to 
reported results, in terms of both estimated prices of risk and their significance. 
This section draws on Garrett and Priestley (1997). 
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4.2.3 Conclusion 
Research published in South Africa in which the APTM was tested has exclusively used the 
ITNLSUR technique (Reese 1993; Van Rensburg 1996). 
Clare, Priestly and Thomas (1997) have shown that the choice of the 3NLS over the 
ITNLSUR technique is critical in determining whether or not the results are valid when 
testing the APTM on the London Stock Exchange. 
Since the 3NLS has never been used in South Africa, and there is a possibility that it may be 
more suitable than the ITNLSUR technique, it was considered essential to use both 
techniques. 
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CHAPTERS 
RESULTS 
5.1 THE RECURSIVE LINEAR FACTOR MODEL 
Although the LFM, as explained previously, is not an asset pricing model, the aim of this 
model is to identify which risk factors maximise certain selection criteria (Adjusted R2 and/or 
Akaike's information criterion) and then to test them in the "full APTM'' to see if they are 
priced. Although they show sensitivity to asset returns, they should in fact be statistically 
significant. A similar approach was used by Berry, Burmeister and McElroy (1988), as well 
as by Van Rensburg (1996). 
Although the recursive linear factor model looks complicated, the selection of the best LFM 
was essentially determined using OLS regressions. This process was repeated month by 
month over a period of 120 months, using a 36-month (three year) data base. The data base 
was moved along the 120-month testing period, month by month, adding one month (current 
month) and dropping one month (oldest month). 
Both the research papers quoted above used monthly data in their analysis of the APTM. 
To maintain consistency with their approach, this thesis initially used monthly data for the 
recursive LFM. 
However, when the time came to test the risk factors imposing the APT restrictions 
(consistent with asset pricing models), a problem was encountered. Since testing the APTM 
involves the joint estimation of factor sensitivities (f3s), as well as risk premia (A.s) in 
nonlinear regressions, there is a possibility that the results may be affected by small sample 
problems. 
On this subject, McElroy and Burmeister (1988) point out that the estimators A, and f3 will 
exist as long as NT>Nk+k, where N is the number of equations, T is the number of 
observations and k is the number of prices of risk to be estimated. 
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Also, it is essential that there should be enough observations because if N> T, then the 
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals becomes singular and results become 
meaningless. 
Garret and Priestley (1997) give some guidelines on the number of degrees of freedom per 
equation necessary to avoid the small sample size problem. The number of degrees of 
freedom available for the system is obtained from: 
TDF = ( (NT)-(Nk+k) )- (N+N(N-1)/2) (5.1) 
where: 
TDF is the total number of degrees of freedom available in the system. 
The number of degrees of freedom per equation is: 
TDFE=TDF/N (5.2) 
where: 
TDFE is the total number of degrees of freedom per equation. 
Garret and Priestley (1997) use 164 observations (T), 70 equations (N) and 10 risk factors (k) 
and calculate the number of degrees of freedom per equation as 118, which they regard as 
adequate. Van Rensburg (1996) uses 120 observations, 72 equations (N) and five risk factors 
(k), which provides 78 degrees of freedom per equation. 
Going back to our problem, if monthly data had been used to test the APTM in this thesis, the 
data base of 36 months would not have been sufficiently large, as there were 57 equations to 
be estimated in the ITNLSUR technique1, that is N=57 and T=36. Because N>T this would 
have caused the covariance matrix of the residuals, which is the first step in the ITNLSUR 
approach, to become singular. 
1 58 equations when the NL3SLS technique is used. 
104 
This problem was overcome by deciding to use weekly instead of monthly observations and 
in this way transform the database from 36 to 156 observations. 
Using the new set of data (N=57, T=156, K=6.82) and substituting in 5.1 and 5.2, we 
calculated the number of degrees of freedom per equation to be 120.08. This is adequate 
according to Garret and Priestley (1997). 
Hung and Jo (1995) examined the issue of whether the number of factors that explain stock 
returns in empirical tests of the APT tends to change with different data frequencies. The 
estimates were performed, using asymptotic principal components analysis and maximum 
likelihood factor analysis. The analysis was conducted at three levels (using daily, weekly 
and monthly returns), to show that the rates of total explained variance to total variance, the 
number factors and the number of priced factors are stable across data frequencies. However, 
the authors note that the question whether the same macroeconomic factors reliably influence 
stock returns measured over various time intervals still needs to be studied. Since we are 
more interested in how political and economic events influence the APTM, choosing any of 
the three data frequencies (daily, weekly or monthly returns) should not affect the results. 
The justification for using the monthly recursive LFM in the section below when the results 
cannot be used is not obvious at first. 
Essentially, the reason is that the use of the weekly LFM narrowed our period of review from 
March 1988 to April 1998 to 20 October1991 to 21 June 1998. The reason for this is the 
unavailability of vital data from I-NET3. We would therefore have been unable to examine 
the period 1March1988 to 19 October 1991. By calculating the monthly LFM we were able 
to investigate this period. 
2 This is the average number of risk factors in the best subset LFM over the 87 four- week periods from 20 October 1991 
to 21June1998. This figure is calculated in chapter 5 (sec 5.1.2). 
3 Daily data on all variables have been available only since the 8/8/1988 on I-NET. 
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5.1.1 The recursive linear factor model using monthly data 
The base set of nine regressors (risk factors) was chosen in chapter 3 (sec 3.2). 
The recursive LFM used was described in chapter 4 (sec 4.1). 
SAS software programming was used to write a program, both with this analysis and with all 
subsequent model analyses, in order to identify the best subset regression equation over 120 
months. 
Since the Akaike's selection criterion tended to choose the same best subset as the adjusted 
R2 criterion, for the sake of consistency, the regression selected was the one exhibiting the 
highest adjusted R2. 
An example of how the recursive LFM (best subset selection model) works is shown below 
for period 60 (equivalent to March 1993 ). 
With the excess returns on the financial and industrial sector as the dependent variable, all 
different combinations of the nine risk factors were used as the independent variables of the 
OLS regression in order to choose the combination that gave the highest adjusted R2 statistic. 
The data set used was from March 1990 to February 1993. 
Appendix 3 lists the 512 different combinations of equations which have to be regressed in 
order to find which one exhibits the highest adjusted R2 for period number 60 (March 1993). 
The regression shown below was chosen with an adjusted R2 score of0.22. 
EPFINIIND = 
where: 
EPFINIIND 
RPDJ = 
RPVOL 
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excess returns on the F & I index 
a constant 
unanticipated changes in the Dow-Jones index 
unanticipated changes in the volume of 
shares traded on the JSE 
This selection process was repeated 120 times for the 120 periods between 1 April 1988 and 
31March1998 and the results are shown in Appendix 4. 
The average number of regressors in each period is 3.55 and the average adjusted R2 for the 
entire period (April 1988 to March 1998) is 25 percent. 
The plot of adjusted R 2 vs time (graph 5 .1) shows a remarkable drop from approximately 5 5 
percent in October 1991 to around 15 percent, fluctuating around this lower level, until the 
beginning of 1997, when it reverted back to the mid-50 percent. 
As stated before, since the APTM will be analysed using weekly data, this section is only of 
interest to the extent that it helps us examine the LFM for the period 1 April 1988 to 20 
October1991, which the weekly LFM does not cover. 
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GRAPHS.I 
Adjusted R2 of the best monthly subset LFM vs time over the 120 month period from 
1 April 1988 to 31 March 1998, using monthly data 
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5.1.2 The recursive linear factor model using weekly data 
After the researcher had decided to use weekly data in this thesis, a number of decisions still 
had to be made because the following problems were encountered: 
(1) Some risk factors are only published and the information provided on a monthly basis. 
These risk factors are the SACOB business confidence index and the consumer price 
index. 
(2) Information on the volume of shares traded on the JSE (in R'OOO) was available on a 
daily4 basis for only part of the period under review. Prior to that, it was available on a 
monthly basis. 
4 Daily data needed to calculate the mean for the week on the volwne of shares traded on the JSE were only available from 
25/03/91 onwards on I-NET. 
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(3) Even though some risk factors were available on a continuous weekly basis (Dow-Jones, 
gold price, term structure of interest rates, bankers' acceptance rate and dividends paid by 
companies in the industrial and financial sectors), these proved to be unsuitable. When 
the weekly data were used in the usual manner, namely Friday's closing figure is taken to 
represent the week, the time series exhibited excessive volatility. In time, with the use of 
an iterative solving technique such as the ITNLSUR, this volatility causes 
nonconvergence. 
These problems were dealt with as follows: 
(1) The two risk factors that are available only on a monthly basis (SACOB and CPI) were 
plotted and weekly figures were taken to be the extrapolated values between the monthly 
points. This procedure is available on SAS programming and is known as Proc Expand. 
(2) The monthly values of the volume of shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
were converted to weekly values, by dividing the monthly values by the appropriate 
number of weeks in that month. 
(3) As an initial attempt to solve the problem of nonconvergence, it was decided to use a 
moving average5 to smooth the weekly data before extracting the unanticipated 
component of the risk factors and using the ITNLSUR. Although this solved the problem 
with the ITNLSUR technique, the autocorrelation introduced was excessive. Even though 
this was corrected by removing any auto-correlation going back 12 lags, the moving 
average procedure was abandoned. It was intuitively felt that when autocorrelation is 
consciously introduced and then removed by autocorrelation-correcting procedures, the 
variables are suspect because we could be introducing other problems which are more 
difficult to detect and correct. The volatility problem was eventually overcome by using 
the weekly mean figure instead of Friday's closing price as the representative figure for 
the week. 
5 Different period moving averages were attempted. 
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All the same procedures as those used with the monthly data were undertaken in order to 
extract the unexpected components of the risk factors, the only exception being that the auto-
correlation was corrected for up to seven lags, instead of 12, because this was found to be 
sufficient. 
The base data set now becomes the 156 week period from 14 August 1988 to 14 September 
1988. Again, this base set moved along four weeks at a time over 87 four-week periods, each 
time adding four observations (current observations) and dropping four observations6 (oldest 
observations). 
Appendix 5 shows which risk factors are included in each LFM chosen over the 87 four-week 
period, along with the p value of their beta coefficient. 
Table 5.4 shows the percentage of periods a regressor (risk factor) is included in the best 
subset. 
6 At the start of the process (period l) the data set contained 156 weekly observations (3 years). For Period 2, the l57th, l58th, 
l59th and l60th weekly observation were included in the data set and the 181, zru1, 3n1and4th observations were dropped. For 
period 3, the 16lst, 162ru1, 163rd and 164dt weekly observations were included in the data set and the 5t1t, 6th, 7t1t and gth weekly 
observations were dropped and so on. At all times the data set contained 156 weekly observations. 
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TABLES.I 
Percentage of time a risk factor is priced in the LFM during the three subperiods 
DJ GOLD TSD INT 
PERIODl 100% 10% 0% 0% 
PERIOD2 100% 0% 28% 62% 
PERIOD3 100% 14% 69% 100% 
AVERAGE 100% 8% 32% 54% 
VOL CRUDE SACOB4 CPI8 
PERIODl 52% 52% 7% 0% 
PERIOD2 86% 10% 0% 0% 
PERIOD3 76% 7% 0% 10% 
AVERAGE 71% 23% 2% 3% 
The regressors are the unexpected rate of change of: DJ = Dow-Jones index, 
GOLD = dollar gold price, TSD = term structure of interest rates, INT = three-month bankers' 
acceptance rate, IFDIV = dividends, VOL = volume of shares traded, CRUDE = dollar Dubai 
crude oil spot price, SACOBI = SACOB business confidence index lagged four weeks, 
CPI8 = consumer price index lagged eight weeks 
IFDIV 
69% 
69% 
0% 
46% 
p-value is the probability that the risk factor is not priced. We regard a risk factor to be priced if p<.05 
Period 1:20 Octoberl991to9January1994 
Period 2: 10 January 1994 to 31 March 1996 
Period3: 1April1996to21June1998 
The average number of regressors in each period is 6.87 and the average adjusted R2 for the 
entire period (20 October1991to21 June 1998), is 21 percent. Although the average number 
of regressors is high, the average number of significant factors (having a statistic of p<0.05) 
in each period is 3.3. This is comparable with Van Rensburg's (1995) findings of four 
significant risk factors in the LFM, using monthly data during the period January 1980 to 
December 1989 and the JSE's ASI as the dependent variable. 
7 Appendix 6 gives the percentage of time a risk factor appears in the LFM dwing the three subperiods. 
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A plot of the adjusted R2 statistic for the best subset regression versus time is shown in graph 
5.2. 
GRAPHS.2. 
Adjusted R2 of the best monthly subset LFM vs time over the 87 periods from 20/10/1991 
to 21/06/1998, using weekly data 
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In order to see the contribution of each risk factor to the total explanatory power (adjusted 
R2) of the model, the standardised beta of each risk factor, in a linear regression with the 
returns on the financial and industrial index as the dependent variable and the nine risk 
factors as the dependent variables, was calculated for each period. Each beta was then 
squared and a graph was plotted of f3 2 versus the adjusted R2. Since f3 2 reflects the unique 
contribution of that particular risk factor to the overall adjusted R2 statistic, this plot 
accurately reflects the unique contribution of the risk factor over the entire period. By way of 
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example, graph 5.3 shows the unique contribution of the Dow-Jones risk factor to the overall 
adjusted R2 during the period 20 Octoberl991to21June1998. 
The same plot for the other eight risk factors is shown in Appendix 7. 
GRAPHS.3 
Graph showing the unique contribution of the Dow-Jones risk factor to the overall 
explanatory power of the linear factor model with nine risk factors, over the 87 periods 
from 20/10/1991to21/06/1998 
--a4justed R squared 
--beta DJ squared 
Case number 
For ease of comparison between the monthly and weekly adjusted R2 statistic, graph 5.2 was 
superimposed on graph 5 .1 to produce graph 5 .4. 
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GRAPH5.4 
Graph showing the monthly and weekly adjusted R2 of the best subset LFMs vs time 
over the 120 month period 1April1988 to 31March1998 
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As stated before, companson for the entire period is not possible because of the 
unavailability of daily data between 1April1988 and 20 Octoberl991 . 
Before comparing the two plots, the fact that the weekly plot used four-week periods, while 
the monthly plot used repeating periods of five weeks, four weeks and four weeks, should be 
borne in mind8. 
From graph 5.4, it can be seen that over the entire period, the weekly adjusted R2 statistic is a 
smoothed-out version of the monthly adjusted R2 in that it fluctuates around a limited range 
of low values and then rises sharply at the beginning of 1997. 
8 This means that the monthly periods do not coincide exactly. 
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5.2 THE ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY MODEL 
5.2.1 The ITNLSUR approach 
From the previous chapter (sec 5.1.2), using weekly data, the researcher identified the best 
subset LFM for each period from 20 October1991 to 21 June 1998 (87 LFMs). The risk 
factors identified in each period were shown in Appendix 4. 
To give an example, the best subset LFM for period 63 (June 1996) was found to be as 
follows: 
EPFNIINDWt 
where: 
EPFNIINDW 
~o 
RPDJD 
excess returns on the F & I index9 
a constant10 
a measure of the unique contribution of the Dow Jones risk 
factor to the overall correlation11 between the seven risk factors 
and EPFNIINDW 
unanticipated changes in the Dow-Jones index 
9 The excess return is calculated by subtracting the three-month treasury bill tender rate from the rate of change 
in the financial and industrial index. See equation 3 .1. 
10 This constant would have represented E (PENDIINDW) if the risk-free rate {TBT3) had not moved across to the left- hand 
side of the equation. 
11 And hence the adjusted R2 statistic. 
~2 
RPDGOLDD 
RTSDD 
RPINTD = 
RP VOLD 
RPCRUDED 
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a measure of the unique contribution of the dollar price of the 
gold risk factor to the overall correlation between the seven 
risk factors and EPFNIINDW 
unanticipated changes in the dollar price of one ounce of 
gold 
a measure of the unique contribution of RTSDD to the overall 
correlation between the seven risk factors and EPFNIINDW 
unanticipated changes in the term structure of interest rates 
a measure of the unique contribution of RPINTD to the overall 
correlation between the seven risk factors and EPFNIINDW 
unanticipated changes in the three-month 
bankers' acceptance rate 
a measure of the unique contribution ofRPVOLD to the overall 
correlation between the seven risk factors 
and EPFNIINDW 
unanticipated changes in the volume of shares traded on the 
JSE 
a measure of the unique contribution ofRPCRUDED to the 
overall correlation between the seven risk factors and 
EPFNIINDW 
unanticipated changes in the dollar price of crude oil 
= 
RPCPID8 
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a measure of the unique contribution of RPCPID8 to the overall 
correlation between the seven risk factors and EPFNIINDW 
unanticipated changes in the consumer 
price index lagged eight weeks 
Imposing the arbitrage pricing restrictions on the intercept ((30), which means restricting the 
values of the risk premia (A.s) to be constant across all 57 equations, ensures that all assets 
with the same sensitivity profiles will have the same expected returns (ch 2, sec 2.3.2). 
The effect of this on the example for period 63 is that it will produce the following set of 57 
simultaneous equations, which must be solved using 156 observations (June 1993 to May 
1996) using the ITNLSUR technique: 
Pit 
for: i = 1, ................. 57 and t = 1, .................. 156 
Note the following: 
(1) A.1 ... A.8 is restricted to be equal across all 57 equations and f3i1 ... , '3i7 is restricted to be 
the same when showing the sensitivity of a particular risk premium (A.) and corresponding 
risk factor. 
(2) The residual market factor (RMF) is calculated by the following OLS regression: 
117 
where: 
RMF 
(3) In order to make the effect of each risk factor comparable all variables must be 
standardised. This also ensures that the mean of all the risk factors is brought to zero over 
the period June 1993 to May 1996. 
(4) Eit is the idiosyncratic risk of each share and if enough assets are used, it should average 
out to zero. The SUR approach assumes that these errors are correlated across the 57 
equations and that their expected mean is zero. 
5.2.2 The N3SLS approach 
As explained in section 3.3 of chapter 3, this approach used an "approximate factor" version 
of the APTM, to take into consideration the possibility that the return on some assets may be 
correlated with the errors in their LFMs. 
Instead of the RMF, the excess returns on the market portfolio (EMR) were used as the 10th 
risk factor. The market portfolio equation was added to the 57 asset return equations to make 
a total of 58 simultaneous equations to be solved. 
The market portfolio equation is : 
The following instruments were used: 
(1) RPDJD 
(2) RPDGOLDD = 
unanticipated rate of change in the Dow-Jones index 
unanticipated rate of change in the dollar price of one ounce of 
gold 
(3) RTSDD = 
(4) RPINTD = 
(5) RP VOLD 
(6) RPCRUDED = 
(7) RPCPID8 = 
(8) RPIFDIVD 
(9) RPSACBD4 
(10) RPDJD2 
(11) RPDGOLDD2 = 
(12) RTSDD2 
( 13) RPINTD2 
118 
unanticipated changes in the term structure of interest rates 
unanticipated rate of change in the three-month 
bankers' acceptance rate 
unanticipated rate of change in the volume of 
shares traded on the JSE 
unanticipated rate of change in the dollar price of 
crude oil per barrel 
unanticipated rate of change in the consumer 
price index lagged eight weeks 
unanticipated rate of change in the total 
dividends paid by companies in the financial and industrial 
sectors 
unanticipated rate of change of the SACOB 
business confidence index lagged four weeks 
the square of unanticipated rate of change in the Dow-Jones 
index 
the square of unanticipated rate of change in the dollar price 
of one ounce of gold 
the square of unanticipated changes in the term structure 
of interest rates 
the square of unanticipated rate of change in the 
three-months bankers' acceptance rate 
(14) RPVOLD2 
(15) RPCRUDED2 = 
(16) RPCPID82 
(17) RPIFDIVD2 
(18) RPSACBD42 
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the square of unanticipated rate of change in 
the volume of shares traded on the JSE 
the square of unanticipated rate of change in the 
dollar price of crude oil per barrel 
the square of unanticipated rate of change in the 
consumer price index lagged eight weeks 
the square of unanticipated rate of change 
in the total dividends paid by companies in the financial 
and industrial sectors 
the square of unanticipated rate of change 
in the SACOB business confidence index lagged four weeks 
The market portfolio was instrumented with: 
(1) the return on the mining financial index 
(2) the squared value of the return on the mining financial index 
(3) fitted values from a regression of the excess return on the market portfolio (F & I index) 
with the nine risk factors 
( 4) the squared values of the fitted values from a regression of the excess returns on the 
market portfolio with the nine risk factors 
The EDS submodule of the SAS package was again used. 
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5.2.3 Results of the two approaches 
The ITNLSUR and N3SLS are iterative techniques. This gave rise to the following problems: 
(1) The calculations were computationally demanding. 
(2) Local instead of general solutions were sometimes found. 
(3) There was nonconvergence of iterations. 
These problems were dealt with as follows: 
(1) Allowance was made for this, and the programme was left to run overnight on a powerful 
computer. 
(2) Kim and Sall (1993:574) mention this problem and warn that it is difficult to detect 
because the procedure will appear to have succeeded. They suggest that the way to guard 
against this is by running the estimation with two different minimisation techniques, 
namely the Gauss and Marquardt techniques. 
(3) The problem of nonconvergence is more difficult to deal with and arises when the data 
are ill-conditioned. In this case, the computer will continue with the iterations 
indefinitely. Different approaches were followed in order to deal with these problems. 
Firstly, the convergence criterion was relaxed; secondly the number of permitted 
iterations was increased; thirdly, the covariance matrix of a similar model was used as the 
starting value of the iteration; and lastly share returns that had an abnormally high or low 
correlation with the risk factors were removed from the system. None of these approaches 
succeeded and the problem of nonconvergence was dealt with by comparing the results of 
the two techniques and by using the results of the technique (ITNLSUR or N3SLS) which 
converged. This problem was encountered in less than 10 percent of the time periods 
tested. 
Appendix 8 shows the results of the ITNLSUR and the N3SLS procedures on the 87 LFMs 
using both the Gauss and the Marquardt minimisation techniques, convergence criterion of 
.0001 and a maximum permissible number of200 iterations. 
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The ITNLSUR technique did not converge for periods 20, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46, 57, 
69, 70, 71, 84 and 85. 
In order to better understand how the pricing of a risk factor varies with time, the entire 
period from 20 October1991 to 21 June 1998 (87 months) was broken up into three equal 
subperiods (29 months each). This is essential as risk factors tend not to be included in the 
LFM continuously and therefore will not have a chance to show if they are priced or not on a 
month-to-month basis. However, a trend can be established if a comparison is made on a 29-
month period to period. 
A revealing way to compare the results of the two techniques (ITNLSUR and N3SLS) is to 
tabulate the percentage of time that each technique shows a risk factor to be priced per 29-
month period. 
Table 5.2 gives a breakdown on how the risk factors are priced over time using the ITNLSUR 
and N3LS techniques. As stated previously, the ITNLSUR technique failed to converge in 15 
out of the 87 time periods. However, this refers to the ITNLSUR technique using the Gauss 
minimisation technique. There were instances when using the Marquardt minimisation 
method where the ITNLSUR technique converged over these 15 time periods. If the results 
over these instances could be confirmed with the N3SLS techniques, then those results were 
used. This happened over the following runs: 34, 36, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46, 57, 69, 70, 71 
and 84. 
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TABLE5.2 
Percentage of time a risk factor is priced in the APTM during the three subperiods 
DJ GOLD TSD 
Period ITNLSUR NJSLS ITNSLUR NJSLS ITNLSUR NJSLS 
1 90% 72% 34% 7% 3% 0% 
2 100% 38% 4% 8% 42% 42% 
3 43% 58% 18% 12% 57% 50% 
Average 78% 56% 19% 9% 34% 31% 
INT IFDIV VOL 
Period ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNSLUR N3SLS ITNLSUR 
1 24% 14% 41% 38% 52% 
2 42% 42% 50% 25% 12% 
3 61% 46% 0% 0% 21% 
Average 42% 34% 30% 21% 28% 
CRUDE SACB 
Period ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNSLUR N3SLS ITNLSUR 
1 3% 10% 52% 59% 0% 
2 38% 17% 0% 0% 33% 
3 29% 19% 21% 19% 29% 
Average 23% 15% 24% 26% 21% 
The regressors are the unexpected rate of change of: DJ = Dow-Jones index, 
GOLD= dollar gold price, TSD =term structure of interest rates, INT= three-month bankers' 
acceptance rate, IFDIV = dividends, VOL == volume of shares traded, CRUDE = dollar Dubai 
crude oil spot price, SACB = SACOB business confidence index lagged four weeks, 
CPI = consumer price index lagged eight weeks 
N3SLS 
59% 
33% 
38% 
43% 
CPI 
N3SLS 
0% 
13% 
38% 
17% 
p-value is the probability that the risk factor is not priced. We regard a risk factor to be priced ifp<.05 
Period 1:20 Octoberl991to9 January 1994 
Period 2: 10 January 1994 to 31 March 1996 
Period 3: 1 April 1996 to 21June1998 
An unintended contribution of this thesis was to show that both the ITNLSUR and the 3NLS 
techniques are applicable on the JSE because they tended to produce similar results. 
123 
Graph 5. 5 shows histograms of how risk factors are priced over time using the ITNLSUR 
technique. 
GRAPH5.5 
Histograms of how risk factors are priced over time using the ITNLSUR technique 
during the period 20/10/1991to21/06/1998 
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The risk factors are the unexpected rate of change of: DJ = Dow-Jones index, 
GOLD= dollar gold price, TSD =term structure of interest rates, INT= three-month bankers' 
acceptance rate, IFDIV = dividends, VOL =volume of shares traded, CRUDE= dollar Dubai 
crude oil spot price, SACB = SACOB business confidence index lagged four weeks, 
CPI = consumer price index lagged eight weeks 
p-value is the probability that the risk factor is not priced. We regard a risk factor to be priced ifp<.05 
Period 1:20 Octoberl991 to 9 January 1994 
Period 2: 10 January 1994 to 31March1996 
Period 3: 1 April 1996 to 21 June 1998 
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The following trends can be seen from Graph 5.5: 
(1) The Dow-Jones risk factor showed a decrease in importance over the three subperiods. It 
regressed from being the most important risk factor in the APTM in the first subperiod to 
being the third most important during the third subperiod. Overall, because it had been 
consistently priced, it was still the most important risk factor over the entire period. 
(2) The risk factors associated with political events showed a decrease in importance over the 
three subperiods. The SACOB business confidence index as a risk factor was jointly the 
second most important risk factor with the volume risk factor, during the first subperiod, 
but dropped to being the joint sixth most important in the third subperiod. The volume of 
shares traded on the JSE as a risk factor started off as the joint second most important risk 
factor, but dropped to being the joint sixth most important during the third subperiod. 
(3) The dollar price of gold has shown a steady decline - from being priced 34 percent of the 
time during the first subperiod - to becoming the second least important risk factor in the 
third subperiod (18%). 
( 4) The total dividends paid by companies in the financial and industrial index as a risk 
factor dropped dramatically in importance from being priced 41 percent of the time 
during the first period down to 0 percent during the third subperiod. 
( 5) The term structure of interest rates increased dramatically in importance as a risk factor 
from being almost unpriced during the first sub-period, to being the second most 
frequently priced factor in the third subperiod. 
(6) The three risk factors associated with inflation and inflation expectations, namely the 
consumer price index, the dollar price of crude oil and the rate of change in the three-
months bankers' acceptance rate, have become increasingly more important. The rate of 
change in the three-months bankers' acceptance rate is the second most frequently priced 
risk factor after the Dow-Jones index over the entire three subperiods. Although the 
dollar price of crude oil and the consumer price index have shown an increase in 
importance from subperiod one to subperiod two, and finally to subperiod three, because 
they started from a low base, they only managed to finish as the joint seventh and eighth 
most important risk factors respectively, over the entire three subperiods. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER6 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
In this final chapter the work done thus far is matched to the objectives of the thesis. 
Specifically, the research problem, the component subproblems into which it was broken 
down and the matching hypotheses that were formulated from the subproblems are examined 
here, with the objective of ascertaining whether the results obtained are compatible with the 
objectives that were set out at the beginning of the thesis. 
Of greater importance is the fact that the results are interpreted in this chapter and although 
the interpretation involves the use of economic theory which would make some of these 
interpretations subjective, this section represents the distillation of all the research carried out 
thus far for this thesis. 
Clearly, the scope of the work involved and the different approaches that were possible could 
not be anticipated, with the result that, at the end of this chapter, recommendations are made 
for future research. 
6.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH PROBLEM REVISITED 
6.2.1 The first subproblem and hypothesis 
The first subproblem was as follows: 
To establish that the impact of political and economic events has changed the specification of 
the linear factor model, described by the arbitrage pricing theory for the financial and 
industrial sector of the JSE, during the period from 1988 to 1998. 
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The matching hypothesis was as follows: 
A different set of financial and macroeconomic variables will be specified in the linear factor 
model, assumed by the arbitrage pricing theory, for the period before and after a regime 
switch caused by an economic or political event (events). 
The objectives of the first subproblem were met, because the results showed that important 
political and economic events do change the specification of the linear factor model. 
Also, the hypothesis was confirmed in that different risk factors are specified before and after 
a regime switch. 
However, it was found that the change in specification is not immediately apparent, but takes 
time to manifest itself as it works though the system by affecting the economic environment. 
The period between the release of Nelson Mandela and the settling in of the new government 
was so crowded with instances of major political and economic events that the specification 
of the LFM and the predictive powers of the risk factors were severely affected from 
approximately October 1991 to the beginning of 1997. 
6.2.2 The second subproblem and hypothesis 
The second subproblem was stated as follows: 
To confirm that any change in the specification of the linear factor model is translated into a 
change in the specification of the nonlinear asset pricing model described by the APT. 
The matching hypothesis was as follows: 
Any change in specification of the LFM will be translated into a change in the specification 
of the nonlinear asset pricing model described by the APT. 
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Clearly this hypothesis was not confirmed and the objectives of the second subproblem were 
not met. 
The conventional way of testing the APTM (Van Rensburg 1996) is to find the most 
significant risk factors in the LFM and then to confirm that they are priced in the APTM. 
When this did not happen for one particular risk factor in Van Rensburg (1996:110), he stated 
the following: 
It is, perhaps, surprising to note that Gold price risk is not priced given the 
importance of this variable to the South African economy. Mining shares are not 
underrepresented in the share sample and, in fact, their proportion of market 
capitalisation is higher than that of the industrial component of the sample. 
However, examining the magnitudes of the sensitivity coefficients estimated in Van 
Rensburg ( 1995), it can be seen that, although the mining and mining financial 
sectors displayed significant positive sensitivities to unexpected movements in the 
gold price, the industrial and financial share portfolios were not affected by this 
variable, suggesting the possibility that it is more industry than market related in the 
breadth of its influence. 
In fact it was found that the "magnitudes of the sensitivity coefficients" had no predictive 
power as to whether or not a risk factor was priced. 
For example, in one particular period (case number 63), a risk factor (DJ) showing a level of 
significance of more than 99 percent in the LFM was found not to be priced in the APTM, 
while a risk factor (CPI), showing significance at a level of confidence of 80 percent 
was found to be priced in the APTM at a 99 percent level of confidence. This conclusion is 
also obvious if a comparison is made between tables 5.1 and 5.2, showing which risk factors 
were priced in the LFM and APTM respectively, over the three subperiods. 
A possible explanation for this anomaly can be found if the standardised beta of each risk 
factor plotted against time is examined (the standardised betas are obtained by linear 
regression using the excess returns on the F & I index as the dependent variable and the nine 
risk factors as the independent variables over the 87 time periods). 
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If we examine the plot of the Dow-Jones beta versus time shown below (graph 6.1)1, it can be 
seen that a risk factor must show a significant standardised beta consistently over time before 
we can expect it to be priced. 
GRAPH6.1 
Graph of the standardised beta of the Dow-Jones risk factor vs time over the 87 periods 
from 16/10/1988 to 21/06/1998 
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However, this observation offers us a rough guideline and in no way can it be used in practice 
to calculate the potential performance of a risk factor in the APTM. 
1 Plots of the standardised betas of the other eight risk factors vs time can be found in Appendix 9. 
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6.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
In chapter 5 it was seen that the time period that was studied intensively with respect to the 
APTM was narrowed down from 1 April 1988 to 31March1998 to 20 October 1991 to 21 
June 1998 because of the nonavailability of daily data on the I-Net from 1 March 1985 to 8 
August 1998. 
This is not considered an obstacle to the attainment of the objectives of this thesis because 
the analysis of the LFM using monthly data over the entire period ( 1 April 1988 to 31 March 
1998) showed that the LFM was only perturbed around October 1991. 
It was found that an illuminating way to determine how the pricing of a risk factor varies 
over time would be to divide the 87 four-week periods into three equal subperiods and to 
study the behaviour of each risk factor from subperiod to subperiod. 
20 October 1991 to 9 January 1994 (first subperiod) 
During this period the four most frequently priced risk factors in the APTM in order of 
importance were: 
(1) the Dow-Jones index 
(2) the volume of shares traded on the JSE 
(2) the SACOB business confidence index 
(3) dividends paid by companies in the industrial and financial sectors 
It comes as no surprise that the Dow-Jones index was the most frequently priced risk factor 
because the influence of this index on world markets is well documented. 
In this period leading up to the national elections, after an extended period of political 
manoeuvring, it is not unexpected that the risk factor proxying for political events would be 
the joint second most frequently priced risk factor. 
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It seems reasonable to expect that the prevailing uncertainty at that time would also influence 
the confidence of the business community (SACOB business confidence index) to such an 
extent that this factor would become an important risk factor priced in the APTM (joint 
second). The manner in which the SACOB BCI, which was designated as a proxy for 
economic events, has become important during the turbulent period before the general 
elections would suggest that it is now acting as a proxy for political events in the country. It 
appears that as SACOB became involved during the transitional phase before the national 
elections as an honest broker (see chapter 3 section 3.1.3.2) for political change, the business 
confidence index became politicised, with the result that the index began to reflect the 
confidence of business2 in the political future of this country and thus effectively became a 
proxy for political events. After the general elections when a democratically elected 
government had been installed and there was no need for SACOB to play a political role, the 
index reverted back to becoming an indicator of business confidence released monthly by 
SACOB for the benefit of its members, who use the index to ascertain the effect of the 
economic environment on their businesses. 
An unexpected finding was, however, that the dividends paid by companies in the financial 
and industrial sectors were the fourth most frequently priced risk factor, especially in view of 
the fact that tax on dividends was abolished only in March 1990, in other words before it had 
had time to gain significance. However, on reflection, an explanation for this significance 
could be that before South Africa emerged from its isolation from the international 
community (April 1994 ), South African companies had very little opportunity for overseas 
expansion. During this period of isolation, successful South African companies, after buying 
as many local companies as they could, had no other option but to distribute their profits in 
the form of dividends. This argument was raised previously in chapter 3 to explain the shape 
of the dividend yield graph. This would explain why dividends paid would be a significant 
risk factor (predictor variable) during South Africa's years of isolation, only to become 
totally insignificant once that isolation was ended. 
2 Possibly as a result of the way they responded to the manufacturing survey, which is one of the 13 indicators 
making up the SACOB BCI. Unfortunately SACOB gives no indication of the weight of each indicator in the 
total index. 
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Van Rensburg (1996) found three factors that were applicable to the JSE to be priced in the 
APTM during the period from January 1980 to December 1989. These were: unexpected 
movements in the returns on the Dow-Jones industrial index, unexpected movements in the 
term structure of interest rates and unexpected movements in inflation expectations3. 
Clearly, the specification of the APTM has changed. The low explanatory power of the LFM 
(adjusted R 2 approximately 15%) would suggest that in the event of a major regime switch in 
the economy such as the one introduced by the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning 
of the ANC, learning may take a long time to complete, as investors attempt to model, say, 
the new relationship between inflation, nominal interest rates and stock returns. 
10 January 1994 to 31 March 1996 (second subperiod) 
During this period the four most frequently priced risk factors in the APTM in order of 
importance were: 
( 1) the Dow-Jones index 
(2) the three-month bankers' acceptance rate 
(3) the term structure of interest rates 
( 4) dividends paid by companies in the industrial and financial sectors 
1 April 1996 to 21 June 1998 (third subperiod) 
The risk factors that tended to be priced the most frequently during this period in order of 
importance were: 
(1) the three months bankers' acceptance rate 
(2) the term structure of interest rates 
(3) the Dow-Jones index 
( 4) the consumer price index 
( 5) the price of crude oil 
3 Although Van Rensburg used returns on the JSE ASI as his dependent variable and this thesis used returns on the JSE 
industrial and financial index, the high correlation between the two indices would suggest that they are comparable. 
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Comparing subperiod two with subperiod three, we see that the top three risk factors priced 
during these subperiods are the same. The fourth most frequently priced risk factor in 
subperiod two, namely dividends paid by companies in the industrial and financial sectors, 
diminished dramatically in importance in subperiod three for reasons that were discussed 
above. 
The fact that the second and third subperiods (10 January 1994 to 31March1996 and 1 April 
1996 to 21 June 1998) reveal that the same risk factors tend to be priced suggests that as the 
first subperiod coincided with the preparations for the 1994 national elections the second and 
third subperiods, by virtue of their being similar, could be merged into a single post-election 
period stretching from 10 January 1994 to 21June1998. 
Clearly, the specification of the APTM has changed since the national elections in April 
1994. The fact that the new set of risk factors gradually increased in importance after this 
date would suggest that the new specification is more stable. This is confirmed by the higher 
explanatory power that the LFM has for stock returns (adjusted R2 approximately 22%). 
Since all the price risk factors with the exception of the Dow-Jones index are proxies for 
economic events, it would appear that the economic environment now shapes the APTM. 
The most important economic event after the national elections was South Africa's joining 
the global economic community. According to Stals (1998), South Africa has removed about 
75 percent of the exchange controls that existed four years ago. All controls applicable to 
nonresidents, such as the two-tier exchange rate system for investments in South African 
equities and securities by nonresidents, have been removed. Controls applicable to outward 
investments by residents have also been gradually relaxed. In fact, according to Stals (1998): 
"nonresidents are completely free to bring funds into South Africa and to repatriate funds, for 
whatever purpose." 
The consequence of this is that the mobility of capital can make it extremely difficult to 
delink the rates of return on financial assets from those prevailing abroad. Bodie, Kane and 
Marcus (1995) regard the level of interest rates as perhaps the single most important 
macroeconomic factor in investment decision making. 
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Interest rates influence equity prices in at least two ways: 
(1) by altering the return from financial instruments that compete with equities 
(2) by changing the cost of funds needed to do business 
However, there is a more subtle way in which the interest rate level influences stock prices, 
namely, the perceived expectations of how interest rates will behave. 
Because the level of interest rates is perhaps the most important macroeconomic factor, 
expectations about the behaviour of interest rates are likely to be the most important 
consideration in the minds of investors when buying equities. 
According to Obstfeld ( 1995: 135) the prices of assets such as long bonds, stocks and storable 
commodities depend on potentially volatile expectations about current as well as future 
economic conditions. The prices of these assets respond immediately and often sharply to 
actual news or rumours about economic fundamentals. 
Economic news can affect expectations regarding interest rates. We know that interest rates 
are sensitive to expectations regarding inflation. Interest rates will respond to any economic 
news which results in a change in such expectations. 
For example, a higher M3 money supply growth figure than the market expected will change 
the market's perception of the future course of interest rates4. It would also have an 
immediate effect on bond prices. If the released CPI figure is substantially higher than the 
markets thought it would be, interest rate expectations will become more bearish. Again, 
bond prices will respond immediately. 
4 Investors will be concerned that the Reserve Bank might view this as an indication of an imminent increase in 
inflation which might prompt the Reserve Bank to increase the bank rate. 
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From the list of the five most important risk factors during the period 1April1996 to 21 June 
1998, it can be seen that four are proxies for economic news events. These are: the bankers' 
acceptance rate, crude oil, CPI and the term structure of interest rates. These risk factors will 
be shown in the next few paragraphs to reflect the internationalisation of the capital markets 
in South Africa after the elections by becoming effective proxies for interest rate 
expectations. 
Interest rate expectations 
(1) The three-month bankers' acceptance rate overtook the Dow-Jones index in the third 
subperiod (1April1996-21June1998) to become the most important risk factor. 
The objective of the Reserve Bank is to protect the value of the rand~ this can effectively 
be translated to mean that the Reserve Bank will fight inflation. Dr Stals (1998:38) has 
indicated that the Reserve Bank's objective is to bring the inflation rate in line with that 
of South Africa's main trading partners. According to Nel (1993) since the mid-nineteen-
eighties, the monetary authorities have relied almost exclusively on the Bank rate to serve 
as the domestic instrument of monetary control. Therefore any increase in inflation rates 
or any expectations of an increase in inflation will prompt the Reserve Bank to tighten 
the bank rate, and by extension the BA rate, an action or impending action that will exert 
an influence on the JSE. 
A recent example that will illustrate why this is the case would be the time when, 
contrary to the prevailing course of events, there was a sudden outflow of capital from the 
country. This sudden outflow of funds drained liquidity from the domestic money market 
and put upward pressure on money market interest rates. The Reserve Bank had two basic 
choices: 
( 1) to inject more money into the banking system and thereby increase the money supply 
growth rate but at the same time boost inflation 
(2) to raise the repo rate 
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It decided to allow the repo rate, and consequently the bankers' acceptance rate, to rise. 
From the above argument it can be seen that the internationalisation of the capital 
markets in South Africa has strengthened the predictive powers of the BA rate over 
returns on the JSE. 
(2) The CPI and crude oil have become the fourth and fifth most important risk factors 
respectively in the third subperiod (1 April 1996 - 21 June 1998). The reason for this is 
that they have now been targeted by the Reserve Bank. 
Dr Stals (1998:38) has indicated that the Reserve bank focuses mainly on "core" or 
underlying inflation5, that is the change in the overall CPI excluding the price of food, the 
cost of home ownership and value added tax. The objective of the bank is to bring "core" 
inflation more in line with that of South Africa's main trading partners. Since a rise in 
underlying inflation is of concern to the Reserve Bank because it indicates that 
fundamental inflationary forces are at work, such a rise would induce the Reserve Bank 
to follow a stricter monetary policy. 
It was seen in chapter 3 sec 3.1.3.2 that because of its correlation with imported PPI the 
crude oil dollar price provides an indication of the trend that consumer prices will follow. 
From the argument in the previous paragraph this relationship was confirmed. 
The CPI has therefore become more important as a risk factor as it influences the Reserve 
Bank's monetary policy , which in turn influences expectations regarding interest rates. 
This trend is confirmed by Cooper and Fraser (1993:209) who stated that "In recent years, 
inflation has been one of the most pervasive influences on interest rates". 
The effect of the internationalisation of the capital markets in South Africa has been to 
increase the importance of these two risk factors in the APTM applicable to the JSE. 
5 This would magnify the importance of the dollar price of crude oil as a risk factor. 
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(3) The term structure of interest rates has become the second most important risk factor in 
the third subperiod (1April1996-21June1998). 
Following the internationalisation of the capital markets in South Africa the Reserve 
Bank has adopted a stricter monetary control policy to bring inflation in line with that of 
South Africa's main trading partners (Stals 1988:38). According to Nel (1996:169) "the 
yield curve is basically the result of monetary policy". Since mid-1995 the real rate (the 
prime rate minus the inflation rate) has dramatically increased in comparison with the 
prime rate because of the stricter monetary policies pursued by the Reserve Bank. This 
has caused the fixed interest market to become more attractive and has had a negative 
effect on equity prices. This inverting of the yield curve was discussed in chapter 3. 
The fact that pressure to be internationally competitive has forced the Reserve Bank to 
adopt an interest rate policy severe enough to invert the yield curve is a good example of 
how the new economic order has increased the influence of the term structure of interest 
rates on the APTM applicable on the JSE. 
To summarise, the situation that prevailed in South Africa before the national elections were 
held in April 1994 was that the National Party government was unable to govern effectively 
during the period between the unbanning of the ANC and the elections. During this 
transitional period it became a "lame duck" government unable to take any major economic 
decisions, with the result that economic policy was not sensitive to the economic 
environment. In so far as interest rates were not governed by market forces, they had no 
predictive powers over stock returns. This explains why the Dow-Jones index was the most 
important risk factor during this period in explaining stock returns. 
The effect of South Africa's joining the global economic community after the elections has 
been to make interest rates sensitive to the economic environment. Therefore it is not 
surprising that they are now showing a greater ability to predict returns than the Dow-Jones 
index, with the result that the Dow-Jones index is now the third most important risk factor as 
a predictor of stock returns. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
By treating the APTM as a dynamic model instead of a static one, the researcher was able to 
establish that the specification of the APTM applicable to the F & I index on the JSE had 
undergone a change over the period under review (16 October 1988 to 21 June 1998). It was 
found that the APTM is not stationary and that it must be continuously tested before it can be 
used as political and economic events can change its specification. It was also found that 
political events had a more direct effect on the specification of the APTM than did economic 
events, which influenced the APTM by first influencing the economic environment in which 
it operated. 
The conventional approach that would have evaluated important political and economic 
events, case by case, to determine whether they affected the linear factor model (LFM), and 
subsequently the APTM, could not be used since no correlation was found between the 
pricing of a risk factor in the LFM and its subsequent pricing in the APTM. This necessitated 
a new approach which amounted to working backwards and finding a relationship with a 
political or economic event when a change in the specification of the APTM was detected. 
By examining the nature of the risk factors in the APTM, the researcher was able to conclude 
that political events changed the specification of the APTM in late 1991. Since the national 
elections in April 1994, the acceptance of South Africa into the world community and the 
globalisation of its economy have meant that there has been another change in the 
specification of the APTM and that a different set of risk factors primarily influenced by 
economic events is currently priced in the APTM. These risk factors are the same as those 
that were found to be priced in the APTM in the study by Van Rensburg in 1990, the only 
difference being that the Dow-Jones index is no longer the dominant risk factor, because it 
has been overtaken in importance by two risk factors proxying interest rate expectations (the 
BA rate and the term structure of interest rates). 
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6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As it is now clear that the conventional method of testing the APTM by first determining 
which risk factors are significant in the LFM offers limited benefits, the approach adopted in 
this thesis is one way of overcoming this shortcoming. Garrett and Priestley (1997) adopted 
another approach in their analysis of the APTM applicable to the London Stock Exchange 
where candidate macroeconomic and financial factors were tested directly in the APTM by 
using the N3SLS technique. A variant of this approach, which would entail subtracting one 
factor at a time from the APTM consisting of all risk factors and then testing to see which 
combination of risk factors increases the explanatory power of the APTM, was considered in 
the pursuit of a viable testing method in this thesis. It was found to be impractical mainly 
because of the large number of risk factors involved. A suggestion for further research would 
be to develop a method of screening risk factors and identifying the most important ones 
(possibly using standardised betas) and modifying the methodology mentioned above to make 
it usable for the JSE. 
It was found that the APTM is not stationary and that it must be continuously tested before it 
can be used as political and economic events can change its specification. These findings 
applied to the financial and industrial index of the JSE. A suggestion for further research 
would be to use the methodology developed in this thesis and test the APTM applicable to 
the FT-SE 100 index of the London Stock Exchange. Political and economic events such as 
those related to Britain's relationship with the European Union could then be evaluated to see 
if they have caused any change in the specification of the APTM. 
APPENDIX I 
Annual index for the period January 1988 to June 1998 listing articles on South 
Africa published by The Economist during each of these years 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED Pub. date 
AS REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
Fighting among blacks in Pietermartizburg January 1988 
Hendrickse, Allan, and questions about the general election I Group January 1988 
Areas Act 
Media, press, limits of freedom January 1988 
Sanctions, new study on January 1988 
Angola, and support for Unita guerrillas February 1988 
Apartheid, gradual erosion of in hospitals I housing I education February 1988 
Bills on residential areas I car bomb outside rugby stadium I ANC policy February 1988 
Black townships, violence I rethinking of tactics February 1988 
Botha, PW, banning of 17 black organisations February 1988 
Stock markets, slump in gold stocks February 1988 
Angola, and proposal for "non-aligned" government coalition I armed March 1988 
forces in 
Elections, parliamentary by-elections, Conservative victory I dilemma for March 1988 
NP 
Government further curbs on democracy, summary March 1988 
Religion, government - church discord I Dutch Reformed Church stance March 1988 
on apartheid 
United Nations budget contribution arrears March 1988 
ANC, alleged involvement in violence against April 1988 
Botha, PW, comparison with Gorbachev, Mikhail I programme of April 1988 
reforms 
Japan, and trade with apartheid April 1988 
Liberal Party, activities of ex-members I death of Paton, Alan April 1988 
Namibia, and independence from I importance to Angola April 1988 
Race relations, De Beers call for new South African constitution I black April 1988 
equality 
Trade unions, Cosatu strike April 1988 
Afrikaners, as supporters of ANC I terrorists May 1988 
Angola, and possible involvement in following ending of war May 1988 
Antarctica and mining, talks on international convention May 1988 
Disease, AIDS, unwillingness to undertake research I need for statistics May 1988 
and openness 
Literature, censorship May 1988 
Politics, Promotion of Orderly Politics Bill and restrictions on foreign May 1988 
money for political groups 
USSR, new approach to I academic and diplomatic contacts May 1988 
Angola, and diminished influence over UNIT A June 1988 
Election campaign launch I renewal of state of emergency June 1988 
Mozambique, and improved relations I plan to restore Cahora Bassa Dam June 1988 
USA, and Jackson, Jesse request for Democratic Party platform June 1988 
commitment on /house sanctions bill 
Angola, negotiations in Egypt July 1988 
Opposition to conscription I acceptance of Angola I Namibia peace plan July 1988 
Preview of municipal elections I black leaders' refusal to serve on July 1988 
national council 
Sanctions, new USA bill /new tariff controls July 1988 
Stock markets, possible penalties for USA citizens holding South African July 1988 
shares 
Angola, ceasefire announcement, possible snags August 1988 
Angola I Namibia, and departure proposal August 1988 
Angola, and withdrawal from September 1988 
Angola government I UNIT A relations and September 1988 
Diamonds, India trade and September 1988 
Economy, gold I foreign-currency reserves September 1988 
Elections, preview September 1988 
Election preview I questions on release of Mandela, Nelson and power - October 1988 
sharing 
Elections, municipal, black I white vote October 1988 
Government crackdown on political activity October 1988 
Investment abroad to guard against sanctions October 1988 
Labour Party blocking of Group Areas Act I other bills October 1988 
Media, newspapers, probable closure of Weekly Mail I launch of Vrye October 1988 
Weekblad 
Mozambique, and relations I talks October 1988 
Possible Southern Africa summit October 1988 
Religion, apartheid and October 1988 
Resumption of Angola talks October 1988 
Death sentences, commuting of 13 I treason convictions November 1988 
Economy, problems I frozen foreign debt I current account November 1988 
Economy, state of I black economy November 1988 
Elections, municipal, results I possible effects on Heunis, Chris November 1988 
Namibia, and withdrawal agreement November 1988 
Pan Africanist Congress, history I revival of November 1988 
"whites only" signs I white man killing of blacks November 1988 
Gold, effects of new discoveries on December 1988 
Namibia I Angola double withdrawal deal, cancellation of signing of December 1988 
Namibia I Angola peace deal, signing of December 1988 
Release of Mothopeng, Zephania and Sisulu, Zwelakhe I question of December 1988 
Mandela, Nelson release 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED AS Pub. date 
REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
Afrikaner Resistance Movement, incidents involving Terre Blanche, January 1989 
Eugene and Allan, Jani at Paardekraal and Voortrekker Monuments I 
Pretoria massacre 
Apartheid, Botha, PW reforms I inevitability of further government January 1989 
concessions 
Government, Botha, PW mild stroke I possible successors January 1989 
Angola, and former support for UNIT A February 1989 
Economy, cut in foreign debt I cost of international sanctions February 1989 
Government, de Klerk, FW as likely next president I Botha, PW February 1989 
resignation 
Government, presidency, questions of elections I candidates to succeed February 1989 
Botha, PW 
"Mandela United Football Club", democratic movement criticism of February 1989 
"Mandela United Football Club", abduction of youths I alleged murder of February 1989 
Mokhetsi, Stompie and 
Namibia, and withdrawal of troops I Namibia's transition to February 1989 
independence and 
ANC, National Party attitude softening March 1989 
Government, Botha, PW plans to resume presidency I question of election March 1989 
National Party calls for resignation of Botha, PW I question of mixed - March 1989 
race voting 
Retail business, black boycott of white shops in Carltonville I purchasing March 1989 
power 
Namibian peace settlement and, fighting with Swapo guerillas April 1989 
Namibia peace agreement I Swapo and April 1989 
Politics, Democratic Party, launch I belief in universal suffrage April 1989 
UK, and attempted arms deal with Ulster Resistance I arrest of diplomat April 1989 
in Paris 
USA pension funds, and companies' support for April 1989 
Business, "black empowerment" I white ownership June 1989 
Education, Soweto schools, state of I overcrowding June 1989 
Government, de Klerk, FW visit to Europe, Western I reform promises I June 1989 
profile 
Mozambique relations June 1989 
Sport, running, black domination of Comrades race I marathon June 1989 
Debts, exploitation of July 1989 
Effect of improved railways on neighbours July 1989 
Ivory trade ban and protection of the elephant July 1989 
Law, restrictions on blacks July 1989 
Mozambique peace talks July 1989 
Oppenheimer family, three-page report July 1989 
Politics, PW meeting with Mandela, Nelson I Nationalist Party July 1989 
popularity/ talks on new constitution 
Politics, Broederbond, resurgence under de Klerk, FW I National Party July 1989 
five-year "Plan of Action" and I role of president 
Politics, Mandela, Nelson, birthday celebration I election, black protests I July 1989 
boycott against I Democratic Party and 
Politics, National Party election manifesto and dividing and sharing of July 1989 
power between racial groups 
Bond markets, high-yielding government bonds July 1989 
Elections, issues I Mass Democratic Movement campaign August 1989 
Government, Botha, PW resignation, effect on polls I record as president I August 1989 
de Klerk, FW new National Party leader, prospects 
Namibia, election issues and August 1989 
Sport, cricket, England Test team members and August 1989 
Sport, cricket, UK rebel tour August 1989 
De Klerk, FW, presidential speech September 1989 
Elections, de Klerk, FW pre-election talks with foreigners I preview of September 1989 
coloured and Indian voting 
Elections, opinion polls I prospects September 1989 
Elections, preview September 1989 
Elections, results I question of power-sharing September 1989 
African National Congress, government contact with October 1989 
Apartheid, Commonwealth commumique, Kuala Lumpur and October 1989 
Banks and banking, debt rescheduling October 1989 
Banks and banking, reserve bank debt rescheduling October 1989 
Broederbond, influence I proposals on reform October 1989 
Decrease in executions October 1989 
Economy, debt rescheduling October 1989 
Economy, sanctions and October 1989 
Economy I government, need for pluralism and decentralisation October 1989 
Politics, relationship between ANC and Communist Party October 1989 
Politics, start of dialogue with blacks October 1989 
African National Congress I rival black groups November 1989 
Death squads, allegations of police connections I corroboration November 1989 
Namibia, and allegation of Swapo incursion November 1989 
Pan-Africanist Movement, launch of December 1989 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED AS Pub. date 
REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
ANC and negotiations January 1990 
Black schools failure rate January 1990 
De Klerk and reform January 1990 
Market focus, stocks and bonds January 1990 
Possible release of Nelson Mandela January 1990 
Road to democracy January 1990 
Apartheid laws February 1990 
Economy after removal of sanctions February 1990 
Mandela' s release February 1990 
Mandela's release, opinion February 1990 
Sanctions, Mrs Thatcher and the European Community February 1990 
Surrender of white power, opinion February 1990 
White political reaction to Mandela's release February 1990 
Collapse of black states March 1990 
ANC I government talks, opinion April 1990 
De Klerk - Mandela talks April 1990 
First government talks with ANC April 1990 
Death I torture squads May 1990 
Prospects for black rule May 1990 
Sanctions, de Klerk's and Mandela's interests May 1990 
EC relaxation of sanctions June 1990 
Mandela visit to United States June 1990 
Market focus, gold market, falling price June 1990 
Natal violence June 1990 
Political situation June 1990 
British historical reaction to situation July 1990 
Internal politics July 1990 
Internal power struggles July 1990 
Black township violence August 1990 
Coalition hopes August 1990 
Communist Party August 1990 
Sanctions, Dutch plan August 1990 
Suspension of armed struggle August 1990 
Violence in black townships August 1990 
Control of platinum and chromite production September 1990 
De Klerk and Mandela meeting September 1990 
De Klerk visit to United States September 1990 
Township violence September 1990 
Winnie Mandela prosecution September 1990 
Black in-fighting October 1990 
Shaping black politics October 1990 
ANC as future government November 1990 
Constitutional negotiations November 1990 
Constitutional talks, lack of November 1990 
Economic future November 1990 
Economy, future under black rule November 1990 
End of apartheid, relations with neighbours November 1990 
Peasants November 1990 
Survey November 1990 
White apprehensions about black rule November 1990 
Apartheid talks stalled December 1990 
Homelands December 1990 
Reintegration of homelands December 1990 
Sanctions against December 1990 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED Pub. date 
AS REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
Talks on new constitution stalled January 1991 
Violence and uncertainty January 1991 
De Klerk promises to end apartheid February 1991 
Winnie Mandela' s trial raises doubt about ANC February 1991 
Internal situation March 1991 
Plans to change apartheid land laws March 1991 
Possible return to Olympic competition March 1991 
ANC ultimatum to De Klerk April 1991 
EC sanctions on iron, steel and gold lifted April 1991 
Gold mines closings April 1991 
Violence in black townships April 1991 
Zulu weapons law under threat April 1991 
ANC-government compromise May 1991 
Lesotho, military coup May 1991 
Squatters murdered by Zulus May 1991 
Tribal rivalries May 1991 
Winnie Mandela sentencing May 1991 
ANC, new leadership June 1991 
Coloured MPs join National Party June 1991 
Gradual dismantling of apartheid June 1991 
Population Registration Act repeal June 1991 
America's trade embargo ended July 1991 
ANC, first conference held at home July 1991 
ANC, new executive July 1991 
Investment after sanctions July 1991 
Police, financing Inkatha July 1991 
Rothman's July race, ANC conference July 1991 
Afrikaner whites blame De Klerk for increasing violence August 1991 
ANC-Inkatha violence, problem of August 1991 
Black capitalism August 1991 
Payment to Inkatha, De Kl erk' s denial August 1991 
Massacre by unknown gunmen September 1991 
Rejection of the new constitution September 1991 
Commonwealth meeting participation October 1991 
Commonwealth summit, no movement October 1991 
New constitution, possible first meeting October 1991 
Difficulties of democratisation November 1991 
Formation of Patriotic Front November 1991 
Killings at gold mine November 1991 
Communist Party December 1991 
Possibility of talks between ANC and PAC December 1991 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED Pub. date 
AS REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
African National Congress, constitutional demands January 1992 
Afrikaner homeland February 1992 
Bankorp I ASBSA merger February 1992 
Confusion in process of democratisation February 1992 
Election, Conservative Party's win February 1992 
Optimism about De Klerk February 1992 
Possibility of a coup against De Klerk February 1992 
Prospects of economic equality February 1992 
Split conservatives February 1992 
Referendum March 1992 
Reform referendum March 1992 
Results of referendum March 1992 
Suggestions for new constitution and government March 1992 
EC ban on oil sales lifted April 1992 
Future April 1992 
Mandela, Winnie, new criminal allegations April 1992 
Scandals undermining reform May 1992 
African National Congress demonstrations against government June 1992 
After apartheid June 1992 
Boipatong massacre June 1992 
Boipatong massacre and aftermath June 1992 
Water imports from Lesotho projects June 1992 
African National Congress and FW De Klerk July 1992 
Afrikaners August 1992 
Mass action, government in action August 1992 
Strikes August 1992 
Arms control September 1992 
Ciskei massacre September 1992 
Homelands unrest September 1992 
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu secession from talks October 1992 
De Kl erk, FW, presidency October 1992 
Government devolution October 1992 
Natal, profile of Harry Gwala October 1992 
Dirty tricks accusations November 1992 
Namibia, impact of majority rule November 1992 
Peace negotiations November 1992 
Black radicals December 1992 
ANC I government talks, multi-racial elections December 1992 
Extremist violence December 1992 
Lost City resort, opening December 1992 
Military purge by government December 1992 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED Pub. date 
AS REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
ANC/government talks January 1993 
Long-distance runners January 1993 
New bilateral talks with ANC January 1993 
Stockmarket, JSE Industrial Index composition, indicators January 1993 
Constitutional changes February 1993 
Future government, power-sharing February 1993 
Talks to end apartheid, proposals February 1993 
Constitution talks resumption March 1993 
Economy, post-apartheid problems and challenges March 1993 
Negotiations, role ofIFP and Chief Buthelezi March 1993 
Nuclear bomb March 1993 
Party negotiations and past strife March 1993 
Past nuclear bombs disclosed March 1993 
Prospects for peace March 1993 
Race relations and standards after apartheid March 1993 
Survey March 1993 
Black homeland incorporation plans April 1993 
Hani, Chris, assassination April 1993 
Extremists and Chris Rani death April 1993 
Funeral of murdered communist leader April 1993 
Rani, Chris national day of mourning April 1993 
Homelands April 1993 
Political future after Chris Rani assassination April 1993 
Transkei isolation April 1993 
Afrikaners homeland proposal May 1993 
ANC leaders assassination plots May 1993 
Companies, unbundling May 1993 
Pan Africanist Congress May 1993 
Political leaders' deaths May 1993 
School disorder, De Klerk/Mandela meeting May 1993 
Whites' consolidation and Volksfront May 1993 
Future June 1993 
Mandela!Buthelezi meeting June 1993 
Nationalist parties June 1993 
Afrikaner attacks on constitutional talks July 1993 
Bloodshed, church killing July 1993 
Constitutional compromises July 1993 
Draft constitution July 1993 
Inkatha/Conservative boycott of talks July 1993 
New draft constitution July 1993 
Race relations and politics July 1993 
Reform proposals July 1993 
Regional government proposals July 1993 
ANC beatings allegations August 1993 
ANC under scrutiny August 1993 
De Klerk/Mandela disagreements August 1993 
Political killings increase August 1993 
Unemployment estimates August 1993 
White votes August 1993 
Multiparty transitional body September 1993 
Transitional executive council September 1993 
Transitional pre-election council September 1993 
Afrikaner dispute October 1993 
Economic sanctions lifted October 1993 
Rani, Chris, murder, two convicted October 1993 
Multiparty talks October 1993 
Rightwingers trial October 1993 
Draft constitution, final details November 1993 
Constitution, final draft November 1993 
Constitution signed, concessions November 1993 
Police force November 1993 
Afrikaner gathering, Pretoria December 1993 
A VF rival transitional government December 1993 
Business and industry, post-apartheid December 1993 
Declining tribalism, counter to world trends December 1993 
Election preparation and peacekeeping December 1993 
Election, transition to democracy December 1993 
Transitional executive council star December 1993 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED AS Pub. date 
REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
Constitutional talks January 1994 
Election and Zulus January 1994 
Murder investigation January 1994 
Political violence January 1994 
Political violence tally January 1994 
Relations with Tanzania January 1994 
Zulu demonstrations January 1994 
ANC and election campaign February 1994 
Apartheid, cost of undoing February 1994 
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, election boycott February 1994 
Election campaign, ANC manifesto launch February 1994 
Election registrations February 1994 
Voter registration drive February 1994 
Bophuthatswana uprising February 1994 
IFP, possible registration February 1994 
Political parties February 1994 
Political parties and election February 1994 
Political past February 1994 
Pre-election instability February 1994 
Relations with black Africa February 1994 
Tourism February 1994 
Train accident February 1994 
Zulu rivarly April 1994 
KwaZulu-Natal state of emergency April 1994 
Election stalemate, efforts to break April 1994 
IFP, end of election boycott April 1994 
Johannesburg killings April 1994 
Johannesburg killings chart April 1994 
Election, first non-racial April 1994 
Election April 1994 
Election (maps and charts) April 1994 
Election and KwaZulu-Natal April 1994 
KwaZulu-Natal, elections and political violence April 1994 
Stock market, market focus April 1994 
Election results May 1994 
Election, ANC victory May 1994 
Mandela, Nelson, new cabinet May 1994 
Presidential inauguration May 1994 
Problems facing new government May 1994 
Brewing industry, operating practices May 1994 
Mandela, Nelson, first state of the nation speech May 1994 
Land, problem for government May 1994 
Land, restitution and distribution to blacks May 1994 
Political amnesty, mechanisms for granting May 1994 
Economy, presentation of budget May 1994 
Human-rights commission promise May1994 
ANC, alleged cover-up of Zulu killings May 1994 
Israel, alleged Mossad involvement in businessman's murder May 1994 
Labour unrest May 1994 
Liebenberg, Chris, new finance minister May 1994 
Black businessmen August 1994 
Cricket August 1994 
Defence, manpower and budget debate August 1994 
Mining industry, need for reform August 1994 
Languages September 1994 
Major, John, visit September 1994 
Mining wage settlement September 1994 
Monthly inflation rise September 1994 
American student murder, black youths imprisonment September 1994 
ANC and open government September 1994 
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu in television fight September 1994 
Credit rating increases September 1994 
Government, criticism of parliamentary pay September 1994 
KwaZulu-Natal, political tensions September 1994 
Sovereign risk rating, granting September 1994 
Government, ANC weakness in governing November 1994 
Rugby, new national anthem November 1994 
State enterprises, possible privatisation November 1994 
Wildlife conference, lifting of white rhino export ban November 1994 
Black identity and relations with whites December 1994 
Elections, Nelson Mandela and ANC victory December 1994 
Europe, trade and concessions December 1994 
First international bond launch December 1994 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED AS Pub. date 
REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
ANC/National Party conflict over police indemnities January 1995 
Housing, obstacles to government policy January 1995 
Police, revoking of prosecution-immunity January 1995 
Schools' desegregation January 1995 
Schools, models and integration January 1995 
Boesak, Alan, corruption allegations February 1995 
Mandela, Winnie, outspokenness and Women's League resignations February 1995 
Parliament, Inkatha walkout and threat of violence February 1995 
Police, appointment of new chief February 1995 
Political controversies February 1995 
Politics, lnkatha withdrawl from parliament February 1995 
Taiwanese links, stumbling block for Chinese relations February 1995 
Truth commission, parliamentary debate on role February 1995 
Two-tier exchange rate, fraud problems February 1995 
Investor-friendly budget March 1995 
Queen's visit March 1995 
lJbuntu,managementtheory March 1995 
Zulu rivalries and restored monarchy suggestion March 1995 
Boesak, Alan, corruption exoneration April 1995 
Mandela, Winnie, dismissal from cabinet and political future April 1995 
Government, Winnie Mandela sacking April 1995 
lnkatha party, assembly-walkout threat April 1995 
lnkatha party, boycott threat April 1995 
Inkatha party, death-squads allegations April 1995 
Mandela, Winnie ministerial resignation April 1995 
Race relations, possible introduction of affirmative action policies April 1995 
Universities, changing racial composition April 1995 
Economic growth, need for end of industrial protectionism May 1995 
Education, financing of black schools May 1995 
Foreign direct investment, cautious growth May 1995 
Gold mining, decline May 1995 
KwaZulu-Natal , dispute with government May 1995 
KwaZulu-Natal, funding-cut threat May 1995 
KwaZulu-Natal, increasing political violence May 1995 
Pietersburg, profile of town post-apartheid May 1995 
Political future after Mandela May 1995 
Political relations, Nelson Mandela and ChiefButhelezi May 1995 
Privatisation, tentative steps May 1995 
Race and society, move towards multi-culturalism May 1995 
Relations with southern African countries May 1995 
Rugby, push to involve black majority May 1995 
Central bank independence, threats June 1995 
Exchange controls and capital inflows June 1995 
Land, restitution and distribution to blacks June 1995 
Languages, multiplicity June 1995 
Mandela, Nelson, Inkatha - demonstration killings admission June 1995 
Nthato Motlana's business empire, face value June 1995 
Racial integration and forthcoming council elections June 1995 
African Development Bank membership, continued postponement July 1995 
Armed forces, purchase of new battleships July 1995 
Arms trade, political control July 1995 
Armscor illegal weapons sale July 1995 
Banking, reaching the unbanked July 1995 
Crime and prevention July 1995 
Employers/unions, industrial relations deal July 1995 
Labour relations, new bill July 1995 
Mercenary ex-servicemen July 1995 
Rugby World Cup champions July 1995 
Theatre, post-apartheid problems July 1995 
Armed forces, defence cuts and army integration plan August 1995 
Business, conglomerates and demerges August 1995 
Foreign investment banks, influx August 1995 
Gambling, possible economic effects of legislation August 1995 
Mandela, Nelson, dress sense August 1995 
Trade liberalisation onus on Government August 1995 
Education system, reform August 1995 
Foreign- exchange controls September 1995 
KwaZulu-Natal, political murders September 1995 
KwaZulu Natal, political violence September 1995 
Parliament relocation debate September 1995 
Solar power possibilities September 1995 
Southern African Development Community's economic powerhouse September 1995 
Constitution, draft, publication October 1995 
Elections, forthcoming municipal October 1995 
Industry, competition policy, positive aspects October 1995 
World Bank loan offers, dissent October 1995 
Central bank independence, threats November 1995 
Elections, local November 1995 
Elections local, ANC endorsement November 1995 
Elections, local, ANC victories November 1995 
Malan, Magnus, arrest November 1995 
Nigeria, internal criticism over Saro-Wiwa execution November 1995 
Sasol, reincarnation November 1995 
Stock exchange big bang November 1995 
Defence, former minister and officers on murder charges December 1995 
Crime in Johannesburg December 1995 
Education, universities and race relations December 1995 
National Party's insult to Nelson Mandela December 1995 
Novels, apartheid legacy December 1995 
Privatisation, slow progress December 1995 
Sport, black involvement December 1995 
White minority, attitudes under black leadership December 1995 
Witchcraft, resurgence of witch-burning December 1995 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER Tiffi PERIOD STUDIED AS Pub. date 
REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
KwaZulu Natal, political murder in January 1996 
Constitution, South Africa's new January 1996 
Politics, National Party dreams January 1996 
Sport, South Africa's footballers February 1996 
Truth Commission February 1996 
Suburbs, blacks flee to February 1996 
Education, integrating schools March 1996 
Politics, who would run South Africa? March 1996 
KwaZulu Natal, killings in March 1996 
Black business bid for Johnie group April 1996 
Coloureds, continued discrimination April 1996 
Massacre correction April 1996 
Ramaphosa, Cyril, exit from politics April 1996 
Rand low April 1996 
Reconstruction and development programme, abandonment April 1996 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, opening April 1996 
Truth Commission, first sitting April 1996 
Truth Commission, effort at reconciliation April 1996 
Botha, Pik, departure from politics May 1996 
Constitution, protest at draft May 1996 
Mining companies' interest in West Africa May 1996 
Mozambique, investment in infrastructure and industry May 1996 
National Party coalition desertion May 1996 
National Party resignation from government May 1996 
National Party's pull-out May 1996 
Rand's further slide, lack of cause May 1996 
Strike over constitution May 1996 
Banking, mobile and fingerprint identification June 1996 
Banking, Standard bank profile June 1996 
Black Americans' homecoming June 1996 
Economic reform plans June 1996 
KwaZulu-Natal, prospects for peace June 1996 
Tutu, Archbishop Desmond, retirement June 1996 
White support for Inkatha June 1996 
European Union, trade deal, obstacles July 1996 
KwaZulu-Natal elections, lnkatha victory July 1996 
KwaZulu-Natal provincial elections, rural/urban divide July 1996 
Mandela, Nelson, British visit July 1996 
ANC, bribery allegations and party donations August 1996 
Apartheid apology by FW de Klerk August 1996 
Asian investment August 1996 
Crime, reform of police force August 1996 
Bribes scandal August 1996 
de Kock, Eugene, murder convictions August 1996 
Airlines, competition for routes September 1996 
de Kock, Eugene, presidential allegations September 1996 
Mandela, Nelson, relationship with Graca Machel September 1996 
Sub-Saharan Africa, model for future September 1996 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, amnesty's power limitations September 1996 
Zulus, make peace October 1996 
Politics, South Africans growmg amnous about their future after October 1996 
Mandela: editorial 
Bonding of South Africa's blacks October 1996 
Apartheid's defenders confess October 1996 
Housing, dearth of November 1996 
ANC centralisers December 1996 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED AS Pub. date 
REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
Angola, role as peace broker January 1997 
Bombings, Boer Attack Troops, member's rearrest January 1997 
Political crimes, amnesty extensions January 1997 
Servant/employer relationship post apartheid January 1997 
Syria, arms sales January 1997 
Syria, US objection to weapon sales January 1997 
Biko, Steve, killers' amnesty plea February 1997 
Biko, Steve, murder confessions February 1997 
Brewing industry, challenge to industry giant February 1997 
Cape Town, focus of white migration February 1997 
Police, Lifeline project February 1997 
Political parties, potential opposition alliances February 1997 
Black run business, growing success March 1997 
Advertising, political correctness March 1997 
Economic turnaround March 1997 
Economy, abolition of currency controls and regional trade barriers call March 1997 
Zulu nationalist march in Soweto March 1997 
Mandela and Mbeki April 1997 
Southern Africa: whose game parks? May 1997 
Politics, indestructible Winnie Mandela May 1997 
South African diplomacy May 1997 
Politics, Nats split May 1997 
South Africa's new policeman May 1997 
Southern Africa's economical revival June 1997 
AIDS, increase and prevention June 1997 
Exchange controls, possible liberalisation July 1977 
Gold-mining industry's decline July 1977 
Afrikaner's emigration to North Africa August 1997 
Botha, PW, marriage rumour August 1997 
Commission,Chris Rani's killers' amnesty appeal August 1997 
De Kl erk, FW, retirement from party politics August 1997 
De Kl erk, FW, resignation from politics August 1997 
Hani, Chris, murderers' amnesty appeal August 1997 
Olympic bid and racial differences August 1997 
Politics, manoeuvering to succeed the president August 1997 
Gold mining industry, need for overhaul August 1997 
McDonald's effort to enter market August 1997 
Madikizela-Mandela, Winnie, new allegations August 1997 
Insurance companies, stockmarket interests August 1997 
National Party, leadership appointment August 1997 
Society, crime prevention with economic growth August 1997 
Politics aid by racial South African party October 1997 
Apartheid men tell their story October 1997 
South Africa's wealth gap October 1997 
White South Africa awaits Mbeki November 1997 
The truth about Winnie Mandela November 1997 
A brave yet a troubled country December 1997 
Nelson Mandela is about to step down as leader of the ANC: editorial December 1997 
South Africa's new men December 1997 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS OVER THE PERIOD STUDIED AS Pub. date 
REPORTED IN THE ECONOMIST 
Sharing South Africa's wealth January 1998 
Truth Commission January 1998 
Politics, parliamentary yawn February 1998 
Toiling in the Cape's vineyards February 1998 
Local squander in South Africa February 1998 
Sport, South Africa's all white rugby April 1998 
Botha, PW, unrepented April1998 
South Africa's taxi wars May 1998 
White flight from South Africa June 1998 
APPENDIX2 
Shares selected from the Financial and Industrial sectors on the JSE to represent the 
FINDI30 (F & I Index) 
NUMBER OF 
SECTOR SHARES SHARE NAME JSECODE 
FINANCIAL 
Banks & financial services 8 BOE BOE 
FIDELITY FDL 
NEDCOR NED 
SAAMBOU SBO 
SAS FIN SFN 
STANBIC SBC 
ABSA ASA 
AD CORP ADR 
Insurance 7 CUSAF CUA 
FEDS URE FDS 
GUARDIAN GAR 
LIBERTY LLA 
METLIFE MET 
SANT AM SNT 
LIBERTY HOLD LBH 
Investment trusts I GENS A GBL 
Property 4 RMPPROP RMP 
AMAPROP ARO 
SABLE SBL 
MA WENZI RESOURCES MWZ 
Property trusts 3 CBDFUND CBD 
UMDONI UMN 
PRIMA PRM 
INDUSTRIAL 
Industrial holding 9 AMIC AMI 
AVI AVI 
CGSMITH HOLD CGS 
SAFREN SFR 
PLATEGL PGS 
DUNLOP DNL 
M&RHOLD MUR 
METKOR MTK 
CHARTER CHR 
Beverages, hotels & leisure 2 KERSAF KER 
SA BREWS SAB 
NUMBER OF 
SECTOR SHARES SHARE NAME JSECODE 
Building & construction 1 PP CEMENT PPC 
Chemicals & oil 3 SASOL SOL 
ENGEN EGN 
AECI AFE 
Electronics 1 POWTECH POW 
EncineerinlJ; 1 AFR OX AFX 
FOOD 6 HLH HLH 
I&J IRV 
TIG. OATS TIG 
TONGAAT TNT 
CGSMITH FOODS CSF 
CADSWEP CAS 
Furniture, household & 1 ELERINE ELH 
allied 
Motor 1 TOYOTA TOY 
Packaging & printing 1 NAMPAK NPK 
SAPP I SAP 
Steel & allied 1 HIVELD HVL 
Stores 6 PICK 'NPAY PIK 
WOOLTRU WLO 
MCCARTHY MCR 
SHOPRITE SHP 
EDGARS EDS 
PEP PEP 
APPENDIX3 
The 512 equations that were regressed for every time period in order to find the best 
subset LFM for that period using the Adjusted R2 statistic as the selection criterion 
EPFINIIND = BO 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ 
EPFINIIND = BO + B2 *RPDGOLD 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B3*RTSD 
EPFINIIND = BO + B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND =BO+ BS*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND = BO + B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND = BO+ B 1 *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO + B 1 *RPDJ +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bi*RPDGOLD +BS*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +BS*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND = BO +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT + B*RPCPI 
EPFINIIND = BO +BS*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +BS*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +BS*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl*RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND ~BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl*RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO +Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO + Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO + B 1 *RPDJ +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO + Bl *RPDJ +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO + B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIVD +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIVD +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIVD +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIVD +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO + B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO :t B2*RPDGOLD +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B2*RPDGOLD +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND = BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + RPPRVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B7*RPCRUDE + RPSACDl 
EPFINIIND =BO +Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl*RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO +Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl*RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B3*RTSD +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl*RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +Bi*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl*RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE +RPSACBl 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B5*RPIFDIV + RPSACBl +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFD~V +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO + B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B3*RTSD +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bi*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE +RPSACBl 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ B2*RPDGOLD +B7*RPCRUDE +RPSACBl +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE. +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE.+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL :+-B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B3*RTSD +B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPRPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIVD + B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIVD + B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIVD + B6*RPVOL +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIVD + B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIVD + B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIVD + B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPRPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB 1 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B6*RPVOL +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3 *RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACBI 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV +B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND =BO+ Bl *RPDJ + B2*RPDGOLD + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB I + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B I *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5°*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACBI 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACBI 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACBI + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACBI 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B3*RTSD + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACBI + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
' EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACBI + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACBI 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACBI + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD +B5*RPIFDIV+ B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B3*RTSD + B7*RPCR:UDE + B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + 8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B5*RPIFDIV B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV +''B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B4*RPINT + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B4*RPINT + B5*RPIFDIV + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B4*RPINT + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB1 + B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B5*RPIFDIV + B6*RPVOL + B7*RPCRUDE + B8*llJ>SACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B8*RPSACB 1 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4 *RP INT +B5 *RPIFDIV+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4*RPINT +B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1. 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2 *RPDGOLD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3 *RTSD+B4 *RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8 *RPS A CB 1 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINlIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL:!-B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+BI*RPDJ+B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+Bl*RPDJ+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4*RPINT +B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE +B8*RPSACB 1 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B2 *RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL+B7*RPORUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND =BO +B2*RPDGOLD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACBI+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINllND = BO+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBI+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBI+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACBI+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINllND = BO+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+ 
B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+ 
B6*RPVOL+B8*RPSACB 1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+ 
B6*RPVOL+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACBl+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINlIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B8*RPSACBI+B9*RPCPl2 , 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB I +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8 *RP SA CB 1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B8*RPSACB I +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
BS *RP SA CB I +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINlIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV,+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B l *RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8 *RPS A CB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL +B7*RPCRUDE + 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB 1 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2 *RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4*RPINT +B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE + 
B8 *RPS A CB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACBI+B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B4*RPINT +B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL + 
B7*RPCRUDE+B8*RPSACB1 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE+B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3 *RTSD+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPl2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B 1 *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE + 
B8*RPSACB1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+B7*RPCRUDE+ 
B8 *RPS A CB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
EPFINIIND = BO+Bl *RPDJ+B2*RPDGOLD+B3*RTSD+B4*RPINT+B5*RPIFDIV+B6*RPVOL+ 
B7*RPCRUDE + B8*RPSACB 1 +B9*RPCPI2 
APPENDIX4 
Risk factors included in the LFM chosen for meeting the highest Adjusted R2 criterion 
over the 120 month period 1 April 1988 to 31 March 1998 
Period DJ GOLD TSD INT IFDIVD VOL CRUDE SACO Bl CPI2 ADJR2 
1 ., ., ., ., .47 
2 ., ., ., ., .51 
3 ., ., ., ., .55 
4 ., ., ., ., ., ., .57 
5 ., ., ., ., ., ., .55 
6 ., ., ., ., .55 
7 ., ., ., ., .55 
8 ., ., ., ., .54 
9 ., ., ., ., .52 
10 ., ., ., ., .49 
11 ., ., ., ., .52 
12 ., ., ., ., .50 
13 ., ., ., ., .56 
14 ., ., ., ., .55 
15 ., ., ., .45 
16 ., ., ., .41 
17 ., ., .42 
18. ., ., ., .,{ .44 
19 ., ., .,{ ., .50 
20 .,{ ., ., ., .46 
21 ., .,{ .46 
22 ., ., ., .48 
23 .,{ ., ., .42 
24. ., ., ., .42 
25 ., .,{ .40 
26 ., ., ., ., ., .44 
27 .,{ ., ., ., ., .45 
28 ., ., .,{ ., .,{ .46 
29. ., ., ., .41 
30 ., .,{ .42 
31 ., ., ., .,{ .43 
32 ., ., ., .22 
33 ., ., .14 
Period DJ GOLD TSD INT IFDIVD VOL CRUDE SACOBl CPI2 ADJR2 
34 .r .r .13 
35 .r .r .10 
36 .r .r .11 
37 .r .r .15 
38 .r .r .16 
39 .r .r .r .r .16 
40 .r .r .15 
41 .r .r .17 
42 .r .r .14 
43 .r .r .r .14 
44 .r .15 
45. .r .r .r .16 
46 .r .r ./ .13 
47 .r ./ .r .08 
48 .r .r .r .13 
49 ./ .r .r .19 
50 .r .r ./ .18 
51 .r .r ./ .21 
52 .r ./ .r .18 
53 .r .r .r .17 
54 .r .r .r .14 
55 .r .r .r .12 
56 .r .r .15 
57 .r .r .18 
58 .r ./ .18 
59 .r .r .r .22 
60 .r .r .22 
61 .r .r ./ .20 
62 ./ .r .r ./ .18 
63 .r ./ .r .r .15 
64 .r .r .r .r .16 
65 .r .r .r .r .17 
66 .r .r .r ./ .10 
67 ./ ./ .r ./ .08 
68 .r .r .r .r .07 
69 .r .r .09 
70 .r ./ ./ .r .27 
71 .r .r ./ .r .37 
72 .r .r .r .31 
73 .r .r ./ .31 
Period DJ GOLD TSD INT IFDIVD VOL CRUDE SACOBl CPI2 ADJR2 
74 J ., ., J .25 
75 J J ., ., .25 
76 ., J J ., .28 
77 ., ., ., .25 
78 J ., ., ., ., .25 
79 ., J ., .20 
80 ., ., ., J ., ., .35 
81 ., ., ., ., ., J .29 
82 J ., ., ., .27 
83 ., J ., .23 
84 ., ., J .23 
85 J ., ., .23 
86 ., J ., .23 
87 ., ., ., .19 
88 ., ., ., .16 
89 ., J ., .15 
90 ., ., ., .13 
91 ., ., J .11 
92 J ., ., .10 
93 ., J ., .08 
94 ., J J .03 
95 J ., .07 
96 ., ., J ., .08 
97 ., ., ., .09 
98 J ., .09 
99 ., J J J J .08 
100 ., ., ., ., J .10 
101 ., ., ., ., ., .15 
102 ., J J J .09 
103 ., ., ., ., .08 
104 ., ., ., .09 
105 ., J J J ., .08 
106 ., ., ., .04 
107. ., ., .04 
108 J J J .02 
109 ., ., ., .03 
110 J .08 
111 ., J .08 
112 ., ., ., ., .13 
113 J ., ., ., .15 
Period DJ GOLD TSD INT IFDND VOL CRUDE SACOBl CPI2 ADJR2 
114. .r .r .r .r .16 
115 .r .r .r .r .r .r .13 
116 .r .r .r .r .r .20 
117 .r .r .r .r .r .r .41 
118 .r .r .r .r .r .r .44 
119 .r .r .r .r .r .42 
120 .r .r .r .r .r .r .r .52 
The regressors are unexpected changes in the rate of change of: DJ = Dow-Jones index, 
GOLD= Dollar gold price, TSD =Term structure of interest rates, INT= Three-month bankers' 
acceptance rate, IFDIV = Dividends, VOL = Volume of shares traded, CRUDE = Dollar Dubai 
crude oil spot price, SACOBI = SACOB Business confidence index lagged one month and 
CPI2 = Consumer price index lagged two months 
APPENDIX5 
The p-value of the risk factor co-efficients, in the best subset LFM for the 87 four-week 
periods from 20 October 1991 to 21 June 1998 
Period DJ GOLD TSD INT IFDIVD VOL CRUDE SACOB4 CPI8 ADJR2 
l .00 .01 .05 .00 .08 .15 
2 .00 .01 .07 .00 .06 .15 
3 .00 .03 .06 .00 .07 .14 
4 .00 .02 .04 .00 .04 .14 
5 .00 .02 .04 .09 .00 .04 .15 
6 .00 .05 .06 .10 .01 .08 .14 
7 .00 .09 .26 .15 .07 .01 .12 .13 
8 .00 .05 .07 .09 .00 .09 .13 
9 .00 .13 .06 .04 .02 .11 .15 
10 .00 .16 .12 .05 .04 .13 .15 
11 .00 .26 .08 .06 .07 .15 .15 
12 .00 .27 .06 .06 .07 .12 .17 
13 .00 .20 .03 .08 .08 .12 .17 
14 .00 .17 .02 .16 .08 .07 .18 
15 .00 .19 .22 .00 .09 .09 .19 
16 .00 .07 .24 .00 .07 .05 .30 .20 
17 .00 .04 .00 .04 .02 .31 .20 
18 .00 .11 .00 .02 .05 .33 .19 
19 .00 .24 .27 .00 .01 .08 .19 
20 .00 .29 .00 .01 .13 .19 
21 .00 .28 .35 .00 .02 .05 .19 
22 .00 .23 .00 .02 .08 .18 
23 .00 .23 .00 .03 .07 .18 
24 .00 .23 .00 .03 .09 .18 
25 .00 .26 .00 .02 .03 .20 
26 .00 .22 .00 .03 .25 .13 
27 .00 .13 .00 .02 .13 
28 .00 .13 .00 .03 .14 
29 .00 .15 .00 .01 .15 
30 .00 .13 .00 .01 .13 
31 .00 .14 .00 .01 .16 
Period DJ GOLD TSD INT IFDIVD VOL CRUDE SACOB4 CPI8 ADJR2 
32 .01 .16 .00 .01 .23 .14 
33 .01 .23 .00 .01 .20 .14 
34 .00 .18 .00 .00 .25 .17 
35 .00 .17 .00 .01 .13 .15 
36 .00 .20 .01 .02 .14 .13 
37 .00 .12 .21 .00 .01 .16 .16 
38 .00 .14 .31 .12 .00 .01 .19 .15 
39 .00 .15 .19 .10 .00 .01 .25 .16 
40 .00 .12 .09 .01 .02 .00 .19 .19 
41 .00 .09 .07 .01 .01 .00 .08 .21 
42 .00 .10 .09 .02 .00 .00 .05 .31 .20 
43 .00 .15 .09 .03 .00 .00 .05 .17 .21 
44 .00 .21 .14 .05 .00 .04 .05 .17 .16 
45 .00 .25 .20 .04 .00 .05 .09 .22 .15 
46 .00 .28 .18 .02 .00 .04 .11 .20 .15 
47 .00 .08 .02 .01 .03 .13 .18 .16 
48 .00 .09 .05 .02 .07 .17 .18 .15 
49 .00 .10 .04 .03 .07 .20 .18 .14 
50 .00 .26 .10 .ll .o7 .08 .28 .18 .12 
51 .00 .16 .03 .04 .08 .06 .26 .28 .12 
52 .00 .27 .01 .03 .19 .05 .31 .ll 
53 .00 .00 .02 .21 .02 .27 .13 
54 .00 .00 .02 .29 .02 .19 .13 
55 .00 .00 .03 .31 .02 .19 .13 
56 .00 .00 .02 .24 .04 .13 .13 
57 .00 .00 .02 .27 .02 .12 .14 
58 .00 .00 .01 .01 .08 .13 
59 .00 .00 .01 .01 .04 .16 
60 .00 .28 .00 .01 .02 .04 .16 
61 .00 .00 .00 .01 .19 .17 
62 .00 .29 .00 .00 .02 .21 .24 .16 
63 .00 .17 .00 .00 .01 .24 .20 .17 
64 .00 .24 .00 .00 .03 .23 .20 .17 
65 .00 .00 .00 .02 .22 .20 .17 
66 .00 .00 .00 .04 .26 .22 .28 .17 
67 .00 .00 .00 .04 .28 .20 .28 .17 
68 .03 .17 .00 .00 .08 .21 .24 .14 
69 .01 .19 .00 .00 .12 .25 .28 .15 
70 .01 .27 .01 .00 .10 .27 .14 
71 .00 .00 .00 .07 .23 .17 
Period DJ GOLD TSD INT IFDIVD VOL CRUDE SACOB4 CPI8 ADJR2 
72 .00 .00 .00 .06 .24 .26 .18 
73 .02 .00 .00 .08 .25 .26 .15 
74 .00 .01 .00 .03 .19 
75 .00 .02 .00 .02 .21 
76 .01 .03 .00 .03 .16 
77 .00 .03 .00 .04 .16 
78 .00 .05 .00 .03 .17 
79 .00 .08 .00 .02 .16 
80 .00 .13 .00 .05 .15 
81 .00 .14 .00 .02 .30 .27 
82 .00 .24 .24 .00 .01 .27 
83 .00 .14 .17 .00 .04 .28 .29 
84 .00 .00 .00 .01 .15 .32 
85 .00 .02 .00 .02 .29 .05 .30 
86 .00 .00 .00 .04 .27 .05 .30 
87 .00 .00 .oo. .07 .27 .03 .33 
The regressors are unexpected changes in the rate of change of: DJ = Dow-Jones index, 
GOLD =Dollar gold price, TSD = Term structure ofinterest rates, INT = Three-month bankers' 
acceptance rate, IFDIV = Dividends, VOL = Volume of shares traded, CRUDE = Dollar Dubai 
crude oil spot price, SACOB4 = SACOB Business confidence index lagged four weeks and 
CPl8 = Consumer price index lagged eight weeks 
p-value is the probability that the risk factor is not priced. We regard a risk factor to be priced ifp<.05 
APPENDIX6 
Percentage of time a risk factor appears in the LFM during the three subperiods 
DJ GOLD TSD JNT 
PERIOD! 100% 69% 7% 41% 
PERIOD2 100% 51% 72% 93% 
PERIOD3 100% 45% 86% 100% 
AVERAGE 100% 55% 55% 78% 
VOL CRUDE SACOB4 CPI8 
PERIOD! 86% 86% 62% 0% 
PERIOD2 100% 93% 0% 34% 
PERIOD3 100% 38% 45% 41% 
AVERAGE 95% 72% 36% 25% 
The regressors are the unexpected rate of change of: DJ = Dow-Jones index, 
GOLD= Dollar gold price, TSD =Term structure of interest rates, INT= Three-month bankers' 
acceptance rate, IFDIV = Dividends, VOL = Volume of shares traded, CRUDE =Dollar Dubai 
crude oil spot price, SACOB4 = SACOB Business confidence index lagged four weeks, 
CPl8 = Consumer price index lagged eight weeks 
Period 1: 20 October 1991 to 9 January 1993 
Period 2: 10 January 1994 to 31March1996 
Period 3: 1 April 1996 to 21 June 1998 
IFDIV 
100% 
97% 
0% 
66% 
APPENDIX7 
Graphs showing the unique contribution of various risk factors to the overall 
explanatory power of the LFM, with nine risk factors, from 20 October 1991 to 21 
June 1998 
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APPENDIX8 
Risk premia p .. ) priced over each period from 20October1991to21June1998 in the APTM 
when the ITNLSUR and NJSLS approaches were used with both the Gauss and Marquardt minimisation techniques 
DOW-JONES GOLD DIVIDENDS 
OBS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
GAUSS MARO GAUSS MARO GAUSS MARO GAUSS MARO GAUSS MARO GAUSS MARO 
1 0.000 0.001 0.038 0.059 0.700 0.893 0.478 0.858 0.010 0.005 0.042 0.074 
2 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.013 0.108 0.156 0.957 0.660 0.016 0.003 0.012 0.028 
3 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.861 0.060 0.129 0.127 0.861 0.039 0.006 0.013 0.862 
4 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.063 0.153 0.768 0.706 0.197 0.148 0.259 0.778 
5 0.006 0.001 0.060 0.024 0.046 0.116 0.987 0.549 0.487 0.218 0.375 0.911 
6 0.000 0.005 0.093 0.059 0.166 0.508 0.512 0.815 0.891 0.630 0.877 0.488 
7 0.000 0.013 0.049 0.049 0.026 0.038 0.739 0.546 0.308 0.447 0.298 0.098 
8 0.000 0.004 0.023 0.020 0.185 0.363 0.972 0.706 0.905 0.681 0.853 0.632 
9 0.000 0.003 0.053 0.089 0.188 0.539 0.660 0.659 0.699 0.871 0.950 0.285 
10 0.008 0.385 0.167 0.273 0.062 0.288 0.867 0.347 0.689 0.636 0.894 0.310 
11 0.009 0.224 0.103 0.095 0.016 0.061 0.450 0.136 0.577 0.766 0.511 0.244 
12 0.007 0.040 0.060 0.041 0.012 0.049 0.300 0.124 0.586 0.909 0.423 0.270 
13 0.008 0.234 0.025 0.012 0.011 0.039 0.104 0.051 0.299 0.324 0.253 0.155 
14 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.038 0.025 0.263 0.448 0.131 0.089 
15 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.601 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.021 0.465 0.990 0.070 0.944 
16 0.387 0.969 0.011 0.255 0.013 0.036 0.116 0.019 0.024 0.088 0.051 0.004 
17 0.049 0.148 0.008 0.066 0.026 0.037 0.192 0.146 0.008 0.035 0.020 0.001 
18 0.001 0.990 0.001 0.000 0.099 0.990 0.153 0.431 0.002 0.990 0.009 0.008 
19 0.056 0.105 0.988 0.107 0.009 0.065 0.988 0.101 0.236 0.122 0.988 0.140 
20 n/c 0.000 0.993 0.000 n/c n/c 0.000 0.993 0.000 
21 0.269 0.143 0.987 0.115 0.925 0.534 0.987 0.813 0.219 0.052 0.987 0.097 
22 0.055 0.234 0.080 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.064 0.010 
23 0.019 0.051 0.065 0.008 0.335 0.050 0.116 0.063 
DOW-JONES GOLD DIVIDENDS 
OBS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
24 0.018 0.910 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.012 0.105 
25 0.037 0.500 0.006 0.003 0.190 0.000 0.871 0.942 
26 0.037 0.916 0.305 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.991 0.052 
27 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.027 0.019 
28 0.160 0.443 0.057 0.028 0.002 0.003 0.065 0.040 
29 0.000 0.017 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.048 0.047 
30 0.002 0.006 0.277 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.244 0.020 
31 0.000 0.012 0.068 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.137 0.054 
32 0.001 0.003 0.978 0.055 0.096 0.011 0.978 0.341 
33 n/c 0.004 0.000 0.000 n/c 0.006 0.018 0.036 
34 n/c 0.001 0.089 0.840 n/c n/c 0.300 0.273 0.841 
35 0.296 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.418 0.173 0.212 0.042 0.381 0.254 0.308 0.119 
36 n/c 0.001 0.147 0.000 n/c 0.116 0.233 0.023 n/c 0.234 0.255 0.116 
37 n/c 0.882 0.759 0.491 n/c 0.887 0.763 0.548 n/c 0.881 0.758 0.498 
38 0.168 0.224 0.226 0.072 0.764 0.773 0.411 0.461 0.252 0.262 0.258 0.112 
39 n/c 0.000 0.019 0.030 n/c 0.622 0.022 0.008 n/c 0.052 0.140 0.339 
40 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.135 0.052 0.085 0.039 0.018 0.049 0.122 0.256 0.813 
41 n/c 0.000 0.117 0.003 n/c 0.319 0.132 0.082 n/c 0.031 0.138 0.033 
42 0.138 0.939 0.178 0.672 0.727 0.967 0.862 0.545 0.526 0.973 0.652 0.496 
43 0.279 0.018 0.739 0.750 0.937 0.177 0.749 0.759 0.358 0.222 0.751 0.758 
44 n/c 0.018 0.984 0.019 n/c 0.289 0.984 0.148 n/c 0.101 0.984 0.142 
45 n/c 0.000 0.651 0.697 n/c 0.894 0.708 0.739 n/c 0.004 0.667 0.706 
46 n/c 0.000 0.728 0.728 n/c 0.525 0.741 0.740 n/c 0.019 0.735 0.734 
47 0.683 0.069 0.321 0.241 0.457 0.261 0.986 0.513 
48 0.018 0.015 0.219 0.101 0.024 0.024 0.919 0.310 
49 0.020 0.026 0.426 0.280 0.016 0.023 0.565 0.924 
50 0.080 0.104 0.188 0.187 0.126 0.130 0.617 0.270 0.130 0.201 0.570 0.345 
51 0.047 0.049 0.693 0.732 0.185 0.183 0.259 0.270 0.067 0.082 0.497 0.507 
52 0.188 0.045 0.451 0.385 0.428 0.328 0.067 0.039 0.227 0.113 0.058 0.033 
53 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.036 0.000 0.001 
54 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.161 0.480 0.176 0.037 0.440 
DOW-JONES GOLD DIVIDENDS 
OBS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
55 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.576 0.015 0.077 
56 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.022 0.318 0.099 0.089 
57 0.043 0.123 0.001 0.771 0.458 0.001 0.008 0.006 
58 0.056 0.121 0.047 0.770 
59 0.045 0.039 0.033 0.048 
60 0.062 0.187 0.747 0.522 0.134 0.775 0.447 0.357 
61 0.073 0.419 0.036 0.010 
62 0.087 0.111 0.719 0.922 0.243 0.369 0.137 0.091 
63 0.065 0.257 0.631 0.784 0.037 0.036 0.018 0.014 
64 0.076 0.040 0.267 0.457 0.024 0.059 0.063 0.672 
65 0.097 0.262 0.556 0.408 
66 0.048 0.102 0.021 0.038 
67 0.166 0.122 0.019 0.027 
68 0.283 0.005 0.142 0.000 0.266 0.018 0.153 0.015 
69 n/c 0.011 0.987 0.591 n/c 0.005 0.987 0.588 n/c 
70 n/c 0.009 0.995 0.680 n/c 0.045 0.995 0.686 n/c 
71 n/c 0.004 0.993 0.654 n/c n/c 
72 0.519 0.636 0.061 0.029 
73 0.593 0.429 0.104 0.137 
74 0.155 0.003 0.005 0.059 
75 0.291 0.003 0.033 0.033 0.000 
76 0.183 0.005 0.060 0.059 0.000 
77 0.253 0.002 0.972 0.189 0.000 
78 0.110 0.991 0.033 0.030 0.991 
79 0.106 0.000 0.035 0.034 0.023 
80 0.022 0.311 0.007 0.007 0.784 
81 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.000 
82 0.190 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.254 0.000 0.097 0.000 
83 0.089 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.175 0.000 0.127 0.127 
84 n/c 0.002 0.991 0.001 n/c 0.000 0.991 0.000 n/c 
85 n/c 0.991 0.992 0.053 n/c 0.991 0.992 0.000 n/c 
DOW-JONES GOLD DIVIDENDS 
OBS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
86 0.048 0.000 0.749 0.052 0.015 0.023 0.798 0.153 
87 0.251 0.311 0.084 0.081 0.934 0.784 0.961 0.948 
CRUDE OIL SA COB VOLUME 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARO 
1 0.001 0.004 0.022 0.037 0.416 0.350 0.294 0.239 
2 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.063 0.033 0.028 0.017 
3 0.056 0.719 0.138 0.862 0.244 0.001 0.000 0.863 
4 0.172 0.922 0.445 0.323 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 0.293 0.688 0.933 0.897 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 0.189 0.058 0.079 
6 0.472 0.348 0.382 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.174 0.295 0.148 0.093 
7 0.549 0.127 0.157 0.151 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.180 0.810 0.060 0.058 
8 0.309 0.520 0.379 0.238 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.233 0.108 0.073 
9 0.564 0.142 0.253 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.143 0.046 0.047 
10 0.126 0.200 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.006 
11 0.624 0.335 0.250 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.005 
12 0.718 0.409 0.253 0.184 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
13 0.258 0.131 0.196 0.147 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.006 
14 0.684 0.405 0.334 0.296 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 
15 0.953 0.602 0.524 0.677 0.001 0.002 0.052 0.010 
16 0.250 0.241 0.074 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.000 
17 0.335 0.155 0.151 0.027 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.013 0.019 0.001 
18 0.642 0.990 0.414 0.541 0.001 0.990 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.990 0.136 0.412 
19 0.160 0.212 0.988 0.807 0.007 0.057 0.988 0.086 
20 n/c 0.881 0.993 0.535 n/c n/c 0.000 0.993 0.001 
21 0.742 0.819 0.987 0.511 0.226 0.084 0.987 0.113 
22 0.197 0.130 0.954 0.266 0.001 0.004 0.066 0.007 
23 0.148 0.186 0.538 0.120 0.002 0.021 0.054 0.004 
24 0.295 0.997 0.448 0.072 0.001 0.047 0.002 0.001 
25 0.031 0.577 0.013 0.009 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.001 
26 0.001 0.033 0.001 0.000 0.268 0.227 0.982 0.092 
27 0.005 0.025 0.004 0.006 
28 0.662 0.381 0.097 0.071 
29 0.050 0.020 0.018 0.024 
30 0.663 0.213 0.017 0.227 
31 0.886 0.006 0.132 0.074 
CRUDE OIL SAC OB VOLUME 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
32 0.000 0.000 0.979 0.051 0.518 0.316 0.978 0.110 
33 n/c 0.002 0.006 0.019 n/c 0.112 0.661 0.236 
34 n/c 0.929 0.143 0.854 n/c 0.100 0.066 0.842 
35 0.605 0.721 0.101 0.330 0.342 0.077 0.038 0.000 
36 n/c 0.866 0.404 0.989 n/c 0.092 0.136 0.000 
37 n/c 0.876 0.906 0.889 n/c 0.917 0.763 0.517 
38 0.338 0.344 0.561 0.280 0.968 0.847 0.288 0.161 
39 n/c 0.740 0.033 0.008 n/c 0.692 0.022 0.013 
40 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.002 0.890 0.377 0.018 0.073 
41 n/c 0.493 0.126 0.505 n/c 0.335 0.113 0.000 
42 0.668 0.976 0.894 0.550 0.964 0.973 0.135 0.398 
43 0.716 0.074 0.762 0.772 0.872 0.568 0.786 0.782 
44 n/c 0.157 0.984 0.237 n/c n/c 0.639 0.986 0.894 
45 n/c 0.149 0.720 0.749 n/c n/c 0.818 0.866 0.974 
46 n/c 0.098 0.771 0.771 n/c n/c 0.466 0.902 0.902 
47 0.835 0.605 0.725 0.773 0.701 0.638 0.468 0.477 
48 0.072 0.047 0.815 0.794 0.704 0.447 0.532 0.640 
49 0.239 0.240 0.960 0.991 0.481 0.754 0.346 0.433 
50 0.137 0.134 0.791 0.566 0.245 0.399 0.297 0.283 
51 0.077 0.078 0.317 0.335 0.287 0.467 0.712 0.725 
52 0.186 0.057 0.079 0.048 0.768 0.928 0.757 0.934 
53 0.015 0.010 0.071 0.039 0.678 0.928 0.012 0.015 
54 0.001 0.002 0.063 0.014 0.258 0.888 0.778 0.166 
55 0.000 0.000 0.315 0.091 0.061 0.119 0.729 0.335 
56 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.298 0.929 0.481 0.019 0.022 
57 0.004 0.000 0.030 0.003 0.072 0.015 0.022 0.019 
58 0.025 0.000 0.202 0.782 0.068 0.274 0.057 0.770 
59 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.054 0.040 0.006. 0.028 
60 0.027 0.001 0.067 0.042 0.042 0.105 0.074 0.060 
61 0.058 0.053 0.089 0.478 0.074 0.175 0.141 0.001 
62 0.048 0.021 0.028 0.015 0.024 0.017 0.038 0.022 
CRUDE OIL SAC OB VOLUME 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
63 0.039 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.090 0.798 0.536 0.692 
64 0.041 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.127 0.852 0.236 0.005 
65 0.036 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.148 0.796 0.257 0.170 
66 0.042 0.125 0.097 0.114 0.092 0.078 0.001 0.001 0.217 0.383 0.182 0.209 
67 0.181 0.151 0.067 0.111 0.154 0.099 0.002 0.002 0.326 0.348 0.210 0.286 
68 0.264 0.063 0.164 0.045 0.247 0.008 0.105 0.042 0.244 0.059 0.119 0.012 
69 n/c 0.013 0.987 0.601 n/c 0.004 0.987 0.606 n/c 0.013 0.987 0.597 
70 n/c n/c 0.001 0.995 0.690 n/c 0.006 0.995 0.680 
71 n/c n/c 0.011 0.993 0.667 n/c 0.003 0.993 0.655 
72 0.052 0.052 0.062 0.045 0.131 0.395 0.444 0.030 0.019 
73 0.035 0.035 0.061 0.013 0.008 0.169 0.183 0.040 0.162 
74 0.295 0.121 0.103 0.011 0.169 
75 0.425 0.888 0.391 0.390 
76 0.688 0.687 0.905 0.175 0.169 
77 0.899. 0.093 0.972 0.285 
78 0.991 0.385 0.991 0.024 0.023 
79 0.100 0.283 0.650 0.029 0.032 
80 0.116 0.104 0.020 0.006 0.006 
81 0.126 0.223 0.295 0.243 0.065 0.126 0.103 0.052 0.143 
82 0.603 0.888 0.298 0.450 
83 0.611 0.611 0.688 0.408 0.407 0.937 0.905 0.652 0.652 
84 n/c n/c n/c 0.093 0.991 0.271 
85 n/c n/c 0.991 0.992 0.000 n/c 0.991 0.992 0.745 
86 0.047 0.047 0.100 0.767 0.645 0.238 0.650 0.753 0.103 
87 0.241 0.241 0.116 0.254 0.259 0.025 0.020 0.028 0.029 
RMF/EMP INTEREST TERM. STRUCT. INTEREST 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
1 0.017 0.001 0.028 0.056 
2 0.044 0.001 0.033 0.028 
3 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.902 
4 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 0.126 0.001 0.001 0.000 
6 0.407 0.004 0.000 0.000 
7 0.067 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.061 0.026 0.447 0.395 
8 0.989 0.060 0.058 0.029 
9 0.115 0.001 0.000 0.000 
10 0.066 0.048 0.004 0.003 
11 0.116 0.036 0.044 0.030 
12 0.055 0.007 0.449 0.352 
13 0.118 0.126 0.826 0.901 
14 0.077 0.004 0.794 0.598 
15 0.001 0.000 0.778 0.723 0.904 0.391 0.532 0.740 
16 0.921 0.504 0.289 0.866 0.880 0.437 0.869 0.046 
17 0.950 0.165 0.267 0.633 
18 0.779 0.990 0.181 0.110 
19 0.099 0.069 0.988 0.435 0.244 0.379 0.988 0.257 
20 n/c 0.411 0.993 0.023 n/c n/c 
21 0.267 0.042 0.987 0.273 0.236 0.121 0.987 0.157 
22 0.018 0.000 0.240 0.633 0.001 0.003 0.078 0.016 
23 0.353 0.030 0.271 0.702 0.003 0.029 0.062 0.010 
24 0.172 0.000 0.753 0.547 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.001 
25 0.360 0.001 0.552 0.280 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.001 
26 0.073 0.000 0.009 0.012 0.000 0.006 0.643 0.127 
27 0.593 0.006 0.374 0.675 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.006 
28 0.014 0.003 0.403 0.639 0.002 0.017 0.069 0.041 
29 0.430 0.004 0.931 0.770 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.008 
30 0.398 0.012 0.000 0.820 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.010 
31 0.587 0.003 0.566 0.831 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.018 
RMF/EMP INTEREST TERM. STRUCT. INTEREST 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS. GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
32 0.668 0.095 0.978 0.596 0.000 0.000 0.978 0.055 
33 n/c 0.114 0.003 0.056 n/c 0.000 0.000 0.002 n/c 
34 n/c 0.000 0.023 0.856 n/c 0.204 0.617 0.837 n/c 
35 0.310 0.000 0.004 0.077 
36 n/c 0.000 0.060 0.210 n/c n/c 
37 n/c 0.882 0.822 0.880 n/c 0.881 0.817 0.868 n/c 
38 0.170 0.266 0.808 0.625 0.179 0.242 0.753 0.368 0.185 0.246 0.266 0.167 
39 n/c 0.000 0.003 0.001 n/c 0.159 0.006 0.001 n/c 0.004 0.174 0.317 
40 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.083 0.004 0.000 0.752 0.193 0.532 0.839 
41 n/c 0.000 0.113 0.645 n/c 0.137 0.342 0.920 n/c 0.011 0.188 0.057 
42 0.113 0.000 0.467 0.669 0.112 0.982 0.169 0.295 0.077 0.963 0.144 0.236 
43 0.103 0.468 0.826 0.830 0.071 0.183 0.765 0.791 0.045 0.001 0.737 0.748 
44 n/c 0.481 0.985 0.910 n/c 0.162 0.984 0.327 n/c 0.001 0.984 0.000 
45 n/c 0.043 0.843 0.828 n/c 0.337 0.663 0.712 n/c 0.001 0.648 0.697 
46 n/c 0.225 1.000 0.999 n/c 0.227 0.755 0.755 n/c 0.001 0.729 0.729 
47 0.406 0.647 0.143 0.217 0.379 0.123 0.262 0.502 0.319 0.000 0.127 0.242 
48 0.023 0.005 0.114 0.119 0.548 0.969 0.145 0.310 0.143 0.032 0.074 0.127 
49 0.025 0.011 0.455 0.549 0.492 0.788 0.181 0.348 0.757 0.375 0.103 0.199 
50 0.066 0.050 0.138 0.157 0.448 0.257 0.294 0.875 0.193 0.307 0.062 0.135 
51 0.058 0.031 0.959 0.962 0.104 0.087 0.584 0.623 0.142 0.114 0.086 0.087 
52 0.184 0.023 0.030 0.009 0.232 0.076 0.044 0.020 0.201 0.059 0.255 0.293 
53 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.233 0.094 0.003 0.003 0.035 0.017 0.598 0.693 
54 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.037 0.000 0.002 
55 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.000 
56 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.019 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.012 
57 0.037 0.047 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.161 0.001 0.062 
58 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.752 0.002 0.000 0.680 0.782 0.035 0.002 0.040 0.771 
59 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.008 0.555 0.308 
60 0.042 0.001 0.024 0.015 0.021 0.000 0.044 0.026 0.001 0.002 0.292 0.196 
61 0.035 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
62 0.143 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.037 0.027 0.062 
RMF/EMP INTEREST TERM. STRUCT. INTEREST 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS. GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
63 0.043 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.011 0.114 0.256 
64 0.031 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.341 0.045 0.164 0.467 0.270 
65 0.049 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.047 0.896 0.619 
66 0.039 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.155 0.089 0.052 0.057 0.113 0.018 0.010 
67 0.196 0.222 0.000 0.001 0.151 0.092 0.014 0.015 0.191 0.151 0.038 0.019 
68 0.299 0.003 0.057 0.281 0.232 0.015 0.087 0.046 0.255 0.000 0.129 0.003 
69 n/c 0.066 0.987 0.673 n/c 0.024 0.987 0.633 n/c 0.000 0.987 0.588 
70 n/c 0.028 0.995 0.717 n/c 0.019 0.995 0.706 n/c 0.000 0.995 0.682 
71 n/c 0.010 0.993 0.694 nlc 0.023 0.993 0.694 n/c 0.000 0.993 0.657 
72 0.000 0.011 0.066 0.096 0.015 0.003 0.222 0.215 0.024 0.047 0.751 0.533 
73 0.002 0.019 0.015 0.004 0.049 0.015 0.300 0.279 0.015 0.034 0.409 0.261 
74 0.077 0.687 0.468 0.200 0.021 0.072 0.040 0.191 0.017 0.001 0.002 0.023 
75 0.084 0.037 0.351 0.348 0.042 0.000 0.407 0.397 0.017 0.001 0.009 0.009 
76 0.087 0.098 0.199 0.200 0.051 0.000 0.208 0.191 0.031 0.002 0.023 0.023 
77 0.209 0.052 0.972 0.266 0.183 0.000 0.972 0.326 0.154 0.972 0.161 
78 0.085 0.991 0.251 0.285 0.056 0.991 0.698 0.568 0.018 0.006 0.006 
79 0.118 0.984 0.573 0.695 0.061 0.062 0.072 0.064 0.043 0.016 0.019 
80 0.252 0.179 0.921 0.941 0.022 0.511 0.074 0.076 0.004 0.002 0.002 
81 0.198 0.687 0.760 0.114 0.080 0.072 0.056 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
82 0.596 0.037 0.491 0.953 0.208 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.170 0.001 0.015 0.001 
83 0.806 0.098 0.620 0.619 0.114 0.000 0.024 0.023 0.085 0.002 0.008 0.007 
84 n/c 0.052 0.991 0.208 n/c 0.000 0.991 0.000 n/c 
85 n/c 0.991 0.992 0.491 n/c 0.991 0.992 0.000 n/c 
86 0.224 0.984 0.841 0.462 0.405 0.062 0.754 0.507 
87 0.579 0.179 0.694 0.688 0.119 0.511 0.874 0.862 
CPI CPI 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS GAUSS MARO GAUSS MARQ OBS GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
1 32 
2 33 n/c 
3 34 n/c 
4 35 
5 36 n/c 
6 37 n/c 
7 38 
8 39 n/c 
9 40 
10 41 n/c 
11 42 0.044 0.946 0.095 0.219 
12 43 0.021 0.000 0.736 0.748 
13 44 n/c 0.000 0.984 0.000 
14 45 n/c 0.051 0.644 0.694 
15 46 n/c 0.021 0.727 0.727 
16 47 0.285 0.000 0.090 0.215 
17 48 0.035 0.093 0.041 0.093 
18 49 0.013 0.019 0.057 0.154 
19 50 0.039 0.070 0.049 0.120 
20 n/c 51 0.089 0.127 0.064 0.066 
21 52 
22 53 
23 54 
24 55 
25 56 
26 57 
27 58 
28 59 
29 60 
30 61 
31 62 0.039 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CPI CPI 
ITNLSUR N3SLS ITNLSUR N3SLS 
OBS GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ OBS GAUSS MARQ GAUSS MARQ 
63 0.021 0.002 0.006 0.007 76 
64 0.034 0.002 0.008 0.000 77 0.535 
65 0.048 0.001 0.002 0.005 78 0.991 
66 0.029 0.104 0.005 0.017 79 0.000 
67 0.215 0.186 0.012 0.028 80 0.000 
68 81 
69 n/c 82 
70 n/c 83 
71 n/c 84 n/c 0.535 0.991 0.031 
72 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 85 n/c 0.991 0.992 0.000 
73 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 86 0.000 0.000 0.747 0.002 
74 87 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
75 
The regressors are unexpected changes in the rate of change of: DOW-JONES=Dow-Jones index, 
GOLD= Dollar gold price, TERM STRUCT. INTEREST= Tenn structure of interest rates, INTEREST= Three-month bankers 
acceptance rate, DIVIDENDS =Dividends paid by companies in the financial and industrial sector of the JSE, VOLUME = Volume of shares traded, CRUDE 
OIL= Dollar Dubai crude oil spot price, SACOB = SACOB Business Confidence Index lagged four weeks and 
CPI = Consumer price index lagged eight weeks ,RMF= Residual market factor, EMP= Excess market portfolio. 
p-value is the probability that the risk factor is not priced. We regard a risk factor to be priced if p<. 05 
n/c denotes no convergence. 
APPENDIX9 
Graphs of the standardised beta of nine risk factors appearing in the same LFM vs 
time from 20October1991to21June1998 (87 four-week periods) 
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